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Abstract
This dissertation presents three independent essays. Chapter 1, which is joint work
with Mira Frick, studies a model of innovation adoption by a large population of long-lived
consumers who face stochastic opportunities to adopt an innovation of uncertain quality. We
study how the potential for social learning in an economy affects consumers’ informational
incentives and how these in turn shape the aggregate adoption dynamics of an innovation.
For a class of Poisson learning processes, we establish the existence and uniqueness of
equilibria. In line with empirical ﬁndings, equilibrium adoption patterns are either S-shaped
or feature successions of concave bursts. In the former case, our analysis predicts a novel
saturation effect: Due to informational free-riding, increased opportunities for social learning
necessarily lead to temporary slow-downs in learning and do not produce welfare gains.
Chapter 2, which is joint work with Drew Fudenberg and Scott D. Kominers, extends
the folk theorem of repeated games to settings in which players’ information about others’
play arrives with stochastic lags. To prove the folk theorem, we construct equilibria in
“delayed-response strategies,” which ensure that players wait long enough to respond to
signals that with high probability all relevant signals are received before players respond.
To do so, we extend past work on private monitoring to obtain folk theorems despite the
small residual amount of private information.
Finally Chapter 3 demonstrates how uncertainty over patience can generate strong
reputation effects that are weak when the long-run player’s level of patience is common
knowledge. With uncertainty over patience, these strong reputation effects are the result
of a contagion effect initiated by very patient types: the most patient types have a strict
iiiincentive to play the beneﬁcial action in all equilibria which in turn incentivizes those with
smaller levels of patience to also play this action. Our main result shows that even when
very patient types are extremely small in probability, these contagion effects are very strong
so that types with intermediate levels of patience obtain high payoffs in all equilibria.
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xiIntroduction
This dissertation presents three independent essays. Chapter 1, which is joint work with
Mira Frick, studies a model of innovation adoption by a large population of long-lived
consumers that faces stochastic opportunities to adopt an innovation of uncertain quality.
Consumers are social learners: Over time, news about the product’s quality is generated
endogenously, based on the experiences of past adopters. We analyze how the potential
for social learning in an economy affects consumers’ informational incentives and how
these in turn shape the aggregate adoption dynamics of an innovation. Our main results
highlight the importance of two features of the economy: The extent to which consumers
are forward-looking and the nature of news events through which social learning occurs.
When consumers are forward-looking social learners, the trade-off between the beneﬁt of
adopting the innovation at any given time and the option value of waiting for endogenous
news can generate rich aggregate adoption dynamics, even in the absence of any consumer
heterogeneity. The dynamics of this trade-off and the extent to which it is affected by
increased opportunities for social learning interact in interesting ways with the news process
of the economy. For a class of Poisson learning processes, we establish the existence and
uniqueness of equilibria. In line with empirical ﬁndings, equilibrium adoption patterns are
either S-shaped or feature successions of concave bursts. In the former case, our analysis
predicts a novel saturation effect: Due to informational free-riding, increased opportunities
for social learning necessarily lead to temporary slow-downs in learning and do not produce
welfare gains.
Chapter 2, which is joint work with Drew Fudenberg and Scott D. Kominers, extends
1the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players’ information about
others’ play arrives with stochastic lags. In our ﬁrst model, signals are almost-perfect if
and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect signal of
period-t play with some lag or else never sees a signal of period-t play. In the second model,
the information structure corresponds to a lagged form of imperfect public monitoring,
and players are allowed to communicate via cheap-talk messages at the end of each period.
In each case, we construct equilibria in “delayed-response strategies,” which ensure that
players wait long enough to respond to signals that with high probability all relevant signals
are received before players respond. To do so, we extend past work on private monitoring
to obtain folk theorems despite the small residual amount of private information.
Finally Chapter 3 demonstrates how uncertainty over patience can generate strong
reputation effects that are unavailable when the long-run player’s level of patience is
common knowledge. With uncertainty over patience, these strong reputation effects are the
result of a contagion effect initiated by very patient types: the most patient types have a
strict incentive to play the beneﬁcial action in all equilibria which in turn incentivizes those
with smaller levels of patience to also play this action. Our main result shows that even
when very patient types are extremely small in probability, these contagion effects are very
strong so that types with intermediate levels of patience obtain high payoffs in all equilibria.
2Chapter 1
Innovation Adoption by
Forward-Looking Social Learners1
1.1 Introduction
Suppose an innovation of uncertain quality, such as a novel medical treatment or a new
piece of software, is released into the market. In recent years, the rise of internet-based
review sites, retail platforms, search engines, video-sharing websites, and social networking
sites (such as Yelp, Amazon, Google, YouTube, and Facebook) has greatly increased the
potential for social learning about the innovation: An individual’s treatment success story
or discovery of a bug in the software is much more likely to ﬁnd its way into the public
domain; and there are more people than ever who have access to this common pool of
consumer-generated information.
We analyze how the potential for social learning in an economy affects consumers’
informational incentives and how these in turn shape the aggregate adoption dynamics of
an innovation. Our main results highlight the importance of two features of the economy:
The extent to which consumers are forward-looking and the nature of news events through
which social learning occurs. In choosing whether to adopt an innovation, forward-looking
1Co-authored with Mira Frick.
3consumers recognize the option value of waiting for more information. With social learning,
information is created endogenously, based on the consumption experiences of past adopters.
In equilibrium, adoption levels must therefore strike a balance: If too many consumers
adopt at any given time, then too much information is available in the future and all
consumers would rather wait; conversely, if too few consumers adopt, it might not be
worthwhile for anyone to wait. We show that the dynamics of this trade-off and the extent
to which it is affected by increased opportunities for social learning depend crucially on
the kind of information consumers expect to acquire by waiting. In line with numerous
empirical ﬁndings, our analysis predicts adoption patterns that are either S-shaped or feature
successions of concave bursts, suggesting novel micro-foundations for these observations.
We also make new predictions regarding the impact of increased opportunities for social
learning on consumer welfare, on equilibrium learning dynamics, and on observed adoption
behavior.
In our model, an innovation of ﬁxed, but uncertain quality (better or worse than the
status quo) is introduced to a large population of forward-looking consumers. Consumers
are (ex ante) identical, sharing the same prior about the quality of the innovation, the same
discount rate, and the same tastes for good and bad quality. At each instant in continuous
time, consumers receive stochastic opportunities to adopt the innovation. A consumer who
receives an opportunity must choose whether to irreversibly adopt the innovation or to
delay his decision until the next opportunity. In equilibrium, consumers optimally trade off
the opportunity cost of delays against the beneﬁt to learning more about the quality of the
innovation.
Learning about the innovation is summarized by a public signal process, representing
news that is obtained endogenously—based on the experiences of previous adopters; and
possibly also from exogenous sources, such as professional critics or government watchdog
agencies. Formally, we employ a variation of the Poisson learning models pioneered by
Keller et al. (2005), Keller and Rady (2010), and Keller and Rady (2013). As in these models,
our analysis distinguishes between bad news markets, in which signal arrivals (breakdowns)
4indicate bad quality and the absence of signals makes consumers more optimistic about the
innovation; and good news markets, in which signal arrivals (breakthroughs) suggest good
quality and the absence of signals makes consumers more pessimistic. To capture social
learning, we assume that the informativeness of signals is increasing in the number of
previous adopters.
The automobile industry is an example of a market in which learning is predominantly
via bad news events, as evidenced by the wide-spread social media coverage of a battery ﬁre
in a Tesla Model S electric car in October 2013 or of the 2009-2011 Toyota vehicle recalls. By
contrast, in the market for (essentially side-effect free) herbal remedies or other alternative
medical treatments, learning is mostly via good news: Occasional reports of success stories
boost consumers’ conﬁdence in a treatment, while consumers grow more skeptical of its
effectiveness in the absence of any such reports.2
The heart of our paper, Sections 1.5 and 1.6, analyzes and contrasts equilibrium adoption
behavior in bad and good news markets. For tractability, we focus on perfect bad (respec-
tively good) news environments, in which a single signal arrival conclusively indicates bad
(respectively good) quality, so that equilibrium dynamics are non-trivial only in the absence
of signals. A key insight facilitating our analysis is that consumers’ equilibrium incentives
across time must satisfy a quasi-single crossing property (Theorem 1.4.1): Absent signals,
there can be at most one transition from strict preference for adoption to strict preference
for waiting, or vice versa, with a possible period of indifference in between. This enables
us to establish the existence of unique3 equilibria. Equilibrium adoption dynamics admit
simple closed-form descriptions which are Markovian in current beliefs and in the mass of
consumers who have not yet adopted.
Section 1.5 studies the perfect bad news case. In the absence of breakdowns, consumers
grow increasingly optimistic about the innovation over time. As a result of the single-crossing
2Cf. Board and Meyer–ter–Vehn (2013) and MacLeod (2007) for additional examples of bad news and good
news markets.
3Uniqueness is in terms of aggregate adoption behavior.
5property, the unique equilibrium is then characterized by two times 0  t⇤
1  t⇤
2, which
depend on the fundamentals (Theorem 1.5.1): Until time t⇤
1, no adoption takes place and
consumers acquire information only from exogenous sources; from time t⇤
2 on, all consumers
adopt immediately when given a chance, unless a breakdown occurs, in which case adoption
comes to a permanent standstill. If t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then throughout [t⇤
1,t⇤
2) only some consumers
adopt whenever given a chance, with the ﬂow of new adopters uniquely determined by an
ODE that guarantees consumers’ indifference between adopting and delaying throughout
this interval. Given that consumers are forward-looking, t⇤
1 < t⇤
2 occurs in economies with a
sufﬁciently large potential for social learning and not too optimistic consumers (by contrast,
if consumers are myopic or if there are no possibilities for social learning, then necessarily
t⇤
1 = t⇤
2).
We highlight two key implications for aggregate adoption dynamics and consumer
welfare:
First, provided t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, the innovation’s adoption curve (which plots the percentage of
adopters in the population against time) has the characteristic S-shaped growth pattern that
has been widely observed in empirical studies:4 Up to time t⇤
1 adoption is ﬂat, on [t⇤
1,t⇤
2)
adoption levels increase convexly, and from time t⇤
2 there is a concave increase. Moreover, an
increase in the potential for social learning prolongs the period of convex growth and leads
to strictly lower expected adoption levels across time. The possibility of S-shaped adoption
curves in our model is notable because we assume consumers to be (ex ante) identical,
whereas most alternative explanations in the literature rely on speciﬁc distributions of
consumer heterogeneity to generate a region of convex growth. In our model, convex
growth is driven by informational incentives: As consumers grow increasingly optimistic,
their opportunity cost to delaying goes up. To maintain indifference between adopting and
delaying throughout [t⇤
1,t⇤
2), this increase is offset by an increase in the ﬂow of new adopters,
which raises the odds that waiting will produce information allowing consumers to avoid a
4See, for example, Griliches (1957), Mansﬁeld (1961), Mansﬁeld (1968), Davies (1979), and Gort and Klepper
(1982), among many others.
6bad innovation.
Second, we predict a saturation effect: If the potential for social learning is great enough
that t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then holding ﬁxed other fundamentals, any additional increase in opportunities
for social learning has no impact at all on (ex ante) equilibrium welfare levels. This is in
stark contrast to the cooperative benchmark in which consumers coordinate on socially
optimal adoption levels: Here increased opportunities for social learning are always strictly
beneﬁcial and can in fact be used to approximate ﬁrst-best (complete information) payoffs
in the limit. Relative to the cooperative benchmark, equilibrium adoption behavior displays
two inefﬁciencies: First, adoption generally begins too late; second, once adoption begins it
initially occurs at an inefﬁciently low rate, because during [t⇤
1,t⇤
2) consumers who do not
adopt when given a chance effectively free-ride on the information generated by consumers
who do adopt. Increased opportunities for social learning exacerbate the second inefﬁciency
by prolonging the period of free-riding. As a result, greater opportunities for social learning
do not translate into uniformly faster learning about the quality of the innovation, but rather
lead to strictly slower learning over some periods and faster learning over others. These two
effects balance out to produce the saturation effect. In Section 1.7, we further build on this
non-monotonicity in the speed of learning to construct an example involving consumers
with heterogeneous discount rates, where increased opportunities for social learning are not
only not beneﬁcial, but in fact strictly hurt aggregate welfare.
In Section 1.6 we study learning via perfect good news. Here consumers grow in-
creasingly pessimistic about the innovation in the absence of breakthroughs. Hence, the
single-crossing property for equilibrium incentives implies adoption up to some time t⇤
(which depends on the fundamentals) and no adoption from t⇤ on, unless there is a break-
through, after which all consumers adopt upon their ﬁrst opportunity (Theorem 1.6.1).
Interestingly, in contrast with the perfect bad news case, equilibrium adoption behavior is
all-or-nothing: Regardless of the potential for social learning, there are no periods during
which only some consumers adopt when given a chance. This highlights a fundamental
way in which the nature of information transmission in an economy affects consumers’
7adoption incentives. During a period of time when, absent signals, a consumer is prepared
to adopt the innovation, he will be willing to delay his decision only if he expects to acquire
decision-relevant information in the meantime: Since originally he is prepared to adopt the
innovation, such information must make him strictly prefer not to adopt. When learning
is via bad news, breakdowns have this effect, since they reveal the innovation to be bad.
By contrast, breakthroughs in the perfect good news environment conclusively reveal the
innovation to be good and hence cannot be decision-relevant to a consumer who is already
willing to adopt.
The all-or-nothing nature of the good news equilibrium has the following implications
for adoption dynamics and welfare:
First, adoption occurs in concave “bursts”: Up to time t⇤ adoption levels increase
concavely, then adoption ﬂattens out, possibly followed by another region of concave growth
if a breakthrough occurs. While less commonly observed than S-shaped growth, this pattern
is reminiscent of the “fast-break” product life cycles studied in the marketing literature5,
with movies, music, and other “leisure-enhancing” products as canonical examples.6 We
predict that increased opportunities for social learning bring forward t⇤, compressing the
initial period of concave growth, but do not affect the probability of adoption picking up
again after coming to a temporary standstill.
Second, even in economies with rich opportunities for social learning, an increase in the
potential for social learning is (essentially) always strictly beneﬁcial and speeds up learning
at all times. Nevertheless, equilibrium behavior is generally socially inefﬁcient: Relative
to the cooperative benchmark, adoption takes place at an optimal rate until time t⇤, but
consumers stop adopting too soon.
5Cf. Keillor (2007)
6For additional examples in the context of industrial process innovations, see Davies (1979).
81.1.1 Related Literature and Outline
Our paper proposes a model of innovation adoption by consumers who learn from each
other’s experiences and are forward-looking. Having a tractable model that can incorporate
these two assumptions, examine the informational externalities they give rise to, and derive
predictions for the effect of increased opportunities for social learning is desirable, as there
is considerable empirical evidence for both assumptions. For example, a growing literature
in development economics documents the effect of learning from others’ experiences on the
adoption of new agricultural technologies, as in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) or Conley and
Udry (2010). This literature also ﬁnds evidence for forward-looking behavior: Bandiera and
Rasul (2006) analyze the decision of farmers in Mozambique to adopt a new crop, sunﬂower.
They ﬁnd that farmers whose network of friends and family contains many adopters of the
new crop are less likely to initially adopt it themselves. Relatedly, Munshi (2004) compares
farmers’ willingness to experiment with new high-yield varieties (HYV) across rice and
wheat growing areas in India. Farmers in rice growing regions, which compared with wheat
growing regions display greater heterogeneity in growing conditions that make learning
from others’ experiences less feasible, are found to be more likely to experiment with HYV
than farmers in wheat growing areas.
At a theoretical level, the key feature of our model is that social learning and forward-
looking incentives jointly give rise to informational externalities that do not arise in the
absence of either assumption. In relation to existing models of innovation adoption, this has
at least two interesting implications.
First, many models of innovation adoption rely on consumer heterogeneity as a key
ingredient in ﬁtting observed adoption data. Our analysis suggests that in existing learning-
based models7 heterogeneity is only crucial because of the common assumption that either
consumers are forward-looking but news is generated purely exogenously, as in Jensen
(1982), or that learning is social but consumers are myopic, as in Young (2009) or Ellison
7For comprehensive surveys of the literature, including also non-learning based explanations of innovation
adoption, such as the epidemic model and the probit model of ﬁrm characteristics, see for example Geroski
(2000) and Baptista (1999).
9and Fudenberg (1993):8 In either case, a population of identical consumers would behave
according to a simple cutoff rule, adopting the innovation at beliefs above a certain threshold
and not adopting otherwise, and this rules out convex growth in adoption levels.9 By
contrast, in our model consumers are assumed to be ex ante identical, but the combination
of forward-looking behavior and social learning allows us to provide an alternative micro-
foundation for convex growth in terms of purely informational incentives.
The literature also commonly appeals to variations in consumer heterogeneity in order to
explain qualitative differences in adoption patterns across different products. For example,
in his study of the diffusion of 22 post-war industrial process innovations in the UK,
Davies (1979) uses symmetrical logistic distributions to ﬁt the S-shaped adoption patterns
characteristic of expensive and complex innovations, but lognormal distributions to ﬁt the
rapid, essentially concave growth in adoption levels he observes for less expensive and
simpler innovations. Again, our analysis shows that when consumers are forward-looking
social learners, these contrasting patterns can instead be explained through differences in
the informational environment: S-shaped curves arise in bad news markets with a relatively
large potential for social learning, while concave adoption patterns are characteristic of
good news markets (or of bad news markets with little potential for social learning or with
very optimistic consumers). Our focus on the role of the market learning process in shaping
consumers’ informational incentives and generating varied aggregate adoption dynamics is
8Two exceptions are Persons and Warther (1997) and Kapur (1995), who feature a form of forward-looking
social learning, but differ substantially from our paper in terms of both setup and focus. Persons and Warther
(1997) focuses on the combination of forward-looking incentives, endogenously generated news, and ﬁrm
heterogeneity to provide rational foundations for seemingly irrational, fad-like patterns in the adoption of
ﬁnancial innovations. In Kapur (1995), a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms engage in a sequence of waiting contests to
adopt a new technology, with each contest ending once a ﬁrm adopts. Restricting to MPE, he ﬁnds that if more
information is revealed when more ﬁrms adopt during a given waiting contest, then the mean duration of
waiting contests shrinks over time, suggesting a crude approximation of convex diffusion. Since both models
are set in discrete time, they are less tractable and not suited to performing comparative statics analyses with
respect to the potential for social learning in an economy. In addition, discrete time is less suited to highlighting
the role of the market learning process in shaping aggregate adoption dynamics, because when the information
process is sufﬁciently informative relative to the period length, adoption behavior is qualitatively similar across
many news processes. By contrast, when the period length becomes short as in our continuous time model,
differences become transparent.
9Adoption patterns can exhibit concave growth simply as a result of gradual depletion of the population of
remaining consumers.
10similar in spirit to Board and Meyer–ter–Vehn (2013), who in the context of a capital-theoretic
model of quality and reputation, highlight the dependence of ﬁrms’ reputational incentives
on the news process and contrast reputational dynamics across different markets.
Second, in addition to providing an alternative explanation for observed data, the
informational externalities that arise from the interaction between forward-looking behavior
and endogenously generated information are important because they suggest caution in
evaluating the effect of increased opportunities for social learning. In contrast to existing
models, we predict that increased opportunities for social learning need not produce welfare
gains and may lead to a temporary slowdown in learning and a strict decline in initial
adoption levels. On the other hand, if learning is modeled as purely exogenous or consumers
are assumed to be myopic, then increased opportunities for social learning necessarily speed
up learning and are unambiguously welfare-improving.
The techniques and framework of this paper are closest to those employed in the strategic
experimentation literature, e.g. Bolton and Harris (1999), Keller et al. (2005), Keller and
Rady (2010), and Keller and Rady (2013). However, our paper differs in two key respects:
First, in our model any individual consumer’s inﬂuence on the information seen by others
is negligible; second, adoption of the innovation is irreversible. The ﬁrst assumption is
natural in the context of the large market applications we have in mind, and for many
new products (for example movies or books, for which consumption is usually a one-
time event, or technologies that entail large switching costs) irreversibility is also more
reasonable than the possibility of consumers continuously switching back and forth between
the innovation and the status quo as in the strategic experimentation literature.10 In the
strategic experimentation literature, consumers’ direct inﬂuence on opponents’ information
and their ability to adjust their experimentation levels as a function of beliefs produces the
so-called encouragement effect: There is an incentive to increase current experimentation in
10Moreover, if consumers could continuously switch back and forth between the two options, then under the
large market assumption, consumers’ equilibrium strategies would effectively reduce to myopic best response
with respect to beliefs.
11order to drive up beliefs and induce more future experimentation by others.11 As a result
of the encouragement effect, many comparative statics in those models differ substantially:
For example, an increase in the rate of information transmission may cause consumers
to begin to adopt earlier, whereas in our model, we observe that initially adoption rates
always weakly decrease in response to such a change. Without the encouragement effect, we
are more easily able to study comparative statics on adoption behavior, speed of learning,
and welfare with respect to changes in the social learning environment. Moreover, we
obtain equilibrium uniqueness (at the aggregate level) without any Markovian restriction
on strategies.
A number of papers, including Rosenberg et al. (2007), Chamley and Gale (1994), and
Murto and Välimäki (2011), also study the impact of informational externalities on adoption,
investment, or exit behavior, but rely on the assumption that agents hold private information.
Notably, Chamley and Gale (1994) obtain a result somewhat resembling our saturation
effect, according to which in the limit, an increase in the number of players has no effect on
the rate of investment or ﬂow of information. In the context of a two-armed bandit problem
in which the decision to switch to the safe arm is irreversible, Rosenberg et al. (2007) obtain
a similar uniqueness result to ours in the limit as the number of players becomes large.
However, the speciﬁcs of all these models differ substantially from ours, as agents obtain
private information and make inferences about the quality of the product by observing
others’ actions, while in our model all relevant news is public and actions do not reveal
additional information.
Finally, Bergemann and Välimäki (1997) and Bergemann and Välimäki (2000) study inno-
vation adoption in the presence of pricing motives by sellers when learning is social. In these
papers, prices that dynamically adjust through time act as an additional instrument through
which the seller can affect the endogenous information generation process. Bergemann and
Välimäki (1997) study a model in which one established ﬁrm (with known technology) and
11There is no encouragement effect in the perfect good news environment of Keller et al. (2005), but consumers’
ability to inﬂuence each other’s beliefs as well as the reversibility of experimentation are once again crucial in
generating asymmetric switching equilibria, in which consumers take turns in experimenting at different beliefs.
12a new ﬁrm with a risky innovation compete through prices. They derive the Markov perfect
equilibrium pricing strategies and adoption behavior and demonstrate that adoption is too
fast (relative to the social optimum) when consumers are pessimistic and too slow when
consumers are optimistic. The main difference with our paper is that consumers in their
model best respond myopically at each point in time, so that adoption dynamics are driven
purely by sellers’ informational and pricing motives. By contrast, in our model consumers
are more sophisticated and consider the option value to waiting, producing interesting
adoption dynamics even in the absence of pricing motives.12 Bergemann and Välimäki
(2000) analyze a similar model in which consumers display forward-looking behavior. As in
Bergemann and Välimäki (1997), they ﬁnd that pricing motives cause experimentation to be
excessive, which is in contrast to our ﬁnding that in the absence of pricing motives there
is too little (and, under perfect bad news, too slow) adoption. They ﬁnd additionally that
when the innovation is launched in many markets simultaneously, adoption rates become
socially optimal in the limit as the number of markets grows large. Much of the focus in our
paper is on analyzing the effect of increased opportunities for social learning on consumers’
informational incentives. In order to isolate the effect on the consumer side, our baseline
model therefore abstracts away from pricing considerations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model, deﬁn-
ing formally the perfect bad news and perfect good news signal processes that we use
throughout the paper as well as the equilibrium concept. Section 1.3 analyzes the cooper-
ative (socially optimal) benchmark which selects an aggregate ﬂow of adoption so as to
maximize ex ante aggregate welfare. Section 1.4 establishes a quasi-single crossing property
for equilibrium incentives that simpliﬁes the equilibrium analysis in the following sections.
Section 1.5 establishes existence of a unique equilibrium under perfect bad news and studies
comparative statics with respect to changes in the potential for social learning. Section 1.6
performs the analogous exercise under perfect good news. Section 1.7 provides an example,
12The key distinction is again due to the assumption that adoption is irreversible in our model, so that
potentially adopting a bad product incurs a cost on consumers. On the other hand, in Bergemann and Välimäki
(1997), consumers adopt at every point in time and the adoption decision is freely reversible.
13involving consumers with heterogeneous discount rates, where an increase in the potential
for social learning strictly hurts ex ante welfare. Section 1.8 concludes. Appendix A.1 - A.9
contains proofs omitted from the main text.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 The Game
Time t 2 [0,+•) is continuous. At time t = 0, an innovation of unknown quality q 2{ G =
1,B =  1} and of unlimited supply is released to a continuum population of potential
consumers of mass ¯ N0 2 R+. Consumers are ex ante identical: They have a common prior
p0 2 (0,1) that q = G; they are forward-looking with common discount rate r > 0; and they
have the same actions and payoffs, as speciﬁed below.
At each time t, consumers receive stochastic opportunities to adopt the innovation.
Adoption opportunities are generated independently across consumers and across histories
according to a Poisson process with exogenous arrival rate r > 0.13 Upon an adoption
opportunity, a consumer must choose whether to adopt the innovation (at = 1) or to
wait (at = 0). If a consumer adopts, he receives an expected lump sum payoff of Et[q],
conditioned on information available up to time t, and drops out of the game. If the
consumer chooses to wait or does not receive an adoption opportunity at t, he receives a
ﬂow payoff of 0 until his next adoption opportunity, where he faces the same decision again.
1.2.2 Learning
Over time, consumers observe public signals that convey information about the quality of
the innovation. To capture the idea of social learning, the informativeness of the public
signal at time t is increasing in the ﬂow Nt of consumers newly adopting the innovation at
t, which we deﬁne more precisely in Section 1.2.3.
13Stochasticity of adoption opportunities can be seen as capturing the natural assumption that consumers
face cognitive and time constraints, making it impossible for them to ponder the decision whether or not to
adopt the innovation at every instant in continuous time.
14Formally, we employ a variation of the Poisson learning model pioneered by Keller
et al. (2005), Keller and Rady (2010), and Keller and Rady (2013).14 Conditional on quality
q, public signals arrive according to an inhomogeneous Poisson process with arrival rate
(#q +lqNt)dt, where lq > 0 and #q   0 are exogenous parameters that depend on the quality
q of the innovation. The signal process summarizes news events that are generated from two
sources. First, the social learning term lNt represents news generated endogenously, based
on the experiences of other consumers: It captures the idea of a ﬂow Nt of new adopters
each generating signals at rate ldt.15 Thus, the greater the ﬂow of consumers adopting the
innovation at t, the more likely it is for a signal to arrive at t, and hence the absence of a
signal at t is more informative the larger Nt. Second, we also allow for (but do not require)
signals to arrive at a ﬁxed exogenous rate #dt, which represents information generated
independently of consumers’ behavior, for example by professional critics or government
watchdog agencies.
For tractability, we focus on learning via perfect Poisson processes, where a single signal
provides conclusive evidence of the quality of the innovation. Learning is via perfect bad
news if #G = lG = 0 and #B = #   0, lB = l > 0, so that the arrival of a signal (called a
breakdown) is conclusive evidence that the innovation is bad. Learning is via perfect good news
if #B = lB = 0 and #G = #   0, lG = l > 0, so that a signal arrival (called a breakthrough)
is conclusive evidence for the innovation being good. As motivated in the Introduction,
the distinction between bad news and good news can be seen to reﬂect the nature of news
production in different markets. In addition, L0 := l ¯ N0 can be seen as a simple measure of
14Keller et al. (2005) have learning via perfect good news Poisson signals, Keller and Rady (2010) study
imperfect good news learning, and Keller and Rady (2013) study perfect and imperfect bad news learning. For
other recent work that prominently features learning via Poisson signals, see for example Che and Hörner
(2013); Board and Meyer–ter–Vehn (2013); Halac et al. (2013).
15Note that by letting the social learning component of the signal arrival rate at time t, lNt, depend only on
the ﬂow of adopters Nt at time t itself, we are effectively assuming that each each adopter can generate a signal
only once, namely at the time of adoption. This assumption is natural for “innovations” such as new movies or
medical procedures, for which “consumption” is a one-time event and quality is revealed upon consumption.
For durable goods, such as cars or consumer electronics, it might be more natural to allow adopters to generate
signals repeatedly over time, which can be captured by replacing lNt with l
R t
0 Ns ds. This would yield results
that are qualitatively similar to those presented in the following sections.
15the potential for social learning in an economy, summarizing both the likelihood l with which
individual adopters’ experiences ﬁnd their way into the public domain and the size ¯ N0 of
the population which can contribute to and access the common pool of information.
We brieﬂy summarize the evolution of consumers’ beliefs under bad and good news:
Learning via Perfect Bad News
Under perfect bad news, consumers’ posterior on q = G permanently jumps to 0 at the
ﬁrst breakdown. Let pt denote consumers’ no-news posterior, i.e. the belief at t that q = G
conditional on no signals having arrived on [0,t). Given a ﬂow of adopters N, standard
Bayesian updating implies that
pt =
p0
p0 +( 1  p0)e 
R t
0(#+lNs)ds
.16 (1.1)
In particular, if Nt is continuous in an open interval (s,s + n) for n > 0, then pt for
t 2 (s,s + n) evolves according to the ODE:
˙ pt = (# + lNt) pt(1  pt).
Note that the no-news posterior is continuous and increasing.
Learning via Perfect Good News
Under perfect good news, consumers’ posterior on q = G permanently jumps to 1 at the
ﬁrst breakthrough. Given a ﬂow of adopters N, Bayes’ rule now implies that consumers’
no-news posterior satisﬁes
pt =
p0e 
R t
0(#+lNs)ds
p0e 
R t
0(#+lNs)ds +( 1  p0)
. (1.2)
16Deﬁnition 1.2.1 imposes measurability on N, so this expression is well-deﬁned.
16In particular, if Nt is continuous in an open interval (s,s + n) for n > 0, then pt for
t 2 (s,s + n) must satisfy the ODE:
˙ pt =  (# + lNt) pt(1  pt).
In contrast to the perfect bad news case, the no-news posterior is now continuous and
decreasing.
1.2.3 Equilibrium
Since our main interest is in the aggregate adoption dynamics of the population, we take as
the primitive of our equilibrium concept the aggregate ﬂow (Nt)t 0 of consumers newly
adopting the innovation over time and do not explicitly model individual consumers’
behavior. Given our focus on perfect news processes, consumers’ incentives are non-trivial
only in the absence of signals: Under perfect bad news, no new consumers will adopt
after a breakdown, while under perfect good news all remaining consumers will adopt
when given a chance after there has been a breakthrough. Therefore, we henceforth let
Nt denote the ﬂow of new adopters at t conditional on no signals up to time t and deﬁne
equilibrium in terms of this quantity. Reﬂecting the assumption that aggregate adoption
behavior is predictable with respect to the news process of the economy, we require that Nt
be a deterministic function of time. We consider all such functions which are feasible in the
following sense:
Deﬁnition 1.2.1. A feasible ﬂow of adopters is a right-continuous function N: [0,+•) ! R
such that Nt := N(t) 2 [0,r ¯ Nt] for all t 2 [0,+•), where ¯ Nt := ¯ N0  
R t
0 Nsds.
Here ¯ Nt denotes the mass of consumers remaining in the game at time t. We require that
Nt  r ¯ Nt so that Nt is consistent with the remaining ¯ Nt consumers independently receiving
adoption opportunities at Poisson rate r.
Any feasible adoption process N deﬁnes an associated no-news posterior pN
t as given by
Equation 1.1 if learning is via perfect bad news and by Equation 1.2 if learning is via perfect
good news.
17In equilibrium, we require that at each time t, Nt is consistent with optimal behavior
by the remaining ¯ Nt forward-looking consumers: If a consumer receives an adoption
opportunity at t, he optimally trades off his expected payoff to adopting against his value to
waiting, given that he assigns probability pN
t to q = G and that he expects the population’s
adoption behavior to evolve according to the process N. For this we must ﬁrst deﬁne the
value to waiting at t.
Let St denote the set of all right-continuous functions s : [t,+•) !{ 0,1}, each of which
deﬁnes a potential set of future times at which, absent signals, a given consumer might
adopt if given an opportunity. Under the Poisson process generating adoption opportunities,
any s 2 St deﬁnes a random time ts at which, absent signals, the consumer will adopt the
innovation and drop out of the game.17
Let WN
t (s) denote the expected payoff to waiting at t and following s in the future,
given the aggregate adoption process N. Speciﬁcally, if learning is via perfect bad news, s
prescribes adoption at the random time ts if and only if there have been no breakdowns
prior to ts, yielding
WN
t (s) := E

e r(ts t)
✓
pN
t   (1  pN
t )e 
R ts
t (#+lNs)ds
◆ 
,
where the expectation is with respect to the Poisson process generating adoption opportuni-
ties.
If learning is via perfect good news, then following s means that at any adoption
opportunity prior to ts, adoption occurs only if there has been a breakthrough, and at ts
adoption occurs whether or not there has been a breakthrough. For any time s   t, denote
by ts the random time at which the ﬁrst adoption opportunity after s arrives. Then WN
t (s)
17Formally, we deﬁne ts as follows. Let (Xs)s t denote the stochastic process representing the number
of arrivals generated on [t,s] by a Poisson process with arrival rate r, and let (Xs )s>t denote the number of
arrivals on [t,s). Then,
ts := inf{s   t : ss ⇥ (Xs   Xs ) > 0},
where, as per convention, inf∆ :=+ •. It is well known that the hitting time of a right-continuous process
of an open set is an optional time. Therefore, the expectations in the deﬁnition of the value to waiting are
well-deﬁned.
18is given by
E
2
4
✓
pte 
R ts
t (#+lNs)ds +( 1  pt)
◆
e r(ts t) (2pts   1) + pt
ts Z
t
(# + lNs)e 
R s
t (#+lNk)dke r(ts t)ds
3
5,
where the expectation is again with respect to the Poisson process generating adoption
opportunities.
The value to waiting at t is the payoff to waiting and behaving optimally in the future:
Deﬁnition 1.2.2. The value to waiting given a feasible adoption process N is the function
WN
t : R+ ! R+ deﬁned by WN
t := sups2St WN
t (s) for all t.
We are now ready to deﬁne our equilibrium concept:
Deﬁnition 1.2.3. An equilibrium is a feasible adoption process (Nt)t 0 such that
1. WN
t   2pN
t   1 for all t such that r ¯ Nt > Nt
2. WN
t  2pN
t   1 for all t such that 0 < Nt.
Thus, Deﬁnition 1.2.3 requires that at any time t, the aggregate ﬂow of new adopters Nt
be consistent with the remaining ¯ Nt consumers optimally trading off the expected payoff to
immediate adoption, 2pN
t   1, against the value to waiting, WN
t .
Note that our deﬁnition of equilibrium is essentially Nash equilibrium, i.e. we do not
require subgame perfection. The motivation for this is that in a continuum population any
individual consumer’s behavior has a negligible impact on the aggregate adoption levels so
that any history not on the equilibrium path (in which a different number of consumers than
expected previously adopted) is more than a unilateral deviation from the equilibrium path.
Thus, off-path histories do not affect individual consumers’ incentives on the equilibrium
path and are unimportant for equilibrium analysis.
As usual, the equilibrium value to waiting WN
t admits an alternative characterization as
the solution to a functional equation, which we note here for use in future sections:
19Lemma 1.2.4. Suppose N is an equilibrium. If learning is via perfect bad news, WN
t satisﬁes the
functional equation
Vt =
Z •
t
re (r+r)(s t) pN
t
pN
s
max
n⇣
2pN
s   1
⌘
,Vs
o
ds.
If learning is via perfect good news, WN
t satisﬁes the functional equation
Vt =
Z •
t
re (r+r)(s t)
 
pN
t
⇣
1  e 
R s
t (#+lNk)dk
⌘
+
pN
t e 
R s
t (#+lNk)dk
pN
s
max
n⇣
2pN
s   1
⌘
,Vs
o
!
ds.
Proof. The proof is standard.
1.3 Cooperative Benchmark
To establish a socially optimal benchmark, we ﬁrst consider the cooperative problem: This
selects an aggregate ﬂow N of adopters that maximizes ex ante aggregate welfare, taking
into account the effect of N on the public information process; we impose feasibility, but do
not impose the incentive compatibility requirements of the equilibrium in Deﬁnition 1.2.3.18
Clearly, under perfect good news it is optimal to require adoption at the maximal
possible rate once there has been a breakthrough. Similarly, under perfect bad news it is
optimal to terminate adoption as soon as there has been a breakdown. Thus, the objective
of the cooperative problem under perfect good news is:
sup
N
p0
• Z
0
(#G + lGNt)e 
R t
0 (#G+lGNs)ds
0
@
t Z
0
e rsNsds+ e rt r
r + r
0
@ ¯ N0  
t Z
0
Nsds
1
A
1
A dt
+ p0e 
R •
0 (#G+lGNs)ds
• Z
0
e rsNs ds  (1  p0)
• Z
0
e rsNs ds, 19
subject to the feasibility constraint that Nt 2 [0,r ¯ Nt] for all t.
18We are not concerned with implementation here, but because beliefs are publicly observed, as long as we
allow for transfers, the solution that we provide will be implementable while respecting individual rationality.
19We impose the convention that e • = 0. Thus whenever #G > 0, e 
R •
0 (#G+lGNs)ds = 0.
20Under perfect bad news, the objective is:
sup
N
p0
• Z
0
e rsNsds  (1  p0)
• Z
0
(#B + lBNt)e 
R t
0 (#B+lBNs)ds
t Z
0
e rsNs dsdt
  (1  p0)e 
R •
0 (#B+lBNs)ds
• Z
0
e rsNsds, 20
again subject to the feasibility constraint that Nt 2 [0,r ¯ Nt] for all t.
Standard techniques show that the solution to both cooperative problems has an all-or-
nothing form:21 In each problem, there is a cutoff time ts (depending on the parameters)
such that conditional on no signals, there is no (respectively maximal) adoption until time ts
under perfect bad (respectively good) news, and maximal (respectively no) adoption from ts
on:
Proposition 1.3.1. In both problems, there exists an adoption ﬂow N that attains the maximum.
Furthermore, there exists an optimal adoption ﬂow with the property that there exists ts such that
• Nt = r ¯ Nt for all t such that (lG   lB)(ts   t) > 0;
• Nt = 0 for all t such that (lG   lB)(ts   t) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix Section A.9.
We now solve for the cutoff time, or equivalently the cutoff belief, under both signal
structures.
1.3.1 Cooperative Benchmark under Perfect Good News
Under perfect good news, letting # := #G and L0 := lG ¯ N0, the cutoff time ts solves
sup
ts 0
r
r + r
⇣
1  e (r+r)ts⌘
¯ N0(2p0   1)+e (r+r)ts r
r + r
¯ N0
✓
ps +( 1  ps)ps #
# + r
◆
(1.3)
20Again we assume that whenever #B > 0, e 
R •
0 (#B+lBNs)ds = 0.
21This is due to the linearity of the signal arrival rate in Nt.
21where ps and ps denote, respectively, the probability of a breakthrough prior to time ts and
the no-news posterior at time ts; that is,
ps := p0
⇣
1  e #ts L0(1 e rts
)
⌘
,
ps :=
p0e #ts L0(1 e rts
)
p0e #ts L0(1 e rts) +( 1  p0)
.
Taking the ﬁrst order condition of the above, we obtain:
(r + r)(1  ps)
✓✓
2 
#
# + r
◆
ps   1
◆
+ ps(1  ps)
⇣
# + L0re rts⌘ r
# + r
= 0 (1.4)
if an interior solution exists.
If the left-hand side of Equation 1.4 is non-positive at all times, then the cooperative
cutoff satisﬁes ts = 0, so that there is no adoption until a breakthrough. This happens if and
only if
(r + r)
✓
(2p0   1)   p0
#
# + r
◆
+ p0 (# + rL0)
r
# + r
 0. (1.5)
On the other hand, if the left-hand side of Equation 1.4 is strictly positive at all times, then
ts =+ • and the cooperative solution calls for maximal adoption irrespective of whether or
not there has been a breakthrough. This happens if and only if # = 0 and p0
 
1+ e L0 
  1.
We summarize this in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3.2. Under perfect good news, the cooperative cutoff time is as follows:
• If Inequality (1.5) holds, then ts = 0.
• If # = 0 and p0
 
1+ e L0 
  1, then ts =+ •.
• Otherwise, ts satisﬁes Equation (1.4).
Note that the cutoff posterior ps depends on the prior. This is in contrast to the strategic
experimentation literature because of our assumption that the stock of remaining consumers
is depleted as consumers drop out following adoption. In strategic experimentation, the
cooperative solution only depends on the current belief and does not depend on the initial
22conditions since experimenters remain in the game to potentially experiment further in the
future.
1.3.2 Cooperative Benchmark under Perfect Bad News
Under perfect bad news, letting # := #B and L0 := lB ¯ N0, the cutoff time ts solves:
sup
ts 0
e rts ¯ N0
0
@p0
r
r + r
  (1  p0)e #ts
• Z
0
re #t L0(1 e rt)e (r+r)tdt
1
A.
Taking the ﬁrst order condition, we obtain:
e #ts
K(L0)=
r
# + r
r
r + r
p0
1  p0
where
K(L0) :=
• Z
0
re #t L0(1 e rt)e (r+r)tdt <
r
# + r + r
.
Then an easy calculation yields the cutoff posterior:
ps =
K(L0)
r
#+r
r
r+r + K(L0)
<
# + r
# + 2r
.
We summarize this in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3.3. Under perfect bad news, the cooperative solution is given by:
Nt =
8
> > <
> > :
0 if pt < ps
r ¯ Nt if pt   ps,
where
ps =
K(L0)
r
#+r
r
r+r + K(L0)
.
1.4 Quasi-Single Crossing Property for Equilibrium Incentives
We now proceed to equilibrium analysis. As a preliminary step, we ﬁrst establish a useful
property of equilibrium incentives under both perfect bad news and perfect good news.
23Suppose that Nt 0 is an arbitrary feasible ﬂow of adopters, with associated no-news posterior
pN
t 0 and value to waiting WN
t 0 as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1.2.2. In general, the dynamics of
the trade-off between immediate adoption at time t (yielding expected payoff 2pN
t   1) and
delaying and behaving optimally in the future (yielding expected payoff WN
t ) can be quite
difﬁcult to characterize, with (2pN
t   1)  WN
t changing sign many times. However, when
Nt 0 is an equilibrium ﬂow, then for any t,
2pN
t   1 < WN
t =) Nt = 0; and
2pN
t   1 > WN
t =) Nt = r ¯ Nt;
and this imposes considerable discipline on the dynamics of the trade-off. Indeed, the
following theorem establishes that 2pN
t   1 and WN
t must satisfy a quasi-single crossing
property:
Theorem 1.4.1. Suppose that learning is either via perfect bad news (lB > 0 = lG) or via perfect
good news (lG > 0 = lB). Let Nt 0 be an equilibrium, with corresponding no-news posteriors pN
t 0
and value to waiting WN
t 0. Then WN
t 0 and 2pN
t 0   1 satisfy single-crossing, in the following sense:
• Whenever (lB   lG)(WN
t   (2pN
t   1)) < 0, then (lB   lG)(WN
t   (2pN
t   1)) < 0 for
all t > t.
• Whenever (lB   lG)(WN
t   (2pN
t   1))  0, then (lB   lG)(WN
t   (2pN
t   1))  0 for
all t > t.
Proof. See Appendix Section A.2.
The basic intuition is as follows. Consider ﬁrst the case of learning via perfect bad news
and suppose that immediate adoption is strictly better than waiting today (and hence also
in the near future provided there are no breakdowns).22 Then all consumers adopt upon an
opportunity in the near future, so the no-news posterior strictly increases, while the number
of remaining consumers strictly decreases. Because information is generated endogenously,
22The latter implication follows from the continuity of the equilibrium value to waiting, which is established
in the Appendix.
24this means that the ﬂow of information must be decreasing over time. As a result, immediate
adoption becomes even more attractive relative to waiting, and consequently immediate
adoption continues to be strictly preferable in the future.
Similarly, suppose that learning is via perfect good news and that waiting is strictly
more attractive than immediate adoption today (and hence also in the near future). Then in
the near future, no consumers adopt and information is generated purely via the exogenous
news source (or not at all if # = 0). As a result, the no-news posterior decreases (weakly)
while the number of remaining consumers does not change. This makes waiting even more
attractive relative to adopting immediately, so that waiting continues to be strictly preferable
in the future.
0 t⇤
1 t⇤
2
Wait Indifference Adopt
Figure 1.1: Perfect Bad News
0
Adopt
t⇤
1 = t⇤
2
Wait
Figure 1.2: Perfect Good News
Theorem 1.4.1 implies that any equilibrium features two threshold times 0  t⇤
1  t⇤
2 
+• given by23
t⇤
1 := inf{t : (lB   lG)
⇣
2pN
t   1 WN
t
⌘
  0},
t⇤
2 := inf{t : (lB   lG)
⇣
2pN
t   1 WN
t
⌘
> 0},
such that if there are no signal arrivals, then under perfect bad (respectively good) news,
23With the usual convention that inf∆ =+ •.
25waiting (respectively adoption) is strictly preferable before t⇤
1, and adoption (respectively
waiting) is strictly preferable after t⇤
2, with indifference in between, as illustrated in Figures
1 and 2. In Sections 1.5 and 1.6 we will build on this observation to establish the existence
of unique equilibria under both perfect bad news and good news. The threshold times, as
well as the ﬂow of adopters between t⇤
1 and t⇤
2, are fully pinned down by the parameters.
Looking ahead to Section 1.6, we will see that under perfect good news, any equilibrium
must in fact satisfy t⇤
1 = t⇤
2.24 Depending on parameters, the equilibrium takes three possible
forms: (i) 0 = t⇤
1 = t⇤
2; (ii) 0 < t⇤
1 = t⇤
2 < +•; or (iii) 0 < t⇤
1 = t⇤
2 =+ •.25 By contrast,
under perfect bad news in Section 1.5, the equilibrium takes one of six forms depending
on parameters: (i) 0 = t⇤
1 = t⇤
2 < +•; (ii) 0 = t⇤
1 < t⇤
2 < +•; (iii) 0 < t⇤
1 = t⇤
2 < +•; (iv)
0 < t⇤
1 < t⇤
2 < +•; (v) 0 < t⇤
1 = t⇤
2 =+ •;26 or (vi) 0 = t⇤
1 < t⇤
2 =+ •.27 The possibility of a
non-empty interval (t⇤
1,t⇤
2) of indifference will emerge as a key feature distinguishing bad
news markets from good news markets. Maintaining indifference at times (t⇤
1,t⇤
2) requires
a form of informational free-riding, which we term partial adoption, whereby only some
consumers adopt when given the chance (i.e. Nt 2 (0,r ¯ Nt) at each t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2)). We will
see that partial adoption has important implications not just from an efﬁciency standpoint,
but also for the shape of equilibrium adoption curves and for the impact of increased
opportunities for social learning on welfare, learning, and adoption dynamics.
1.5 Perfect Bad News
1.5.1 Equilibrium Characterization
We now build on the analysis of the previous section to establish the existence of a unique
equilibrium when learning is via perfect bad news. Fix parameters r, r, ¯ N0 > 0, # = #B,
24With the sole exception of # = 0 and p0 = 1
2, in which case it is easy to see that N ⌘ 0 and t⇤
1 = 0 < t⇤
2 = •.
25This possibility will arise iff # = 0 and p0
⇣
1+ e l ¯ N0
⌘
  1.
26This possibility will arise iff # = 0 and p0 < 1
2.
27This possibility will arise iff # = 0 and p0 = 1
2.
26l = lB   0, and p0 2 (0,1). Suppose Nt 0 is an equilibrium ﬂow of adopters. Let pt 0 and
Wt 0 be the corresponding no-news posterior and value to waiting, and let Lt 0 := l ¯ Nt 0
describe the evolution of the economy’s potential for social learning.28 From Theorem 1.4.1,
we know that there are times 0  t⇤
1  t⇤
2  +• given by
t⇤
1 := inf{t :2 pt   1   Wt},
t⇤
2 := inf{t :2 pt   1 > Wt},
such that (appealing also to right-continuity) N must satisfy
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
Nt = 0 if t < t⇤
1,
2pt   1 = Wt if t 2 [t⇤
1,t⇤
2)
Nt = r ¯ Nt if t   t⇤
2.
In the following we will show that t⇤
1, t⇤
2, and the evolution of Nt between t⇤
1 and t⇤
2
are uniquely pinned down by the parameters. We ﬁrst introduce some notation. For any
p 2 (0,1) and L   0, let
G(p,L) :=
• Z
0
re (r+r)t
⇣
p   (1  p)e (#t+L(1 e rt))
⌘
dt.
G(p,L) represents the payoff to adopting at the next opportunity if there have been no
breakdowns by then, given that the current belief is p, that the remaining potential for social
learning is L, and that absent breakdowns the remaining L
l consumers adopt at their ﬁrst
opportunity in the future.
Deﬁne the posteriors p, p, and p] as follows. Let p be the posterior given by 2p   1 =
G(p,0); that is,
p :=
(# + r)(r + r)
2(# + r)(r + r)   #r
.
Thus, p is the lowest belief at which a consumer is willing to adopt given that he could also
delay, obtain more information at rate # and reevaluate his decision at his next adoption
28Recall that ¯ Nt := ¯ N0  
R t
0 Ns ds denotes the remaining population at time t.
27opportunity which is generated at rate r.
Deﬁne p := limr!• p, that is,
p =
# + r
# + 2r
;
p is the lowest belief at which a consumer would be willing to adopt given that he could
also delay and obtain more information at rate # and given that adoption opportunities
arrive continuously in the future.
Deﬁne p] := lim#!• p, that is,
p] =
r + r
r + 2r
.
p] is the lowest belief at which a consumer would be willing to adopt given that he could also
delay until his next opportunity, which is generated at rate r, and given that all uncertainty
is completely resolved by then.29
Finally, deﬁne the function L⇤ : (0,1) ! R+ [{+•} as follows. Let L⇤(p) ⌘ 0 for all
p  p, L⇤(p)=+ • for all p   p], and for all p 2 (p, p]), let L⇤(p) 2 R+ be the unique
value such that
2p   1 = G(p,L⇤(p)).30
Thus, if the current posterior is p 2 [p, p]) and the current potential for social learning in
the economy is L⇤(p), then consumers are indifferent between adopting now or at their
next opportunity absent breakdowns, provided that all remaining
L⇤(p)
l consumers also
adopt at their ﬁrst opportunity in the future.
We are now ready to state the equilibrium characterization theorem:
Theorem 1.5.1. Fix r,r > 0, #   0, and p0 2 (0,1). Let p⇤ := min{p, p]}. For every l, ¯ N0 > 0,
there is a unique equilibrium. Furthermore, in the unique equilibrium, Nt is Markovian in (pt,Lt)
29Note that for all p > p], limL!• G(p,L) < 2p   1 and for all p < p], limL!• G(p,L) > 2p   1.
30Note that such a value must exist given that p 2 (p, p]) and is unique because L⇤(p) is strictly increasing
in p on this domain.
28for all t and satisﬁes
Nt =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if pt  p⇤ and Lt > L⇤(pt),
r(2pt 1)
l(1 pt)   #
l 2 (0,r ¯ Nt) if pt > p⇤ and Lt > L⇤(pt)
r ¯ Nt if Lt  L⇤(pt).
(1.6)
A detailed proof of Theorem 1.5.1 is provided in Appendix Section A.3.1. Here we sketch
the basic idea. Before we proceed, however, note the following two special cases of the
theorem: First, if r  #, so that p⇤ := min{p, p]} = p], then by Equation (1.6) and because
L⇤(p)=+ • for all p   p], Theorem 1.5.1 asserts that regardless of the other parameters, Nt
takes an all-or-nothing form with cutoff belief p]: Nt = 0 whenever pt < p] and Nt = r ¯ Nt
whenever pt   p]. Second, if # = 0 and p0  1
2, then it is easy to see that Theorem 1.5.1
asserts that regardless of the other parameters, the unique equilibrium is given by Nt = 0
for all t.
Throughout Section 1.5, we will be particularly interested in the implications of N
featuring a partial adoption region, in which Nt 2 (0,r ¯ Nt) is as described by the second line
of Equation (1.6). Since the two special cases above preclude the existence of such a region
regardless of other parameters, we rule out these cases for the remainder of Section 1.5 by
imposing the following two conditions:31
Condition 1.5.2. The rate at which exogenous information arrives is small relative to the
rate at which consumers obtain adoption opportunities: # < r. Thus, p⇤ = p < p].
Condition 1.5.3. Either # > 0 or p0 2 (1
2,1).
Given these two conditions, we now sketch the derivation of Theorem 1.5.1. In order
to obtain the Markovian description of Nt in Equation (1.6), we note the following lemma,
which we prove in the Appendix. This provides an alternative characterization of the
threshold times t⇤
1 and t⇤
2, relating these times to the evolution of (pt,Lt):
31In Section A.4 in the Appendix, we discuss in more detail the case where r  #.
29Lemma 1.5.4. Fix r,r > 0, #   0 and p0 2 (0,1) satisfying Conditions 1.5.2 and 1.5.3. Let Nt 0
be an equilibrium with corresponding no-news posterior pt 0 and threshold times t⇤
1 and t⇤
2, and let
Lt 0 := l ¯ Nt 0 describe the evolution of the economy’s potential for social learning. Then
1. t⇤
2 = inf{t : Lt < L⇤(pt)}; and
2. t⇤
1 = min{t⇤
2,sup{t : pt < p}}.32
Proof. See Appendix Section A.3.1.
By Lemma 1.5.4 the ﬁrst line of Equation (1.6) corresponds to times t  t⇤
1, the second
line to t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2), and the third line to t   t⇤
2. Thus, the ﬁrst and third lines are immediate
from the deﬁnition of these threshold times. We now give a heuristic argument outlining
the derivation of the second line, i.e. the equilibrium ﬂow of adoption at times t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2),
where adoption is partial. At all these times, consumers must be exactly indifferent between
adopting today and waiting for more information. Maintaining consumer indifference at
these times requires that the cost and beneﬁt of delaying be equal:
Beneﬁt of Delay
z }| {
(# + lNt)(1  pt)dt
| {z }
Probability of
breakdown
(0  ( 1))
| {z }
Beneﬁt:
Avoid Bad Product
=
Cost of Delay
z }| {
(1  (# + lNt)(1  pt)dt)
| {z }
Probability of
no breakdown
(2pt+dt   1)rdt
| {z }
Cost:
Discounting
. (1.7)
Delaying one’s decision by an instant is beneﬁcial if a breakdown occurs at that instant,
allowing a consumer to permanently avoid the bad product. The gain in this case is
(0  ( 1)), and this possibility arises with an instantaneous probability of (# + lNt)(1 
pt)dt. On the other hand, if no breakdown occurs, which happens with instantaneous
probability 1  (# + lNt)(1  pt)dt, then consumers incur an opportunity cost of (2pt+dt  
1)rdt, reﬂecting the time cost of delayed adoption.33 Ignoring terms of order dt2 and
32With the convention that if {t   0:pt < p} = ∆, then sup{t : pt < p} = 0.
33Note that r does not enter into this expression, because in the indifference region consumers obtain the
same continuation payoff regardless of whether or not they obtain an adoption opportunity in the time interval
(t,t + dt) and hence are indifferent between receiving an opportunity to adopt or not.
30rearranging yields Nt =
r(2pt 1)
l(1 pt)   #
l, as in Equation (1.6).34
Finally, Figure 1.3 illustrates how from Equation 1.6, we obtain a unique equilibrium as
a function of the parameters. Regions (2) and (3) represent values of (pt,Lt) corresponding
to the ﬁrst line of Equation (1.6), so that no adoption takes place in these regions. Region
(4) corresponds to partial adoption as given by the second line of Equation (1.6). Finally,
region (1) corresponds to the third line of Equation (1.6) and thus to immediate adoption.
If (p0,L0) is in region (2), then initially no adoption takes place and the no-news
posterior drifts upward according to the law of motion ˙ pt = pt(1  pt)#, while Lt remains
unchanged at L0. This yields a unique time 0 < t⇤
1 = t⇤
2 at which (pt,Lt) hits the boundary
separating regions (2) and (1); from then on consumers adopt immediately upon an
opportunity so that Nt = re r(t t⇤
2) ¯ Nt⇤
2 uniquely pins down the evolution of (pt,Lt). If
(p0,L0) is in region (3), then again no initial adoption occurs and the no-news posterior
drifts upward according to the law of motion ˙ pt = pt(1  pt)#, while Lt remains unchanged
at L0. However, now this yields a unique time 0 < t⇤
1 at which (pt,Lt) hits the boundary
separating regions (3) and (4), and at this time Lt⇤
1 = L0 > L(pt⇤
1)=L(p), so that we
must have t⇤
1 < t⇤
2. From t⇤
1 on the evolution of (pt,Lt) is uniquely pinned down by the
second line of Equation (1.6).35 Thus, t⇤
2 is uniquely given by the ﬁrst time t at which
Lt = L⇤(pt), at which point (pt,Lt) enters region (1). Similar arguments show that when
(p0,L0) starts in region (4), we have t⇤
1 = 0 and t⇤
2 > t⇤
1 is the ﬁrst time at which (pt,Lt),
evolving according to the second line of Equation (1.6), enters region (1). Finally, if (p0,L0)
is in region (1), then 0 = t⇤
1 = t⇤
2 and absent breakdowns all consumers adopt upon their
34A bit more precisely, ignoring terms of order dt2, the right hand side of Equation 1.7 is given by (1  
(# + lNt)(1  pt)dt)(2(pt + ˙ ptdt)   1)rdt = r(2pt   1)dt. Further rearrangement yields the desired expression.
35Speciﬁcally, combining the second line of Equation (1.6) with Equation (1.1) yields the ODE:
˙ pt = rpt(2pt   1),
which pins down pt uniquely given the initial value pt⇤
1 = p:
pt =
pt⇤
1
2pt⇤
1   er(t t⇤
1)(2pt⇤
1   1)
.
Plugging this back into Nt =
r(2pt 1)
l(1 pt)   #
l uniquely pins down Lt = l ¯ Nt. Note that since pt⇤
1 > 1
2, pt given
above is strictly increasing and reaches p] in ﬁnite time. Thus t⇤
2 = inf{t : Lt < L⇤(pt)} < +•.
31pt
Lt L⇤(p)
p]
(3)
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Figure 1.3: Partition of (pt,Lt) when # < r
ﬁrst opportunity from the beginning. This completes the description of the equilibrium.
As seen above, whether or not the equilibrium features a period of partial adoption
depends on the fundamentals. More speciﬁcally, we can show that if consumers are forward-
looking and not too optimistic, then t⇤
1 < t⇤
2 arises whenever the potential for social learning
in the economy is sufﬁciently large. To state this precisely, ﬁrst note that from the Markovian
description of equilibrium dynamics, it is easy to see that L0 = l ¯ N0 is a sufﬁcient statistic
for equilibrium when other fundamentals are ﬁxed:
Lemma 1.5.5. Fix r,r > 0, p0 2 (0,1), and #   0. Suppose that ˆ l ˆ ¯ N0 = l0 ¯ N0. Let ˆ Nt and Nt
denote the unique equilibrium adoption ﬂows under (ˆ l, ˆ ¯ N0) and (l, ¯ N0), respectively, and let ˆ pt, ˆ t⇤
1,
ˆ t⇤
2 and pt,t ⇤
1,t ⇤
2 denote the corresponding equilibrium beliefs and cutoff times. Then
1. ˆ t⇤
i = t⇤
i for i = 1,2;
2. ˆ pt = pt for all t
323. and ˆ l ˆ Nt = lNt for all t.
Proof. Immediate from the proof of Theorem 1.5.1.
With this, the condition for partial adoption to arise in equilibrium can be stated as
follows:
Lemma 1.5.6. Fix r, # and p0 satisfying Conditions 1.5.2 and 1.5.3. Assume p0 < p]. Then for all
r > 0, there exists ¯ L0(r) > 0 such that t⇤
1(L0) < t⇤
2(L0) if and only if L0 > ¯ L0(r).
Proof. Set ¯ L0(r) := max{L⇤(p0),L⇤(p)} and see Section A.6.1 in the Appendix.
On the other hand, if learning is purely exogenous (l = 0 and # > 0) or if consumers are
myopic (“r =+ •”), then there is never any partial adoption, regardless of other parameters.
In the former case, 0 = Lt < L⇤(p) for all p > p, so by Theorem 1.5.1 no consumers
adopt until the no-news posterior hits p (at t⇤
1 = t⇤
2) and from then on all consumers
adopt immediately when given a chance. The latter case corresponds to p = p = 1
2 and
L⇤(p)=+ • for all p > 1
2, so t⇤
1 = t⇤
2 = inf{t : pt > 1
2}. Thus, the possibility of partial
adoption in equilibrium hinges crucially both on consumers being forward-looking and on
there being opportunities for social learning.
1.5.2 Shape of Adoption Curve
With the equilibrium characterization in place, we can explore implications for the shape
of an innovation’s adoption curve, which plots the percentage of adopters in the population
against time. Conditional on no breakdowns up to time t, this is given by
At :=
t Z
0
Ns
¯ N0
ds.
Conditional on the innovation being good, observed adoption levels at t will be exactly
At. If the innovation is bad, then observed adoption levels follow At until the ﬁrst breakdown
(which occurs at a stochastic time), and remain constant from then on. As a result of the
33Figure 1.4: Examples of S-shaped adoption curves (Source: Narayanan and O’Connor (2010), Figure 2.1.)
equilibrium characterization in Theorem 1.5.1, we obtain the following prediction for the
shape of the adoption curve:
Corollary 1.5.7. In the unique equilibrium of Theorem 1.5.1, the adoption curve At conditional on
no breakdowns up to time t has the following shape:
• for 0  t < t⇤
1,A t = 0
• for t⇤
1  t < t⇤
2,A t is strictly increasing and convex in t
• for t   t⇤
2,A t is strictly increasing and concave in t.
In particular, if t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then Corollary 1.5.7 predicts that, possibly after an initial period
of no adoption, the adoption curve conditional on no breakdowns exhibits an S-shaped
(i.e. convex-concave) growth pattern. In the empirical literature on innovation adoption,36
S-shaped adoption patterns have been widely documented for many different innovations
over the past century, including new agricultural seed varieties, such as hybrid corn;
36See, for example, Griliches (1957), Mansﬁeld (1961), Mansﬁeld (1968), Davies (1979), and Gort and Klepper
(1982), among many others.
34household electronics, such as refrigerators and color television; and industrial and medical
innovations, such as the diesel locomotive and electrocardiographs. Figure 1.4 illustrates
this for a selection of household technologies. Figure 1.5 represents a typical adoption curve
generated in our model when # = 0.
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Figure 1.5: Adoption curve conditional on no breakdowns (# = 0)
The intuition for S-shaped adoption curves in our model is as follows: There is no
adoption before time t⇤
1, because initially consumers are pessimistic about the quality of
the innovation and strictly prefer to wait for information from the exogenous news source
rather than risk adopting a bad product. The adoption curve is concave from time t⇤
2 on,
because now consumers are sufﬁciently optimistic to strictly prefer adopting the innovation
when given the chance, so that the ﬂow of new adopters is depleted at the rate r at which
adoption opportunities are generated.
More interestingly, the period of convex growth coincides precisely with the period of infor-
mational free-riding (in the form of partial adoption). The reason for this is the fundamental
trade-off between adopting now and waiting for more information that arises when con-
sumers are forward-looking social learners. During the period (t⇤
1,t⇤
2) of partial adoption,
consumers are indifferent between adopting immediately and delaying. Conditional on no
breakdowns during this period, consumers grow increasingly optimistic about the quality
35of the innovation, which increases their opportunity cost of delaying adoption. In order
to maintain indifference as captured by equation (1.7), the beneﬁt to delaying adoption
must also increase over time: Since consumers are forward-looking, this can be achieved by
increasing the arrival rate of future breakdowns, which improves the odds that waiting will
allow consumers to avoid the bad product. Since consumers are social learners, the arrival
rate of information is increasing in the ﬂow Nt of new adopters. Thus, whenever there is
informational free-riding, Nt is strictly increasing over time. Since Nt represents the rate of
change of the proportion At of adopters in the population, this is equivalent to At being
convex.
Once again, this result relies crucially on our two modeling assumptions that learning is
social and that consumers are forward-looking. As we pointed out following Lemma 1.5.6,
if learning is purely exogenous or if consumers are myopic, then t⇤
1 = t⇤
2, in which case the
adoption curve does not feature a region of convex growth. In order to generate S-shaped
adoption patterns in the absence of either of our assumptions, alternative models appeal to
speciﬁc distributions of consumer heterogeneity, for example Jensen (1982) (in a model of
exogenous learning with forward looking consumers) or Young (2009) (in a model of myopic
social learning). The interplay of social learning and forward-looking consumers allows us
to explain convex growth in terms of purely informational incentives, thus suggesting a novel
micro-foundation for S-shaped curves that remains valid even when consumers are fully
homogeneous.
1.5.3 Welfare
We now examine ex ante consumer welfare, as captured by the time 0 equilibrium value
to waiting, W0. Fix r,r > 0, #   0, and p0 2 (0,1) satisfying Conditions 1.5.2 and 1.5.3.
Then Lemma 1.5.5 and Lemma 1.2.4 imply that W0 = W0(L0) depends only on the potential
for social learning in the economy. The key ﬁnding is the possibility of a saturation
effect: For sufﬁciently large L0, additional increases in opportunities for social learning are
welfare-neutral.
36Nature of Inefﬁciency
We ﬁrst note that, as is to be expected, the equilibrium is in general inefﬁcient relative to the
socially optimal cooperative benchmark:
Proposition 1.5.8. Fix r,r > 0, #   0, and p0 2 (0,1) satisfying Conditions 1.5.2 and 1.5.3. The
unique equilibrium in Theorem 1.5.1 is socially optimal if and only if L0 < L⇤(p0).
Proof. See Appendix Section A.5.1.
Note that if L0 < L⇤(p0), then in equilibrium all consumers adopt immediately upon
ﬁrst opportunity, which is exactly as prescribed by the cooperative benchmark in Propo-
sition 1.3.3. Whenever L0 > L⇤(p0), then the proof of Proposition 1.5.8 demonstrates two
sources of inefﬁciency relative to the cooperative benchmark. First, provided we also have
p0  p (so that t⇤
1 > 0), then adoption begins too late in equilibrium. Second, provided
we also have L0 > L⇤(p) (so that t⇤
1 < t⇤
2), then even once consumers begin to adopt, the
initial rate of adoption is too slow due to partial adoption on (t⇤
1,t⇤
2). Note that both types
of inefﬁciency rely on a sufﬁciently large potential for social learning. Moreover, for any
p0 > 1/2, the ﬁrst type arises only if # is sufﬁciently large or r is sufﬁciently small (in
particular, if learning is purely social or if consumers are myopic, then t⇤
1 = 0). On the other
hand, the second inefﬁciency relies on consumers being forward-looking, but can arise even
if # = 0.
Saturation Effect
The fact that the equilibrium can feature inefﬁciencies relative to the cooperative benchmark
is to be expected. However, the second type of inefﬁciency discussed above, which arises
when there is free-riding in the form of partial adoption, has the following more surprising
implication:
Proposition 1.5.9. Fix r,r > 0, #   0, and p0 2 (0,1) satisfying Conditions 1.5.2 and 1.5.3. Let
L0 := max{L⇤(p0),L⇤(p)}. Then in the unique equilibrium of Theorem 1.5.1, W0(L0) satisﬁes
the following:
371. W0(L0) is strictly increasing in L0 whenever L0 < L0;
2. W0(L0)=W0(L0) is constant in L0 for all L0   L0.
Proof. See Appendix Section A.6.1.
When p0 < p] so that L0 is ﬁnite, Proposition 1.5.9 states that an economy’s ability to
harness its potential for social learning is subject to a saturation effect: If L0 is small, increases
in L0 are strictly beneﬁcial; however, once L0 is sufﬁciently large, any additional increase
in L0 is completely welfare-neutral. This is in stark contrast to the cooperative benchmark:
There increases in L0 are always strictly beneﬁcial and for any p0 > 1
2 the ﬁrst-best (complete
information) payoff of
r
r+rp0 can be approximated in the limit as L0 ! •. We illustrate this
in Figure 1.6,37 which for varying levels of L0 plots the ratio of equilibrium and socially
optimal welfare levels.
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Figure 1.6: Ratio of equilibrium welfare to socially optimal welfare
To see the intuition for Proposition 1.5.9, suppose that p0 > p, so that t⇤
1 = 0. Then as
long as L0 < L0, all consumers adopt immediately upon their ﬁrst opportunity until there
is a breakdown. In this case, a slight increase in L0 does not change consumers’ behavior
in the absence of a breakdown; however, conditional on the innovation being bad, it does
37Parameters used to generate the ﬁgure are: # = 0, r = 1, p0 = 0.6, and r = 1.
38increase the probability of a breakdown occurring prior to any given time—this is clearly
welfare-improving, as more consumers are able to avoid the bad product. On the other hand,
whenever L0 > L0, then t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, so that consumers must initially be indifferent between
adopting and delaying. Then irrespective of the value of L0   L0, equilibrium incentives
immediately imply that W0(L0)=2p0   1. In the next section, we provide some more
intuition for the source of the saturation effect by studying the impact of increases in L0 on
equilibrium learning and adoption dynamics.
1.5.4 The Effect of Increased Opportunities for Social Learning
To further elucidate the saturation effect, this section examines the impact of an increase in
L0 on equilibrium learning dynamics and adoption levels. We ﬁnd that the saturation effect
corresponds to the following two surprising implications of partial adoption: Increased
opportunities for social learning lead to strictly less learning over some periods of time and
to a strict reduction in adoption of both good and bad innovations at all times.
Throughout this section we ﬁx r,r > 0, #   0 and p0 satisfying Conditions 1.5.2 and 1.5.3.
To isolate the role of partial adoption, which is the inefﬁciency driving the saturation effect,
we assume that p] > p0 > p, so that t⇤
1 = 0 and L⇤(p0) < +•. With these parameters ﬁxed,
Lemma 1.5.5 implies that L0 is a sufﬁcient statistic for all quantities we consider in this
section. The following preliminary observation is central to the main results of this section:
Lemma 1.5.10. Suppose that ˆ L0 = ˆ l ˆ ¯ N0 > L0 = l ¯ N0 > L⇤(p0), with corresponding equilibrium
ﬂows of adoption ˆ N and N. Then
1. 0 < t⇤
2(L0) < t⇤
2( ˆ L0).
2. For all t < t⇤
2(L0), lNt = ˆ l ˆ Nt.
Proof. See Appendix Section A.6.2.
Point (ii) states that at all times during which there is partial adoption under both
ˆ L0 and L0, the rate of social learning is the same. Intuitively, this is because in order to
39maintain indifference between immediate adoption and an instantaneous delay, Equation
(1.7) uniquely pins down the instantaneous arrival rate of breakdowns in the partial adoption
region. The ﬁrst bullet point states that increased opportunities for social learning prolong
the initial period of partial adoption. To see the intuition, consider Figure 1.3: For any
posterior p, L⇤(p), which represents the amount of future social information required to
make consumers indifferent between adopting immediately at p and delaying, is the same
under both ˆ L0 and L0. However, since ˆ L0 > L0 and since by (ii) the evolution of beliefs
in region (4) is the same under ˆ L0 and L0, it takes longer to reach the L⇤-curve from the
initial point (p0, ˆ L0).
Non-Monotonicity of Learning
In this section, we consider the effect of increased opportunities for social learning on the
evolution of equilibrium beliefs. The following proposition states a non-monotonicity result:
Increases in L0 do not necessarily translate into increases in pt at all times t. Speciﬁcally, if
L0   L⇤(p0), corresponding to the cutoff for the saturation effect, then upon an increase in
L0 there is a period of times at which pt is strictly lower:
Proposition 1.5.11. Fix r, r, #, and p0 satisfying Conditions 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 and such that p0 2
(p, p]). Consider ˆ L0 = ˆ l ˆ ¯ N0 and L0 = l ¯ N0 such that ˆ L0 > L0   L⇤(p0). Then there exists some
t 2 (t⇤
2(L0),+•) such that
• p
L0
t = p
ˆ L0
t for all t  t⇤
2(L0),
• p
L0
t > p
ˆ L0
t for all t 2 (t⇤
2(L0),t),
• p
L0
t < p
ˆ L0
t for all t > t.
However, when L0 < L⇤(p0), then p
L0
t is strictly increasing in L0 for all t.
Proof. See Appendix Section A.6.2.
Note that by Equation (1.1), the probability of a breakdown occurring prior to time t
conditional on the innovation being bad is given by
401  e 
R t
0(#+lNs)ds = 1 
p0 (1  pt)
pt (1  p0)
, (1.8)
which is increasing in pt. Thus, Proposition 1.5.11 has the surprising implication that
whenever L0 is large enough, any additional increase in opportunities for social learning
will result in consumers being strictly less likely to ﬁnd out about a bad product over a
period of times.
The intuition for Proposition 1.5.11 is closely related to whether or not there is free-
riding in the form of partial adoption (and hence relies on consumers being forward-looking
social learners). Whenever L0 < L⇤(p0), then 0 = t⇤
1 = t⇤
2, so that absent breakdowns all
consumers adopt immediately upon their ﬁrst opportunity. In this case, it is easy to see
from Theorem 1.5.1 that the rate lNt at which social learning occurs is strictly increasing
in L0: We have lNt = re rtL0 for all t. Thus, by Equation (1.8) increasing L0 necessarily
speeds up learning at all times.
On the other hand, if L0 > L⇤(p0), then 0 = t⇤
1 < t⇤
2(L0) and the equilibrium features an
initial region of partial adoption. In this case, an increase to ˆ L0 > L0 has the following effect.
By Lemma 1.5.10, free-riding occurs over a longer period of time: t⇤
2( ˆ L0) > t⇤
2(L0); moreover,
at all times t  t⇤
2(L0) where there is free-riding under both L0 and ˆ L0, the rate of social
learning is the same: lNt = ˆ l ˆ Nt. This explains the ﬁrst bullet point in Proposition 1.5.11.
The strict slowdown in learning at times just after t⇤
2(L0) is due to the following: The proof
of Theorem 1.5.1 shows that whenever t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then the ﬂow of adopters Nt is continuous at
all times except at exactly t⇤
2, where there is a discontinuous increase. This is evident from
the adoption curve in Figure 1.5 where a visible non-differentiability exists at the point of
transition from partial adoption to immediate adoption. Since t⇤
2(L0) < t⇤
2( ˆ L0), this means
that at t⇤
2(L0) the difference between ˆ l ˆ Nt and lNt jumps from 0 to a strictly negative value,
resulting in the temporary slowdown in learning stated in the second bullet point.
Finally, learning under ˆ L0 must eventually overtake learning under L0, because at time
0 the payoff to immediate adoption is the same under both L0 and ˆ L0 and in both cases
consumers are indifferent between adopting immediately and delaying. This relates back to
41the saturation effect for welfare observed in Proposition 1.5.9 as follows. By Lemma 1.2.4,
ex-ante welfare W0 under L0 > L⇤(p0) can be written as
W0(L0)=
• Z
0
re (r+r)t p0
p
L0
t
⇣
2pL0
t   1
⌘
dt = p0
• Z
0
re (r+r)t
✓
2 
⇣
pL0
t
⌘ 1◆
dt,
and similarly for ˆ L0 > L0. The non-monotonicity result for beliefs then has the following
implication. If a consumer obtains his ﬁrst adoption opportunity prior to t⇤
2(L0), his
expected payoff is the same under L0 and ˆ L0; if his ﬁrst adoption opportunity is during
(t⇤
2(L0),t), he is strictly worse off under ˆ L0, because in case the innovation is bad he is
less likely to have found out by then; ﬁnally, if his ﬁrst opportunity is after t, he is strictly
better off under ˆ L0. Depending on ˆ L0, t adjusts endogenously to balance out the beneﬁts,
which arrive at times after t, with the costs incurred at times (t⇤
2(L0),t). This produces the
saturation effect in Proposition 1.5.9.
Even more strongly, in Section 1.7, we exploit the non-monotonicity result for beliefs to
construct an example involving consumers with heterogeneous discount rates in which an
increase in L0 is not only not beneﬁcial, but in fact strictly hurts aggregate welfare.
Slowdown in Adoption
We now consider the effect of increased opportunities for social learning on observed
adoption levels, analyzing separately the case of a good innovation and of a bad innovation.
Adoption Conditional on a Good Product: Recall that At denotes the percentage of con-
sumers in the population who adopt the innovation by time t conditional on no breakdowns
before t, which is the same as the percentage of adopters at t conditional on the innovation
being good:
At(G)=At :=
t Z
0
Ns
¯ N0
ds.
Note also that by Lemma 1.5.5, L0 is a sufﬁcient statistic for the equilibrium levels of At
holding ﬁxed r,r, p0 and #, because Ns
¯ N0 = lNs
L0 and L0 is a sufﬁcient statistic for lNs.
42For a good innovation, we show that when the potential for social learning L0 is small,
additional small increases in opportunities for social learning have no effect on adoption
levels, but when L0 is sufﬁciently large, increases strictly drive down adoption levels at
all times. Once again, the cutoff is given by the level L⇤(p0) above which partial adoption
occurs.
Proposition 1.5.12. Fix r, r, #, and p0 satisfying Conditions 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 and such that p0   p.
Then for all t, At(L0,G) is constant in L0 for all L0  L⇤(p0) and strictly decreasing in L0 for all
L0 > L⇤(p0).
Proof. See Appendix Section A.6.3.
The reason why At(L0,G) is constant for all L0  L⇤(p0) is familiar: For all such L0,
consumers adopt upon their ﬁrst opportunity and At = 1  e rt. If L0 > L⇤(p0), then the
strict slowdown in adoption is due to increased free-riding in the form of partial adoption.
More precisely, an increase from L0 > L⇤(p0) to ˆ L0 has two effects, as summarized in
Lemma 1.5.10: First, on the extensive margin, increased opportunities for social learning push
out t⇤
2 and lead to a longer period of free-riding under ˆ L0. Second, on the intensive margin,
the increase strictly drives down the growth rate of At at all times prior to t⇤
2(L0):
˙ At =
Nt
¯ N0
=
lNt
L0
=
ˆ l ˆ Nt
L0
>
ˆ l ˆ Nt
ˆ L0
=
ˆ Nt
ˆ ¯ N0
= ˙ ˆ At.
Figure 1.7 illustrates these two effects and their implications for a strict slowdown in
adoption. Finally, from t⇤
2(L0) adoption occurs at a maximal rate under L0, so that from
then on ˆ At must remain below At by feasibility.
Two remarks are in order. First, our prediction of a strict slowdown of adoption of
the good product in response to increased opportunities for social learning once again
relies crucially on consumers being forward-looking. If consumers are myopic, then by
the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1.5.12 adoption levels at all times remain unchanged following
the increase. More interestingly, if consumers are myopic, it is not possible to generate
this prediction under perfect bad news even if we allow for an arbitrary distribution of
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Figure 1.7: Changes in adoption levels of a good product under perfect bad news (ˆ l > l)
heterogeneity in tastes. Thus, while models of innovation adoption by myopic social
learners, such as Young (2009), can generate S-shaped adoption curves by imposing suitable
distributions of consumer heterogeneity, the prediction in our model of a strict reduction in
initial adoption of a good innovation is novel.
Second, Proposition 1.5.12 implies that conditional on a good product, increased op-
portunities for social learning are welfare-neutral at best (if L0 < L⇤(p0)) and potentially
strictly harmful (if L0   L⇤(p0)), since adoption levels are unchanged in the former case
and in the latter case adoption is strictly delayed. Therefore any potential welfare gains due
to increased opportunities for social learning must result from more consumers being able
to avoid the bad product. We now study this point by analyzing the effect of increases in L0
on adoption levels of a bad product.
Adoption Conditional on a Bad Product: Conditional on a bad innovation, adoption is
stochastic, following At until the ﬁrst breakdown, which occurs at a random time, and
remaining constant from then on. We therefore study the effect of increased opportunities
for social learning on the expected percentage of adopters at time t conditional on a bad
44product, which is given by:
At(B) :=
t Z
0
(# + lNt)e 
R t
0 (#+lNs)ds
0
@
t Z
0
Ns
¯ N0
ds
1
Adt + e 
R t
0(#+lNs)ds
t Z
0
Ns
¯ N0
ds
=
t Z
0
Nt
¯ N0
e 
R t
0 (#+lNs)dsdt,
where the second line is obtained by integrating the ﬁrst expression by parts. Again, L0 is a
sufﬁcient statistic for At(B) when r, r, p0, and # are ﬁxed. For bad innovations, increased
opportunities for social learning always produce strict decreases in the expected level of
adoption at all times, irrespective of the original level of L0:
Proposition 1.5.13. Fix r, r, #, and p0 satisfying Conditions 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 and such that p0   p.
Then At(L0,B) is strictly decreasing in L0 for all t > 0.
Proof. See Appendix Section A.6.3.
If L0 < L⇤(p0), this is immediate since by Proposition 1.5.11 and Proposition 1.5.12
adoption levels conditional on no breakdowns are the same, but breakdowns prior to any
time are more likely for higher values of L0 < L⇤(p0). If L0   L⇤(p0), then there is a
tension: On the one hand, Proposition 1.5.12 implies that an increase in L0 leads at all
times to strictly lower adoption levels conditional on no breakdowns, but on the other
hand, the non-monotonicity result for learning implies that there are times before which a
breakdown is strictly more likely under lower L0. We show that the former effect always
strictly dominates.
Proposition 1.5.12 and Proposition 1.5.13 relate to the saturation effect observed in
Proposition 1.5.9 as follows: If L0 < L⇤(p0), then small increases in opportunities for
social learning do not affect adoption conditional on the good product, but strictly decrease
the number of consumers adopting the bad product by any time, leading to an overall
welfare gain. On the other hand, if L0   L⇤(p0), then increased opportunities for social
learning strictly decrease adoption both for good products (which is harmful) and for bad
products (which is beneﬁcial), making welfare predictions a priori ambiguous. However, the
45saturation effect illustrates that in welfare terms these two implications balance out exactly.
1.6 Perfect Good News
1.6.1 Equilibrium Characterization
We now turn to study equilibrium behavior when learning is via perfect good news. As
under perfect bad news, the unique equilibrium is Markovian in the state variables (pt,Lt).
Surprisingly, however, regardless of the potential for social learning in the economy, the
unique equilibrium under perfect good news does not exhibit any region of partial adoption
and adoption at each time is all-or-nothing:
Theorem 1.6.1. Let r,r, ¯ N0 > 0, p0 2 (0,1), and l,#   0. There exists a unique equilibrium. In
the unique equilibrium, Nt is Markovian in (pt,Lt) (or equivalently (pt, ¯ Nt)) for all t and satisﬁes:
Nt =
8
> > <
> > :
r ¯ Nt if pt > p⇤
0 if pt  p⇤.
(1.9)
where
p⇤ =
(# + r)(r + r)
2(# + r)(# + r)   #r
.
To prove Theorem 1.6.1 we again invoke the quasi-single crossing property for equi-
librium incentives established in Theorem 1.4.1. Suppose Nt 0 is an equilibrium ﬂow of
adopters. Let pt 0 and Wt 0 be the corresponding no-news posterior and value to waiting,
and let Lt 0 := l ¯ Nt 0 describe the evolution of the economy’s potential for social learning.
By Theorem 1.4.1, there are times38
t⇤
1 := inf{t :2 pt   1  Wt},
t⇤
2 := inf{t :2 pt   1 < Wt},
38With the usual convention that inf∆ =+ •.
46such that (appealing also to right-continuity) N must satisfy
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
Nt = r ¯ Nt if t < t⇤
1,
2pt   1 = Wt if t 2 [t⇤
1,t⇤
2)
Nt = 0 if t   t⇤
2.
In the following, we build on this fact to establish the existence of a unique equilibrium as a
function of the parameter values. The following lemma establishes the all-or-nothing nature
of the perfect good news equilibrium:
Lemma 1.6.2. Suppose either # > 0 or p0 6= 1
2.39 Let Nt 0 be an equilibrium with associated
threshold times t⇤
1 and t⇤
2. Then t⇤
1 = t⇤
2 =: t⇤.
Proof. See Appendix Section A.3.2.
Thus, absent breakthroughs, all consumers adopt immediately if given the chance prior
to t⇤, and after t⇤, consumers stop adopting altogether and rely solely on information
generated by exogenous sources (if # = 0, both adoption and learning come to a permanent
standstill at this point). If a breakthrough occurs at any time (prior to or after t⇤), then from
then on all consumers adopt the innovation whenever given a chance.
To see the intuition for the all-or-nothing nature of the equilibrium, suppose we had
t⇤
1 < t⇤
2. Then consumers would be indifferent between adopting and delaying at each time
t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2). As with perfect bad news, we can compare a consumer’s payoff to adopting at t
with the payoff to delaying his decision by an instant and decompose the difference into
two terms:
r(2pt   1)dt+ pt(lNt + #)dt
✓
1 
r
r + r
◆
.
The ﬁrst term represents the gain to immediate adoption if no breakthrough occurs
between t and t + dt, which happens with instantaneous probability 1  pt(lNt + #)dt. Just
as with perfect bad news, the gain to adopting immediately in this case is r(2pt+dt   1)dt,
39If # = 0 and p0 = 1
2, then it is easy to see that the unique equilibrium must be N ⌘ 0, so that t⇤
1 = 0 < t⇤
2 =
+•.
47representing time discounting at rate r and the fact that at t + dt the consumer remains
indifferent between adopting if given the chance and delaying. The second term represents
the gain to immediate adoption if there is a breakthrough between t and t + dt, which
happens with instantaneous probability pt(lNt + #)dt. Now the situation is very different
from the perfect bad news setting: A breakthrough conclusively signals good quality, so
a consumer who delays his decision by an instant will adopt immediately at his next
opportunity. This results in a discounted payoff of
r
r+r, reﬂecting the stochasticity of
adoption opportunities. On the other hand, by adopting at t, the consumer receives a payoff
of 1 >
r
r+r immediately. Thus, regardless of whether or not there is a breakthrough between
t and t + dt, there is a strictly positive gain to adopting immediately at t, which contradicts
indifference at t.
The above argument illustrates a fundamental difference between the bad news and good
news setting. In order to maintain indifference over a period of time between immediate
adoption and waiting, it must be possible to acquire decision-relevant information by waiting:
Consumers who are prepared to adopt at t will be willing to delay their decision by an
instant only if there is a possibility that at the next instant they will no longer be willing to
adopt. In the bad news setting, this is indeed possible: If there is a breakdown between t and
t + dt, then the innovation is revealed to be bad and no one is willing to adopt from t + dt
on. On the other hand, if learning is via good news, this cannot happen: A breakthrough
between t and t + dt reveals the innovation to be good, so consumers strictly prefer to adopt
from t + dt on; if there is no breakthrough, then consumers remain indifferent at t + dt, so
in either case the information obtained is not decision-relevant.40
With Lemma 1.6.2, the derivation of Theorem 1.6.1 is straightforward. To this end, we
show that any equilibrium can be characterized in terms of a cutoff posterior that only
depends on #, r, and r. Given any equilibrium Nt 0 with associated no-news posteriors
40Note that breakthroughs do of course convey decision-relevant information at beliefs where consumers
strictly prefer to delay. But during a region of indifference, this cannot be the case.
48pt 0, value to waiting Wt 0, and cutoff time t⇤, deﬁne
Ht := pt
Z •
0
(# + lNt+t)e (#t+
R t+t
t lNsds) r
r + r
e (r+r)t dt.
Thus, Ht represents a consumer’s expected value to waiting at time t given that from t on
he adopts only if there has been a breakthrough and given that the population’s ﬂow of
adoption follows N. By optimality of Wt, we must have Ht  Wt for all t. We can deﬁne a
lower bound for Ht: For any posterior p 2 (0,1), let
H(p,0) := p
Z •
0
#e #t r
r + r
e (r+r)t dt = p
r#
(r + r)(# + r + r)
.
H(p,0) represents a consumer’s expected value to waiting at posterior p, given that he
adopts only once there has been a breakthrough and given that breakthroughs are only
generated exogenously. Note that for all t, we have H(pt,0)  Ht: When breakthroughs are
generated both exogenously and at rate lNt, then the probability that a breakthrough is
generated by any given time is (weakly) greater than if learning is purely exogenous; this
beneﬁts a consumer who only adopts once there has been a breakthrough. Moreover, for all
t   t⇤, we have Wt = H(pt,0).
Recall the deﬁnition of p⇤ in Theorem 1.6.1, p⇤ :=
(#+r)(r+r)
2(#+r)(#+r) #r, and note that p⇤ is the
unique solution to 2p⇤   1 = H(p⇤,0). By deﬁnition of p⇤, if pt  p⇤ at any time t, then
2pt   1  H(pt,0)  Ht  Wt,
so for all t < t⇤, we must have pt > p⇤. Conversely, if t⇤ < +• and t   t⇤, then
2pt   1  Wt = H(pt,0),
so pt  p⇤ for all t   t⇤. We summarize this in the following lemma:
Lemma 1.6.3. Let Nt 0 be an equilibrium with corresponding cutoff time t⇤ and no-news posterior
pt 0. Then
pt > p⇤ , t < t⇤.
Given Lemma 1.6.2 and Lemma 1.6.3, the equilibrium characterization under perfect
49good news follows readily. Equation (1.9) is immediate from Lemma 1.6.3. For ﬁxed
parameters, we then obtain the unique equilibrium as follows: If p0  p⇤, then t⇤ = 0 and
Nt = 0 for all t. If p0 > p⇤, then we must have t⇤ > 0 and Nt = re rt ¯ N0 for all t < t⇤; if in
addition # > 0 or p0
⇣
1+ e l ¯ N0
⌘
< 1, then t⇤ < +• is uniquely determined as the solution
to
pt =
p0
p0 + (1  p0)e#t+(1 e rt) ¯ N0 = p⇤. (1.10)
If instead p0 > p⇤ and # = 0 and p0
⇣
1+ e l ¯ N0
⌘
  1, then Equation (1.10) does not admit a
solution, and we must have t⇤ =+ •: In this case, the potential for social learning in the
economy is so small that even a bad innovation is eventually adopted by all consumers,
despite the fact that no breakthroughs are ever generated.
As highlighted at the beginning of the section, the equilibrium under perfect good news
is Markovian in (pt,Lt). However, in marked contrast to the bad news case, if # = 0, then
adoption behavior is independent of the discount rate r: Even very patient consumers
will behave entirely myopically, adopting the innovation at all posteriors above 1
2 and
not adopting otherwise. If # > 0, then consumers’ forward-looking nature is reﬂected
by the fact that the cutoff posterior p⇤ below which consumers are unwilling to adopt is
(r+r)(r+#)
2(r+r)(r+#) r# > 1
2. In both cases, the cutoff posterior does not depend on l or ¯ N0: Social
learning only affects the time t⇤ at which adoption ceases conditional on no breakthroughs.
Moreover, as under perfect bad news, it is easy to see that holding ﬁxed other parameters,
L0 = l ¯ N0 is a sufﬁcient statistic for equilibrium behavior:
Lemma 1.6.4. Fix r,r > 0, p0 2 (0,1), and #   0. Suppose that ˆ l ˆ ¯ N0 = l0 ¯ N0. Let ˆ Nt and Nt
denote the unique equilibrium adoption ﬂows under (ˆ l, ˆ ¯ N0) and (l, ¯ N0), respectively, and let ˆ pt, ˆ t⇤
and pt,t ⇤ denote the corresponding equilibrium beliefs and cutoff times. Then
1. ˆ t⇤ = t⇤ ;
2. ˆ pt = pt for all t
3. and ˆ l ˆ Nt = lNt for all t.
50Proof. Immediate from the proof of Theorem 1.6.1.
1.6.2 Shape of Adoption Curve
Theorem 1.6.1 has the following implication for the shape of adoption curves in good news
markets:
Corollary 1.6.5. In the unique equilibrium of Theorem 1.6.1, the proportion of adopters in the
population is strictly increasing and concave for all t < t⇤ and given by
At :=
t Z
0
Ns
¯ N0
ds = 1  e rt.
If there is a breakthrough prior to t⇤, then the proportion of adopters is given by 1  e rt for all t; if
the ﬁrst breakthrough occurs at s > t⇤,41 then adoption comes to a temporary standstill between t⇤
and s, and for all t   s, the proportion of adopters is strictly increasing and concave and given by
1  e r(t⇤+t s).
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 1.8,42 adoption proceeds in concave “bursts”: Up to time
t⇤, all consumers adopt the innovation upon their ﬁrst opportunity, with the ﬂow of new
adopters declining at the rate r at which adoption opportunities arrive. Conditional on no
breakthroughs, adoption comes to a standstill at time t⇤, because by that point consumers are
pessimistic enough about the product to prefer to delay adoption. If # > 0, then exogenous
news sources might generate a breakthrough after t⇤, in which case a second concave burst
in adoption occurs.
While less common than the S-shaped curves we predicted under bad news,43 this type
of adoption pattern also corresponds to recurrent empirical ﬁndings. For instance, the
41This occurs only if # > 0.
42The parameters used to generate the ﬁgure are: # = 1/2, r = 1, r = 1, l = 0.5, and p0 = 0.7.
43Note that in our model purely concave adoption curves can also arise under bad news if the economy’s
potential for social learning is relatively limited or consumers are very optimistic (so that t⇤
1 = t⇤
2). The key
difference is that under perfect good news adoption curves are necessarily concave, even in economies with a
large potential for social learning or with fairly pessimistic and forward-looking consumers.
51marketing literature44 has coined the term “fast-break" product life cycle (PLC) to describe
goods with large initial sales volumes accompanied by a gradual decline in new purchases
(implying a concave adoption pattern), in contrast to S-shaped PLCs that initially feature
low sales volumes accompanied by a gradual increase in the number of new purchases. The
textbook example for fast-break PLCs is the movie industry,45 as illustrated in Figure 1.9.
Given that the movie industry is also sometimes cited as a typical example of a good news
market46 with learning occurring predominantly via positive events such as awards and
recommendations in social media, this ﬁnding appears to be in line with our model.
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Figure 1.8: Adoption Curves under Perfect Good News (blue = breakthrough before t⇤; yellow = breakthrough
after t⇤; pink = bad quality)
1.6.3 The Effect of Increased Opportunities for Social Learning
To further illustrate the distinction between good news and bad news markets, we now
study the effect of increased opportunities for social learning under good news. In contrast
44Cf. Keillor (2007) pp. 51-61.
45Additional evidence can be found in Davies (1979)’s study of the diffusion of 22 post-war process
innovations among industries in the UK. In the context of his probit model of innovation diffusion, he ﬁnds that
while S-shaped (logistic) diffusion paths are characteristic of complex and expensive innovations, they are less
suited to ﬁtting the diffusion paths of simpler and less expensive innovations, which typically feature rapid,
essentially concave growth from the beginning and are better approximated by a lognormal model.
46Cf. Board and Meyer–ter–Vehn (2013)
52Figure 1.9: “Adoption” patterns for various blockbuster movies (Source: McLaren and DePaolo (2009))
to our results under perfect bad news, we ﬁnd that increased opportunities for social
learning (essentially) always speed up learning, leave initial adoption levels unaffected, and
are strictly welfare-improving—all three results are due to the absence of partial adoption
regions under good news. Throughout this section, we ﬁx r,r > 0, p0 2 (0,1), and #   0,
and let p⇤ denote the equilibrium cutoff posterior:
p⇤ =
(r + r)(r + #)
2(r + r)(r + #)   r#
,
which is independent of the potential for social learning. Given that all other parameters
are ﬁxed, Lemma 1.6.4 implies that L0 = l ¯ N0 is a sufﬁcient statistic for all the quantities we
consider in this section.
Learning Speeds Up
We ﬁrst turn to the effect of increased opportunities for social learning on equilibrium beliefs.
As a result of the all-or-nothing nature of the perfect good news equilibrium, we can see that
learning necessarily speeds up—this is in contrast to the possibility of nonmonotonicities
due to partial adoption under perfect bad news. More precisely:
53Proposition 1.6.6. Fix ˆ L0 > L0
47 and let t⇤( ˆ L0), p
ˆ L0
t and t⇤(L0), p
L0
t denote the corresponding
equilibrium cutoff times and posteriors conditional on no breakthrough.
1. If p0 > p⇤, then
• 0 < t⇤( ˆ L0) < t⇤(L0)
• p
ˆ L0
t < p
L0
t for all t > 0
• p
ˆ L0
t⇤( ˆ L0)+k = p
L0
t⇤(L0)+k for all k   0.
2. If p0  p⇤, then
• t⇤( ˆ L0)=t⇤(L0)=0
• p
ˆ L0
t = p
L0
t for all t.
If p0 > p⇤, then conditional on no breakthroughs, all consumers adopt immediately
upon an opportunity until the time t⇤ at which the cutoff posterior p⇤ is reached. By
Theorem 1.6.1, there is never any partial adoption, so that an increase from L0 to ˆ L0 directly
translates into a faster rate of social learning at all times t prior to min{t⇤( ˆ L0),t⇤(L0)}:
lNt = re rtL0 < re rt ˆ L0 = ˆ l ˆ Nt. Since the cutoff posterior p⇤ is independent of social
learning, this implies that t⇤( ˆ L0) < t⇤(L0) and that learning is strictly faster under ˆ L0 at
all times. However, once the cutoff posterior is reached, information is generated at the
constant exogenous rate #, which means that conditional on t > t⇤, beliefs depend only on
t   t⇤, as summarized in the third bullet point under (i).
On the other hand, if p0  p⇤, then all consumers rely entirely on the exogenous news
source from the beginning, so the potential for social learning is irrelevant.
No Initial Slowdown of Adoption
The all-or-nothing nature of the perfect good news equilibrium also implies that increased
opportunities for social learning do not affect initial adoption levels—this is again in contrast
47If # = 0 we assume that p0
 
1+ e L0 
< 1 so that t⇤(L0) < •.
54to the possibility of initial slowdowns due to partial adoption under perfect bad news. More
precisely:
Proposition 1.6.7. Suppose ˆ L0 > L0.
1. If p0 > p⇤, then:
• For all t  t⇤( ˆ L0),A t( ˆ L0;q)=At(L0;q)=1  e rt for q = B,G.
• For all t > t⇤( ˆ L0),A t( ˆ L0;q) < At(L0;q) for q = B,G.
2. If p0  p⇤, then for all t:
• At(L0;B)=At( ˆ L0;B)=0;
• At(L0;G)=At( ˆ L0;G)=
⇣
1 
r
r #e #t
⌘
+ #
r #e rt.
Until t⇤( ˆ L0) all consumers adopt immediately upon an opportunity under both L0
and ˆ L0 regardless of the quality of the innovation. However, from t⇤( ˆ L0) on, expected
adoption levels are strictly lower under ˆ L0 than under L0: If the innovation is bad, this is
because adoption comes to a permanent standstill under ˆ L0 (until a further breakthrough
generated by the exogenous information #), but continues until t⇤(L0) under L0. If the the
innovation is good, the result is again immediate for all t  t⇤(L0) since adoption occurs
at the maximal rate under L0. For t > t⇤(L0), there are two opposing effects: On the one
hand, the guaranteed lower bound on adoption is higher under L0, but on the other hand
the probability of a breakthrough occurring prior to time t is always higher under ˆ L0.W e
show in the Appendix Section A.7.1 that the former effect dominates.
On the other hand, if p0  p⇤, then increased opportunities for social learning once again
have no effect at all on adoption levels, because no consumers adopt until the exogenous
news source generates a breakthrough.
No Saturation Effect
Proposition 1.6.7 showed that from time t⇤( ˆ L0) on, adoption levels for both good and bad
quality products are strictly lower under ˆ L0 > L0 than under L0. In welfare terms, the
55former effect is harmful while the latter is beneﬁcial. This raises the question whether
welfare under perfect good news might be subject to a similar saturation effect as under
bad news. Provided p0 > p⇤ and # > 0, the answer is negative:
Proposition 1.6.8. Suppose ˆ L0 > L0.
• If p0 > p⇤ and # > 0, then W0( ˆ L0) > W0(L0).
• If p0  p⇤ or # = 0, then W0( ˆ L0)=W0(L0) .
Thus, in contrast to the perfect bad news case, increased opportunities for social learning
are always strictly beneﬁcial, except in two cases: If consumers rely entirely on exogenous
information (p0  p⇤), or if there is no exogenous information (# = 0). Welfare-neutrality in
these two exceptional cases is clear: Increased opportunities for social learning can have an
effect on welfare only if there are histories at which a consumer’s decision whether to adopt
or delay is affected by information generated as a result of social learning. If p0  p⇤, then
consumers’ behavior depends only on information obtained exogenously (and no adoption
ever takes place if # = 0). If # = 0 and p0 > p⇤ = 1
2, then consumers are willing to adopt at
all histories, since no matter how large L0, the equilibrium posterior always remains weakly
above 1
2.
On the other hand, if p0 > p⇤ and # > 0, then under both L0 and ˆ L0 consumers adopt
immediately upon ﬁrst opportunity until p⇤ is reached and from then on delay adoption
until there has been a breakthrough. Moreover, the probability p⇤ of a breakthrough
occurring prior to p⇤ being reached is the same under both L0 and ˆ L0: p⇤ =
1 p0
1 p⇤. And
because learning occurs at the same rate once p⇤ is reached, the continuation value W⇤
conditional on p⇤ being reached is also the same: W⇤ = p⇤ R •
0 #e (#+r)t r
r+rdt = 2p⇤   1.
So the only difference is that conditional on no breakthroughs, the time t⇤ at which p⇤
is reached occurs earlier under ˆ L0. To see that this is strictly beneﬁcial, note that W0 is
composed of the following two terms:
W0(L0)=
⇣
1  e (r+r)t⇤(L0)
⌘ r
r + r
(2p0   1) + e (r+r)t⇤(L0)
✓
p⇤ r
r + r
+ (1  p⇤)W⇤
◆
,
56and similarly for ˆ L0. The ﬁrst term represents the case when a consumer receives an
adoption opportunity prior to time t⇤, and the second represents the case when a consumer’s
ﬁrst adoption opportunity occurs after t⇤. Conditional on either of these cases occurring,
the expected payoff is the same under both L0 and ˆ L0, but the time-discounted probability
e (r+r)t⇤
with which the second case occurs is strictly greater under ˆ L0. This is strictly
beneﬁcial, because the expected payoff in the second case is strictly greater:
✓
p⇤ r
r + r
+ (1  p⇤)(2p⇤   1)
◆
 
r
r + r
(2p0   1) =
r
r + r
(1  p⇤)(2p⇤   1) > 0.
Intuitively, in the second case the consumer adopts the innovation only once it has been
revealed to be good while in the ﬁrst case he adopts it regardless of its quality, and the
resulting beneﬁt from avoiding a bad innovation outweighs the cost of possibly having to
delay adoption of a good innovation.
Nature of Inefﬁciency: Even though there is no saturation effect and consumers are
able to always beneﬁt from increased opportunities for social learning, equilibrium adoption
behavior is not in general socially optimal. Let ps denote the cutoff posterior for the
cooperative benchmark derived in Proposition 1.3.2.
Proposition 1.6.9. If # = 0, equilibrium adoption behavior is socially optimal if and only if either
p0(1+ e L0)   1 or Inequality 1.5 holds. If # > 0, then equilibrium adoption behavior is socially
optimal if and only if ps   p0.
Consider ﬁrst the case where # = 0. Then if p0(1+e L0)   1, we have that t⇤ = ts =+ •;
and if Inequality 1.5 holds, then t⇤ = ts = 0. For the converse and to deal with the case
when # > 0, it then sufﬁces to show that ps < p⇤: This implies that whenever p0 > ps, then
conditional on no breakthroughs adoption ends too soon in equilibrium (or doesn’t take place
at all if p0  p⇤ even though the cooperative benchmark prescribes some initial adoption).
On the other hand, if p0  ps, then both the cooperative benchmark and the equilibrium
prescribe no adoption until there has been an exogenously generated breakdown. Note
that adoption ending too soon under the perfect good news equilibrium is the analog of
adoption beginning inefﬁciently late under perfect bad news. However, since the perfect
57good news equilibrium does not feature regions of partial adoption, there is no analog of
the second type of inefﬁciency that arose under perfect bad news: Whenever adoption does
occur under perfect good news, it takes place at an optimal rate.
To see that ps < p⇤, note that
✓
2 
#
# + r
r
r + r
◆
p⇤   1 = 0.
Using the above equality and evaluating the derivative of the objective function of the
cooperative problem in Equation 1.3 at p⇤, we obtain:
(1  p⇤)p⇤L0re rt⇤ r
# + r
✓
e (r+r)t⇤ r
r + r
¯ N0
◆
> 0.
This shows that ts > t⇤ and so ps < p⇤ as the objective function of the cooperative problem
is single-peaked.
1.7 More Social Learning Can Hurt: An Example
In Proposition 1.5.9 we established the saturation effect, whereby increased opportunities
for social learning under perfect bad news are welfare-neutral when L0 is sufﬁciently large
relative to the other fundamentals. Nevertheless, under the assumption of completely
homogeneous consumers in the previous sections, increases in L0 never produced ex ante
welfare losses. In this section, we establish the surprising result that when consumers are
heterogeneous, increased opportunities for social learning can strictly hurt some consumers
and bring about Pareto-decreases in ex ante welfare. To illustrate this, we introduce some
heterogeneity in consumers’ patience levels.
Consider a population consisting of two types of consumers: There is a mass M
p
0 of
patient types with discount rate rp > 0 and a mass Mi
0 of impatient types with discount
rate ri > rp. To simplify the analysis we assume that # = 0 and p0 > 1/2, although our
arguments easily extend to the case where # > 0. Because our purpose is simply to construct
an example illustrating the possibility of welfare loss, we restrict attention to a perfect bad
news setting.
58To construct our example, we begin by examining equilibria in which only types with
discount rate rp exist in the economy. Recall from Section 1.5.1 that for any discount rate
r > 0, we can deﬁne the function L⇤
r implicitly for every p 2 (1
2,
r+r
r+2r) by
2p   1 = Gr(p,L⇤
r(p)) :=
• Z
0
re (r+r)t
⇣
p   (1  p)e L⇤
r(p)(1 e rt)
⌘
dt.
Then by Theorem 1.5.1, whenever p0 <
r+rp
r+2rp and ˆ lM
p
0 > lM
p
0 > L⇤
rp(p0), then in the game
consisting solely of consumers of type rp, the two equilibria corresponding to information
structures l and ˆ l both feature initial regions of partial adoption.
The main argument in the construction of our example is to consider heterogeneous
economies where the mass Mi
0 of impatient types is very small, holding ﬁxed the mass of
patient types at M
p
0. More speciﬁcally, we show that when the mass of impatient types is
sufﬁciently small, the equilibrium behavior of the patient types in both equilibria (under
information process ˆ l and l) approximates the behavior in the corresponding equilibria
when only patient types are present. Then using arguments about the properties of equilibria
in the game with only patient types, in particular the non-monotonicity result for learning
established in Proposition 1.5.11, we can obtain the following result:
Theorem 1.7.1. Suppose 0 < rp < ri < +•. Fix M
p
0 > 0 and ˆ l > l > 0 such that ˆ lM
p
0 >
lM
p
0 > L⇤
rp(p0). Then there exists h > 0 such that whenever Mi
0 < h, Wi
0(ˆ l) < Wi
0(l) and
W
p
0 (ˆ l)=W
p
0 (l). Thus, whenever Mi
0 < h, the ex ante payoff proﬁle in the l-equilibrium
Pareto-dominates the ex ante payoff proﬁle in the ˆ l-equilibrium and
Mi
0Wi
0(ˆ l)+M
p
0W
p
0 (ˆ l) < Mi
0Wi
0(l)+M
p
0W
p
0 (l).
Here we sketch the main arguments of the theorem. Consider ﬁrst an economy consisting
only of types with discount rate rp: Mi
0 = 0 and M
p
0 > 0. If ˆ lM
p
0 > lM
p
0 > L⇤
rp(p0), then
the two equilibria corresponding to information structures l and ˆ l both feature initial
regions of partial adoption. Thus W
p
0 (ˆ l)=W
p
0 (l)=2p0   1.
Now consider the payoffs that a hypothetical type ri (even though such a type does not
59exist in this economy) would obtain if he were to behave optimally when faced with the
ﬂow of information generated in each of these equilibria. Because an optimal strategy (there
will be a continuum of optimal strategies) of a consumer of type rp is to adopt upon ﬁrst
opportunity absent breakdowns, it is straightforward to show that an optimal strategy of
such a hypothetical type ri would also be to adopt upon ﬁrst opportunity.
Given this, the payoffs of the hypothetical type ri in the two equilibria are given by the
following two expressions:
Wi
0(ˆ l)=
• Z
0
re (ri+r)t p0
p
ˆ l
t
⇣
2p
ˆ l
t   1
⌘
dt
Wi
0(l)=
• Z
0
re (ri+r)t p0
pl
t
⇣
2pl
t   1
⌘
dt.
Furthermore, patient types begin in a partial adoption phase in both equilibria:
2p0   1 = W
p
0 (ˆ l)=
• Z
0
re (rp+r)t p0
p
ˆ l
t
⇣
2p
ˆ l
t   1
⌘
dt
2p0   1 = W
p
0 (l)=
• Z
0
re (rp+r)t p0
pl
t
⇣
2pl
t   1
⌘
dt.
Recall from Proposition 1.5.11 that there exists t > t⇤ := t⇤
2(l) such that p
ˆ l
t = pl
t for all
t  t⇤, p
ˆ l
t < pl
t for all t 2 (t⇤,t) and p
ˆ l
t > pl
t for all t > t. We now exploit the expressions
for the value to waiting of the two types together with the deceleration of learning at
times just after t⇤ to obtain the result. Intuitively, because W
p
0 (ˆ l)=W
p
0 (l)=2p0   1, the
deceleration in learning followed by a later acceleration must balance out exactly so that the
patient type rp obtains the same ex ante payoff under l and ˆ l. But then these adjustments
must strictly hurt the less patient hypothetical type ri, because relative to type rp, type ri
weights the losses due to the slow down of learning more heavily than the beneﬁts that
arrive at later times.48
To complete the proof, we can show that even when Mi
0 > 0, as long as Mi
0 is sufﬁciently
48A formal argument is provided in Appendix Section A.8.
60small, we must still have Wi
0(ˆ l) < Wi
0(l) and W
p
0 (ˆ l)=W
p
0 (l). The ﬁrst inequality is the
result of a simple continuity argument. The second equality comes from the fact that even
upon perturbing Mi
0 slightly, the patient type must continue to partially adopt initially in
both equilibria.
Note that a crucial assumption underlying the above argument is that adoption oppor-
tunities are stochastic and limited. When r is ﬁnite, because of a natural delay in adoption,
the impatient types may not receive any adoption opportunities for a long time. As a
result, if an impatient type obtains his ﬁrst adoption opportunity late in the game, then
the information available at that point in time would be strictly lower under the equilib-
rium with information process ˆ l than l. This decrease in information (due to increased
free-riding of the patient types) when impatient types receive adoption opportunities late in
the game is precisely the cause of the impatient type’s welfare loss. If on the other hand
consumers were able to adopt freely at any time, then the impatient types would incur
no losses as they would adopt at exactly time 0 in both the l and ˆ l-equilibria. Thus the
example here illustrates an interesting interaction between heterogeneity and delays due to
limited opportunities for adoption.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of innovation adoption when consumers are forward-looking
and learning is social. Our analysis isolates the effect of purely informational incentives on
aggregate adoption dynamics, learning, and welfare, and highlights the way in which these
incentives vary across different informational environments. The possibility of free-riding
in the form of partial adoption is found to be particularly important, because it casts doubt
on the the received wisdom that the recent internet-driven surge in opportunities for social
learning should speed up learning and beneﬁt consumers. Owing to the advantages of
continuous time and Poisson learning, the model is very tractable, yielding closed-form
expressions for key quantities and allowing us to compute numerous comparative statics.
We brieﬂy discuss some questions for ongoing and future research that could build on
61the modeling framework and techniques developed in this paper. Current work in progress
relaxes the assumption of perfect Poisson learning to allow for signals that while indicative
of bad (respectively good) quality are not conclusive. Serving as a robustness check for our
results obtained under perfect Poisson learning, preliminary results suggest that many key
qualitative features are preserved, for example the possibility of partial adoption regions in
bad news markets (which once again coincide with convex growth in adoption levels) as
well as the absence of such regions under good news learning. In addition, the extension
to imperfect Poisson learning introduces interesting new questions that cannot be studied
when signals are conclusive. For example, when # = 0, then under imperfect (but not under
perfect) bad news it is possible for good innovations to fail, because even good products
can generate strings of breakdowns that might permanently halt adoption. This suggests
investigating the “fragility” of the adoption process as a function of parameters such as
the initial market belief and the relative rates at which bad and good products generate
breakdowns.
Further work in progress relaxes the assumption that signals are public. To see the idea,
suppose that learning is social, but that signals derived from past adopters’ experiences are
observed privately and independently (at rate lNt) by each remaining consumer, instead
of publicly and simultaneously as in the model in this paper. This captures the intuition
of decentralized social learning, for example when consumers frequent different blogs and
social media platforms. Assuming that at any time consumers make inferences based only
on their own private signals and on the expected number of adopters in the population,
another interesting difference between bad news and good news markets emerges: Under
bad news, a consumer who privately observes a breakdown will never adopt the innovation
in the future and hence will never generate any signals himself; this has a dampening effect
on the production of information in the economy and reduces free-riding incentives. By
contrast, consumers who privately observe breakthroughs under good news will adopt
the innovation at their next opportunity, thus amplifying information production in the
future and increasing free-riding incentives. This difference has important implications
62for aggregate adoption dynamics and for the impact of increased opportunities for social
learning.
Finally, moving beyond our focus in this paper on the purely informational aspects of
the problem, one could explore the implications of incorporating consumer heterogeneity
and pricing motives into the model. As we saw in Section 1.7, heterogeneity can interact in
interesting ways with informational free-riding incentives, sometimes rendering increases
in the potential for social learning strictly harmful. A more general characterization of
this interaction under more complex distributions of consumer heterogeneity appears
challenging but desirable. As for pricing, assume that the innovation is sold by a forward-
looking monopolist who does not have any inﬂuence on the quality of the innovation and
has access to exactly the same public information as consumers, but can inﬂuence the
endogenous production of information via the price. As a simple ﬁrst step, we could restrict
the monopolist to setting a single ﬁxed price and compute comparative statics on this price
and on welfare under increased opportunities for social learning. More challengingly, we
could allow the monopolist to commit to a time path of prices, examining for instance how
the fact that information is generated endogenously by consumer purchases affects the
monopolist’s incentives for intertemporal price-discrimination relative to the well-known
complete information results of Stokey (1979). We leave these two topics as interesting
avenues for future research.
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Delayed Response Strategies in
Repeated Games with Observation
Lags1
2.1 Introduction
Understanding when and why individuals cooperate in social dilemmas is a key issue not
just for economics but for all of the social sciences,2 and the theory of repeated games is
the workhorse model of how and when concern for the future can lead to cooperation even
if all agents care only about their own payoffs. The clearest expression of this idea comes
as players become arbitrarily patient; here various folk theorems provide conditions under
which approximately efﬁcient payoffs can be supported by equilibrium strategies. Because
of the inﬂuence of these results, it is important to understand which of their assumptions
are critical and which are merely convenient simpliﬁcations; a large literature (discussed
below) has extended the folk theorems under successively weaker assumptions about the
1Co-authored with Drew Fudenberg and Scott D. Kominers and published in the Journal of Economic
Theory (2014).
2See e.g., Ahn et al. (2003); Gachter et al. (2004).
64“monitoring structures” that govern the signals players receive about one another’s actions.
Here we relax an assumption which is maintained throughout most of the prior repeated
games literature: the assumption that signals of the actions taken in each period (simultane-
ously) arrive immediately after players’ actions in that period. Instead, we consider repeated
games in which the players’ signals about other player’s actions arrive with stochastic and
privately observed lags. Our folk theorems for settings with lagged signals show that the
assumption that signals are observed immediately is not necessary for repeated play to
support cooperation.
To prove these folk theorems, we use the idea of “delayed-response” strategies, under
which players wait to respond to signals of a given period’s play for long enough that it is
likely (although not certain) that every player has observed the relevant signals by the time
players respond to signal information. Although the observation lags generate a form of
imperfect private monitoring, the private information here has a special form that allows
delayed-response strategies to construct the same set of limit equilibrium payoffs as if the
lags were not present.
More speciﬁcally, we suppose that players act simultaneously each period, and that
players’ actions jointly determine a probability distribution over signals, but that players
• do not observe signals immediately and
• might observe signals asynchronously.
The times at which observation occurs are private information and may be inﬁnite, that
is, a particular signal may never arrive. Some sort of observation lags seem plausible in many
cases; for example there may be a small probability that a player is momentarily innattentive
and temporarily does not see their partner’s actions; more strongly, in some cases a player
may never learn just what happened during moments of inattention. Moreover, information
lags of multiple periods seem especially appropriate in settings for which the time period
under consideration is extremely short (Fudenberg and Levine (2007a, 2009); Sannikov and
Skrzypacz (2010)), and in continuous-time models, where the “period length” is effectively
650 (Bergin and MacLeod (1993); Sannikov (2007); Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007); Faingold
and Sannikov (2011)).3
To prove our folk theorems, we construct delayed-response strategies, in which the repeated
game is divided into a ﬁnite number of “threads,” with play in each thread independent of
play in the other threads. Section 2.3 examines the simplest application of this idea, which
is to the case of bounded lags, where there is a K such that every signal arrives within K
periods of play. Then, using strategies that have K + 1 threads, we can ensure that each
thread is equivalent to an instance of the original game (with the original game’s underlying
monitoring structure), a smaller discount factor, and no lag. Hence if the folk theorem holds
in a given repeated game (with any sort of contemporaneous monitoring), the associated
strategies can be used to establish a folk theorem—in delayed-response strategies—in the
corresponding game with bounded observation lags.4
The rest of the paper allows the lag distribution to have unbounded support, and also
allows for a small probability that some signals never arrive at all (corresponding to an
inﬁnite observation lag). In these cases the use of delay strategies reduces but does not
eliminate the impact of lags, and the game played in each thread has some additional
decision-relevant private information. Section 2.4 considers the case where signals are
almost-perfect if and when they do arrive—that is, each player either observes an almost-
perfect signal of period-t play with some lag, or else never sees a signal of period-t play.5
In our second model, presented in Section 2.5, players are allowed to communicate (via
cheap talk) each period, and the underlying information structure is one of imperfect public
monitoring. 6 In each case, players do not know whether and when other players observe
3Indeed, physics suggests that the speed of light is a constraint on the speed with which signals can travel.
4The Ellison (1994) study of contagion equilibria uses threads for a rather different purpose: to substitute
for public randomization as a way to weaken the effect of a grim-trigger punishment as the discount factor
tends to 1. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we use threads only as a way for the players to wait for lagged signals to
arrive; in Section 2.5, we also use threading in order to weaken the effect of grim-trigger punishments.
5In the case of lagged almost-perfect monitoring, we consider only games with two players, so that we
may invoke results of Hörner and Olszewski (2006). We do not know whether the folk theorem extends to the
analogous setting with n players.
6Our analysis assumes that messages are received the instant they are sent, but the results extend to cases in
66the signals associated with each period’s play, so there is a special but natural form of
private information.
For both of our main results, we use a similar proof technique: First, we consider an
auxiliary game with “rare” lags in which each player sees a private signal immediately with
probability close to (but not equal to) 1. After proving a folk theorem for the auxiliary game
with rare lags, we relate the perturbed game with rare lags to the game with possibly long
lags by identifying the event in which the signal does not arrive immediately with the event
that the signal arrives after some large time T. We then construct equilibria in the game with
lags by using delayed-response strategies as described above. For the ﬁrst main result we
prove the folk theorem for the auxiliary game by extending the bloc-strategy construction of
Hörner and Olszewski (2006) (henceforth HO2006) to treat as “erroneous” any history of
the auxiliary game in which some player observes another’s action with a strictly positive
lag; this corresponds to a “real lag” that is longer than the number of threads. The HO2006
construction does not directly apply here, as signals about past play may arrive outside
of the relevant block, but we construct equilibria that are belief free for the past T periods
provided that the probability of lagged observation is sufﬁciently small.
To prove the second main result, we ﬁrst consider a game with private monitoring,
communication, and no observation lag. In this game, each player either observes the
true action proﬁle or a null signal. We relate this to a game with a public signal that is
observed by all players, but where the game ends each period with a ﬁxed small probability,
corresponding to strategies in the original game that will use reversion to static Nash
equilibrium whenever the reported signals disagree. We prove a sort of folk theorem here
using the techniques of Fudenberg et al. (1994) (henceforth FLM) and then again use threads
and delayed responses to extend this to a proof for the original game.
which messages are received much more quickly than observations. We attribute the difference in speeds to the
fact that messages are crafted to be easily processed, while processing and interpreting signals can take longer.
672.1.1 Related Work
The repeated games literature has explored successively weaker assumptions on players’
monitoring structures, while maintaining the assumption that signals arrive immediately
after play. The ﬁrst wave of repeated-games models established folk theorems under the
assumption that players observe each others’ actions without error at the end of each round
of play (Aumann and Shapley (1976), Friedman (1971), Rubinstein (1994), and Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986)). Subsequent work extended the folk theorem to cases where agents
receive imperfect signals of other agents’ actions, where these signals can either be public
(FLM) or private but accompanied by cheap-talk public messages (Compte (1998), Kandori
and Matsushima (1998), and Obara (2009)),7 or private and without communication (e.g.,
Sekiguchi (1997), Mailath and Morris (2002), Hörner and Olszewski (2006), and Hörner
and Olszewski (2009)). As one step in our argument for the case of lagged almost-perfect
monitoring (Section 4), we extend the Hörner and Olszewski (2006) construction to almost-
perfect monitoring with rare lags.8 With each type of signal structure, the key assumptions
relate to the qualitative nature of the information that signals provide: Roughly speaking,
in order for the folk theorem to obtain, signals must be informative enough to “identify
deviations” in a statistical sense.9
The papers of Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011) and Bhaskar and Obara (2011) are
the closest to the present work, as in each, the time at which signals arrive is private
information. Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011) studied the effect of short privately-known
lags in observing the position of a state variable that evolves in continuous time, so that a
player observing the state variable at slightly different times would get different readings.
7We allow public messages in Section 2.5. The role of such messages has been studied in a number of
subsequent papers, including Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003), Fudenberg and Levine (2007b), and Escobar
and Toikka (2011). Public communication has also been used as a stepping stone to results for games where
communication is not allowed (Hörner and Olszewski (2006), Hörner and Olszewski (2009), and Sugaya (2011)).
8When the unlagged signals are imperfect, the signals in our auxiliary games are not almost common
knowledge in the sense of Mailath and Morris (2002), so the Hörner and Olszewski (2009) construction does not
apply.
9In addition, the folk theorem has been extended to recurrent stochastic games with perfectly or imperfectly
observed actions (Dutta (1995), Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011), and Hörner et al. (2011)).
68Bhaskar and Obara (2011) studied lags that were either deterministic or stochastic with
length at most 1. Both papers considered “short lags” and also restricted to the case of a
single long-run player facing a sequence of short-run opponents; this paper allows fairly
general stochastic lags and considers the case of all long-run players.
Several papers in the stochastic games literature studied deterministic lags of perfect
signals (e.g., Lagziel and Lehrer (2012), Levy (2009), and Yao et al. (2011)); this sort of lag
does not introduce private information and so is quite different from the lags we study. In
Abreu et al. (1991) consecutive signals are grouped together and delivered at once, so the
delay does not introduce private information.
2.2 General Model
This section introduces a general model that encompasses all the settings discussed sub-
sequently. We consider a repeated game with n players i 2 I ⌘{ 1,...,n}, each of whom
has a ﬁnite action space Ai. In each period t = 0,1,2,..., each player i chooses a possibly
mixed action at
i; this generates a sequence of pure action proﬁles {at}•
t=0. Each player i has
a ﬁnite signal space Wi, and there is a private signal structure p over W ⌘ ’i2I Wi; at each
time t, a private signal proﬁle is generated by p according to the conditional probability
p(w1,...,wn | at).
Thus far, the repeated game has the structure of a standard repeated game with private
monitoring. We now relax the assumption that players receive signals of period-t play
immediately after period t by replacing it with the assumption that the monitoring structure
is private with stochastic lags. As in the usual model, upon the choice of a period-t action
proﬁle at, a private signal proﬁle wt is generated according to the conditional distribution
p(wt | at). However, the players need not immediately observe their components of
the signal proﬁle. Instead, we assume that each player i observes his private signal of
period-t play, wt
i, at a stochastic time t + Lt
i, where {Lt ⌘ (Lt
1,..., Lt
n)}t is a collection of
random variables that take values in (N [{ •})n. We assume that the vectors {Lt} are
distributed identically and independently across t, with probability density function l :
69(N[{•})n ! [0,1]. We denote by li the density of the marginal distribution of observation
lags of player i, Li. (The case Lt
i = • is interpreted as the event in which player i never
receives any information about the period-t private signal.) We let Li denote the cumulative
marginal distribution function of player i’s observation lags, i.e. Li(`)=Â
`
m=0 li(m), for
` 2 (N [{•}).
Observation of wt
i takes place in period t + Lt
i after the choice of that period’s actions.10
When player i observes wt
i, he also observes a “timestamp” indicating that wt
i is associated.
with play in period t. That is, for example, when a player observes that player j played “C”
in a prisoner’s dilemma, she is informed about the period to which the observation applies,
rather than just getting a signal that “player j played C sometime in the past.”11
As one concrete example, consider a repeated public goods game in which every period
two friends must decide whether or not to exert effort to provide beneﬁts (or gifts) for each
other. The friends live far apart, so the beneﬁts must be shared via postal mail. This induces
a lag in observation of the realized signals of the friend’s action. Furthermore the postmark
dates serve as natural timestamps.
Alternatively suppose that n coauthors who write numerous papers together and sup-
pose that the quality of the paper is determined by the sum of the authors’ efforts. Each
period they complete a paper and submit it to a journal. The editor then makes a decision
and mails a letter to each of the authors. Here the decision reveals the project’s quality and
so provides evidence about partners’ efforts; in a two-player game if the effort ! quality
! editor’s letter map is deterministic and monotone, the letter perfectly reveals partners’
efforts, but more typically letters have a stochastic component. Here the project itself serves
as a natural timestamp.
Players have perfect recall and receive no further information.
10Thus player i cannot respond to the period-(t + Lt
i) observation information until time t + Lt
i + 1.
11The assumption of timestamps renders our model a smaller departure from the usual repeated game
monitoring structure than a model in which players observe only an aggregate measure of the frequencies with
which opponents took various actions. Note that it is not clear how players would interpret signals received
without timestamps when the expected path of play is not constant over time.
70In one part of the paper we allow for communication in every period. Thus, we include
message spaces Mi in the general model; when we want to rule out communication we
set Mi = ∆ for each i. After the realization of private signal proﬁle wt and after the
observation of all private information wt0
i for which t0 + Lt0
i  t, at each time t = 0,1,...,
each player i reports a message mi chosen from the message space Mi. After all of these
reports are (simultaneously) submitted, all players immediately observe the message proﬁle
m =( m1,...,mn).
We let Ht denote the set of t-period histories. For a given ht 2 Ht and any t0  t,w e
denote by ht,t0
the proﬁle of information about the t0-period signal that has been observed
by each player. If player i has not yet observed the k-th component of his private signal, wi,k
in time t0 then we specify that h
t,t0
i,k = •.
Finally we describe the payoff structure. A sequence of action proﬁles {at} chosen by
the players generates a total payoff
(1  d)
•
Â
t=0
dtgi(at).
In Section 2.5, we prove a Nash threat folk theorem rather than a full folk theorem. To
facilitate this, we ﬁx a Nash equilibrium a⇤ of the stage game and normalize payoffs of
players so that gi(a⇤)=0 for all i. We let V denote the convex hull of the feasible set of
payoffs, and let Va⇤ be the convex hull of the set consisting of g(a⇤)=0 and the payoff
vectors Pareto-dominating g(a⇤)=0: Va⇤ ⌘{ v 2 V | v   0}. We assume that int(Va⇤) is
non-empty.
In contrast, the theorems of Section 2.3 and 2.4 concern full folk theorems; thus, we
deﬁne V⇤ to be the set of individually rational payoffs of V. With this notation, we are ready
to discuss our folk theorems.
We let G(d,p,l) be the repeated game with discount factor d, lag distribution l, and
monitoring structure p, and let E(d,p,l) denote the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs of
G(d,p,l). We let G(d,p) ⌘ G(d,p,imm), where imm is the (degenerate) distribution which
puts full weight on immediate observation, and deﬁne E(d,p) ⌘ E(d,p,imm) similarly.
71Finally we introduce the concept of delayed-response strategies, which are used through-
out the remainder of the paper to prove our folk theorems. We call s a delayed-response
strategy proﬁle in the repeated game if there exists some K such that the repeated game can
be divided into K “threads”, with the `-th thread consisting of periods `, K + `,2K + `,...,
so that at any period t players condition their strategies only on messages and signal
information generated within the thread containing period t.
2.3 Bounded Lags
We ﬁrst present a simple analysis of a repeated game with observation lags in which the lag
is certain to be no more than some ﬁnite bound.
Assumption 2.3.1. There exists some K < • such that Pr(maxi Li  K)=1.
With this assumption, it is common knowledge that all players will have seen the
signal generated in period t by period t + K. This restriction allows us to show that every
equilibrium payoff attainable for sufﬁciently large discount factors in the repeated game
without observation lags with any private monitoring structure p can also be attained in the
associated repeated game with observation lags for sufﬁciently patient players. We show
this using delayed-response strategies. Note that the following result does not impose any
restrictions on p; we use such conditions for our folk theorems later but they are not needed
here.
Theorem 2.3.2. Suppose Assumption 2.3.1 holds. Furthermore suppose that v 2 E(d,p) for all
d 2 (d,1) where 0 < d < 1. Then there exists some d⇤ 2 (0,1) such that v 2 E(d,p,l) for all
d 2 (d⇤,1).
Proof. We divide the periods of the repeated game into K + 1 threads, with the `-th thread
consisting of periods `, (K + 1)+`,2 (K + 1)+`,.... Now, we suppose that v 2 E(d,p) is
generated by the strategy proﬁle s in the game without lags.
As the information lag has an upper bound of K, the signals generated in periods
`, (K + 1)+`,...,(j   1)(K + 1)+` are observed by all players by period j(K + 1)+`.
72Thus, we may deﬁne a delayed-response strategy proﬁle sK by specifying that in period
t = j(K + 1)+` (0  `  K), players play according to s(ht,`,ht,(K+1)+`,...,ht,(j 1)(K+1)+`).
It is clear that the delayed-response strategy proﬁle sK generates a payoff proﬁle of v.
Moreover, it is an equilibrium for discount factor dK+1. Thus, taking d⇤ = dK+1 gives the
result.
The proof of Theorem 2.3.2 relies heavily on Assumption 2.3.1. For example, if the
support of l were concentrated on (0,...,0),(1,...,1),...,(K,...,K), and (•,...,•), then
the proof above would not work, since each of the threads that it constructs would be
a repeated game with a private monitoring structure ˜ p that is different from p. More
problematically, if li(k) > 0 for all i and k 2 N, so that all lag lengths have positive
probability for all players, then no matter how far apart the threads are spaced, there is
always a positive probability that a realized lag will be longer than this chosen spacing, and
the threads considered in the proof above cannot be identiﬁed with a private monitoring
game at all. In the next two sections, we study and demonstrate how these issues can be
resolved when additional assumptions are placed on the monitoring structure p. Therefore
for the remainder of the paper, we dispense with Assumption 2.3.1 and allow l to be an
arbitrary probability distribution on (N [{•})n.
2.4 Lagged Almost-Perfect Monitoring with Two Players
In this section, we extend an approach of HO2006 to obtain a folk theorem for two-player
games with lagged almost-perfect monitoring. We focus on the two-player case since the
techniques of HO2006 extend naturally to this setting.12
12We do not know whether our folk theorem extends to games with n players; we discuss related issues in
Section 2.6.
732.4.1 Model
We restrict the general monitoring structure introduced above. First, we assume that there
are only two players. We assume the monitoring structure to be that of lagged #-perfect
monitoring: We allow a general lag structure here, but restrict the private signal space of each
player i to be Wi = Aj and furthermore assume that p is #-perfect in the sense of HO2006.
We assume that the private signal space of Wi = Aj so that we may extend the techniques of
HO2006.13
Deﬁnition 2.4.1. A private monitoring structure p is #-perfect if for every action proﬁle
a 2 A, p(a2,a1 | a1,a2) > 1  #.
The Folk Theorem
We now prove the following folk theorem.
Theorem 2.4.2. Suppose that v 2 int(V⇤). Then there exists some ¯ # 2 (0,1) such that for all lag
distributions l for which li(•) < ¯ # (for i = 1,2), there exists some ¯ d such that v 2 E(d,p,l) for
all d > ¯ d, and all private monitoring structures p that are ¯ #-perfect. 14
To prove Theorem 2.4.2, we ﬁrst analyze an auxiliary repeated game with rare observation
lags, in which the probability of instantaneous observation of the private signal is very close
to 1. We show that the HO2006 approach to repeated games with almost-perfect monitoring
can be extended to lagged repeated games with almost-perfect monitoring, so long as
positive lags are sufﬁciently rare, and use this to obtain a folk theorem in the auxiliary game.
We then convert the associated auxiliary-game strategies to delayed-response strategies by
multithreading the game with lags. A positive lag in a particular thread corresponds to a
lag that exceeds the number of threads, so by taking the delay long enough we can shrink
13Note that the work of HO2006 does contain a section that extends the analysis to more general private
signal spaces where Wi 6= Ai. However, as Yuichi Yamamoto pointed out to us, that argument contains an error
so we cannot use it here.
14We thank Yuichi Yamamoto for pointing out a problem with our earlier proof of this result and then
suggesting the approach we use now.
74the probability of a positive lag close to 0. We thus obtain a folk theorem in the game with
stochastic lags.
2.4.2 Auxiliary Repeated Game with Rare Observation Lags
This subsection establishes the following folk theorem for the game where li(0) is close to 1
for all players i:
Theorem 2.4.3. Let v 2 int(V⇤). Then there exist ¯ #,d 2 (0,1) such that if li(0) > 1   ¯ # (for
i = 1,2), p is ¯ #-perfect, and d > d, then v 2 E(d,p,l).
Our proof of this theorem adapts a technique of HO2006 to the environment with
small observation lags. The HO2006 construction for the case of almost-perfect monitoring
uses the same strategies as in the perfect-monitoring construction at histories that are on
the equilibrium path of that equilibrium (the “regular histories”), and then uses standard
full-rank arguments to show there are continuation payoffs (at the end of the review phase)
that preserve the belief-freeness property at the “erroneous” histories—those which are off
the path of play under perfect monitoring. When the monitoring is close to perfect, the
additional variation introduced in these continuation payoffs converges to zero. We use
a similar argument, grouping histories together by treating a delayed observation as one
that never arrives, and classifying as “erroneous” any history in which some player observes
the opponent’s action with a strictly positive lag. We then construct continuation payoffs
associated to these histories by applying full-rank arguments to the “immediate observation
structure” deﬁned below.
Note ﬁrst that because the information lag is not bounded, it is possible that information
about some past event arrives very late in the repeated game. Such possibilities cannot be
ignored—even though they happen with very low probability—since they may potentially
affect a player’s beliefs about his opponent’s continuation play. Our extension deals with
this problem by constructing equilibria that are belief-free every T periods for the repeated
75game with the probability of lagged observation sufﬁciently small.15 This means that only
information about the past T periods is relevant for computing best replies. Thus, we
can ensure that effects on beliefs due to observation lags lasting more than T periods are
unimportant.
Note next that lags of length less than T do affect players’ on-path beliefs, so the HO2006
arguments do not directly apply. We extend them to lags with l(0) close to 1 by adding the
histories where observations arrive with a positive lag to the set of “erroneous” histories.
Preliminaries
We let Ht
i be the set of t-period histories in the repeated game with observation lags, with
elements denoted in the form
ht
i =( a0
i ,a1
i ,...,at 1
i ,h
1,o
i ,h
2,o
i ,...,h
t,o
i ).
Here, h
t,o
i denotes all of the new information about the past play of player  i that player i
receives in period t. Furthermore denote by ST
i the set of strategies in the T-times repeated
game with information lags. Let ˜ Ht
i be the set of t-period histories in the repeated game
without observation lags and with perfect monitoring with a typical element of ˜ Ht
i denoted by ˜ ht
i.
Also denote the set of strategies in the T-times repeated game with perfect monitoring and
no observation lags by ˜ ST
i .
Now we partition the set of private histories in the T-times-repeated stage game into
HR
i and HE
i , the regular and erroneous histories. To do this we ﬁrst deﬁne restricted strategy
sets ˜ Si and ˜ S
r
i for i = 1,2 in the T-times repeated game with perfect monitoring. Partition
the set Ai into two subsets, denoted G and B. We call an instance of the T-times repeated
game with perfect monitoring a block, and say that a player i sends message M 2{ G,B} if he
picks an action in M in the ﬁrst period of a block. As in HO2006, we ﬁx a payoff vector v
to be achieved in equilibrium and pick four action proﬁles aX,Y for (X,Y) 2{ G,B}2 with
15A strategy is belief-free at time t if the continuation strategy at time t, si | ht 1
i , is a best response against
s i | ht 1
 i for all pairs of histories (ht 1
i ,ht 1
 i ). (Here, as we deﬁne formally below, “|” indicates the restriction
of a strategy to a given history set.)
76w
X,Y
i = gi(aX,Y), X,Y 2{ G,B}, where w
G,G
i > vi > w
B,B
i , and
w
G,B
1 > v1 > w
B,G
1 , w
B,G
2 > v2 > w
G,B
2 .16
Choose vi < vi with v⇤
i < vi < vi < vi—where v⇤
i is player i’s minmax payoff—such that
[v1,v1] ⇥ [v2,v2] ⇢ int(co{wG,G,wB,B,wB,G,wG,B}).
We let ˜ ST
i be the set of block strategies for player i, i.e. the set of strategies for the T-
period perfect monitoring repeated game. We let ˜ Si be the set of strategies ˜ si 2 ˜ ST
i such
that ˜ si[˜ ht
i]=a
M2,M1
i for all ˜ ht
i =( a,(a
M2,M1
i ,a
M2,M1
 i ),...,(a
M2,M1
i ,a
M2,M1
 i )) with a 2{ Mi}⇥G
(t   1). We then let
˜ Ai(˜ ht
i) ⌘{ ai 2 Ai : 9˜ si 2 ˜ Si such that ˜ si[˜ ht
i](ai) > 0},
˜ S
r
i ⌘{˜ si 2 ˜ Si : ˜ si[˜ ht
i](ai) > r for all ˜ ht
i and ai 2 ˜ Ai(˜ ht
i)}.17
Deﬁne ˜ H
R,t
i to be the set of period-t private histories of player i in the T-times-repeated
game with perfect monitoring that are on the equilibrium path for some (and therefore,
every) strategy proﬁle in ˜ S
r
1 ⇥ ˜ S
r
2. Then we identify each ˜ ht
i 2 ˜ Ht
i with the unique element of
ht
i 2 Ht
i such that ht
i and ˜ ht
i report exactly the same observations about the play of player  i
at all times and ht
i contains no observations with a positive lag (all observations are observed
instantaneously). Deﬁne H
R,t
i as the image of ˜ H
R,t
i under this identiﬁcation, and denote this
identiﬁcation by ˜ ht
i ' ht
i for ˜ ht
i 2 ˜ Ht
i and ht
i 2 Ht
i. Also deﬁne the set of erroneous histories
to be H
E,t
i = Ht
i \ H
R,t
i . This means that H
E,t
i includes any private histories in which player i
did not immediately observe the period-t0 play of player  i for some t0 < t.
Additionally deﬁne the set of strategies Si ✓ ST
i in the repeated game with observation
16These action proﬁles can be assumed to be pure, either with the use of a public randomization device or by
picking a quadruple of sequences of action proﬁles such that the average payoff of each of the sequences satisfy
the above properties.
17As in the HO2006 constructions, given any history ht
i, the set ˜ Si imposes either no restrictions on si[ht
i] or
restricts si[ht
i] to a single action. In particular any strategy ˜ si 2 ˜ S
r
i puts positive weight on all actions after any
erroneous history.
77lags as the set
Si ⌘{ si 2 ST
i : 9˜ si 2 ˜ Si such that ˜ si[˜ ht
i]=si[ht
i] for all ˜ ht
i 2 ˜ Ht
i where ˜ ht
i ' ht
i}.
Additionally, deﬁne
Ai(ht
i) ⌘{ ai 2 Ai : 9si 2S i such that si[ht
i](ai) > 0},
S
r
i ⌘{ si 2S i : si[ht
i](ai) > r for all ht
i 2 Ht
i and ai 2A i(ht
i)}.18
Finally we deﬁne strategies sB
i ,sG
i 2S
r
i by mapping the strategies ˜ sB
i and ˜ sG
i deﬁned by
HO2006 in a perfect monitoring repeated game to strategies in our environment with private
monitoring and observation lags in a natural way. (The details of this deﬁnition are included
in Appendix B.1.)
Proof of Theorem 2.4.3
The proof of Theorem 2.4.3 follows from three key lemmata; once these lemmata have been
established, the remainder of the proof follows exactly as in HO2006. The ﬁrst lemma adapts
Lemma 1 of HO2006 to our setting of repeated games with information lags. Because the
proof requires some nontrivial modiﬁcations, we include the argument here. As we show in
the Appendix, analogous modiﬁcations can be made to the proofs of Lemmata 2 and 3 of
HO2006; Theorem 2.4.3 then follows.
We write si | Hi for the restriction of strategy si to history set Hi. We let ˜ UT
i be the
payoff of player i in the T-times repeated game with perfect monitoring and no observation lags.
Analogously deﬁne UT
i to be the ex-ante payoff of player i in the T-times repeated game
with private monitoring structure p and observation lags. We consider a version of the T-times
repeated game (with observation lags) which is augmented with a transfer x i : HT
i ! R at
the end of the T-th period. In this auxilary scenario, the payoff of i under strategy proﬁle s is
18Just as in the case of ˜ S
r
i in Footnote 17, s
r
i 2S
r
i puts positive weight on all actions after any erroneous
history.
78taken to be
UA
i (s,xi) ⌘ UT
i (s)+( 1  d)dTE(xi | s).
The set of best responses of player i in the auxiliary scenario with opponent’s strategy s i
and own transfer xi is denoted Bi(s i,xi).
With these notations, we have the following lemma that deﬁnes the transfer xB
i received
after “bad” messages.
Lemma 2.4.4. For every strategy proﬁle ¯ s | HE, there exists ¯ # > 0 such that whenever li(0) > 1  ¯ #
for i = 1,2 and p is ¯ #-perfect, then there exists a nonnegative transfer xB
i : HT
 i ! R+ such that
ST
i = Bi(¯ sB
 i,xB
i ) where ¯ sB
 i | HR
 i = sB
 i | HR
 i and ¯ sB
 i | HE
 i = ¯ s i | HE
 i, and for every
si 2 Bi(¯ sB
 i,xB
i ),
lim
#!0
UA
i (si, ¯ sB
 i,xB
i )=max
˜ si2 ˜ ST
i
˜ UT
i (˜ si, ¯ sB
 i).
This generalizes Lemma 1 of HO2006 to a repeated game in which information does not
arrive instantaneously. To do so, we must contend with the fact that HT
 i contains many
more histories than in their private monitoring environment because information may arrive
with lag, so that it is not immediately clear how to construct the xB
i . We handle this issue by
partitioning the set of histories into sets which are past-observation equivalent, in the sense
that for any two time-t histories ht and ht0
in the same set, the (t   1)-period truncations of
ht and ht0
are equal. We then identify each of the elements of this partition with a particular
history in a private monitoring repeated game with the immediate monitoring structure µ
induced by l and p deﬁned over the space of signal proﬁles (W1 [{•}) ⇥ (W2 [{•}):
µ( ˆ w1, ˆ w2 | a1,a2)=
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
Â
•
t1=1 Â
•
t2=1 l(t1,t2) ˆ w1, ˆ w2 = •
(Â
•
t=1 l(t,0))
⇣
Âw0
12A2 p(w0
1, ˆ w2 | a1,a2)
⌘
ˆ w1 = • and ˆ w2 6= •
(Â
•
t=1 l(0,t))
⇣
Âw0
22A1 p( ˆ w1,w0
2 | a1,a2)
⌘
ˆ w1 6= • and ˆ w2 = •
l(0,0)p( ˆ w1, ˆ w2 | a1,a2) ˆ w1, ˆ w2 6= •.
This monitoring structure represents the information about the period-t action of the
opponent that is available in period-t + 1, treating positive lags as the null signal. With this
79identiﬁcation, we can extend the arguments of HO2006 to arrive at our desired conclusion.
We construct the transfers xG
i received after a “good” message in the repeated game with
rare lags in a fashion closely similar to those speciﬁed in Lemma 2.4.4.
Lemma 2.4.5. For every strategy proﬁle ¯ s | HE, there exists ¯ # > 0 such that, whenever Pr(L >
0) < ¯ # and p is ¯ #-perfect, there exists a nonpositive transfer xG
i : HT
 i ! R  such that
{si 2 sT
i : si | HR
i = ˆ si | HR
i for some ˆ si 2S i and si | HE
i = ¯ si | HE
i }✓Bi(¯ sG
 i,xG
i |¯ si)
where ¯ sG
 i | HR
 i = sG
 i | HR
 i and ¯ sG
 i | HE
 i = ¯ s i | HE
 i. Furthermore xG
i : HT
 i ! R  can be
chosen so that, for every si 2 Bi
 
¯ sG
 i,xG
i | ¯ si
 
, we have
lim
#!0
UA
i
⇣
si, ¯ sG
 i,xG
i
⌘
= min
˜ si2 ˜ Si
˜ UT
i (˜ si, ¯ sG
 i),
xG
i depends continuously on ¯ s, and xG
i is bounded away from  •.
We relegate the proof to the Appendix. The remainder of the proof of Theorem 2.4.3
follows along the same lines as in HO2006, deﬁning ¯ sB
 i | HE
 i and ¯ sG
 i | HE
 i, xG
i and xB
i as the
ﬁxed point of the relevant correspondence. The construction works because of Lemma 2.4.5
and the fact that play at periods T,2T,..., is belief free (by Lemma 2.4.4). Thus for example
if player i receives information about the play of player  i in period T   m at some time
T + l, this does not have any effect on his best response calculation since player i’s strategy
only depends on the history of information about the events occurring after period T.
2.4.3 The Repeated Game with Frequent Observation Lags
In the previous section, we required that the probability of a positive lag be small. In this
section, we show that even if the lags are frequent and possibly very long, the folk theorem
still obtains when li(•) is sufﬁciently small for i = 1,2.
The following lemma employs a technique similar to that used in the proof of Theo-
rem 2.3.2, using delayed-response strategies to relate the equilibrium payoffs in the game
with rare observation lags to those with possibly long lags.
80Lemma 2.4.6. Suppose v 2 E(d,p, ˆ l) for all lag distributions ˆ l such that ˆ l(0) > 1   ¯ # and all
d 2 (d,1). Then for all lag distributions l such that li(•) < ¯ #/2 for i = 1,2, there exists some
d⇤ 2 (0,1) such that v 2 E(d,p,l) for all d > d⇤.
Proof. Choose K 2 N such that (1  Li(K   1)) < ¯ # for i = 1,2. and set d⇤ = d
1
K. Then there
exists a positive integer K⇤   K + 1, such that dK⇤
2 (d,1) for every d > d⇤.
Now divide the repeated game G(d,p,l) into K⇤ distinct repeated game “threads,” the
`-th (1  `  K⇤) of which is played in periods `,K⇤ + `,2K⇤ + `,...Because K⇤   K + 1,
each of these separate repeated games is equivalent to G(dK⇤
,p, ˆ l) for some ˆ l such that
ˆ l(0) > 1   ¯ #, and each repeated game thread can be treated independently, as players
never condition their play in the `-th thread on information received about play in the `0-th
repeated games (`0 6= `). Because v 2 E(dK⇤
,p, ˆ l), it is then clear that v 2 E(d,p,l) for all
d > d⇤.
Theorem 2.4.2 follows directly from Lemma 2.4.6 and Theorem 2.4.3.
Remark. Ellison (1994) used threading primarily to lower the discount factor. By contrast,
we use threading to ensure that the probability of lags being longer than the thread length
remains low, so that players (with high probability) observe signals of play within a thread
before choosing new actions within that thread. Thus the number of threads required in
our proof is independent of the discount factor, while Ellison (1994) required the number of
threads to become arbitrarily large as the discount factor approaches 1.
2.5 Lagged Public Monitoring
2.5.1 Model
In this section, we consider an n-player repeated game in which the monitoring structure of
the repeated game is public with stochastic lags: There is a set of public signals, denoted Y,
and we set Wi = Y for all players i 2 I. Furthermore we assume that p is supported on the
set
{(y1,...,yn) 2 Yn : y1 = y2 = ···= yn}.
81That is, the monitoring structure of the underlying repeated game without lags is public.
With a slight abuse of notation, we then write p(y | a) as shorthand for p((y,...,y) | a).
We place a mild restriction on the support of the monitoring structure p.
Assumption 2.5.1. For every pure action proﬁle a 2 A, there exist y,y0 2 Y with y 6= y0
such that p(y | a),p(y0 | a) > 0.
Note that the argument used for the case of lagged perfect monitoring does not work here
because the analogous auxiliary game does not have almost-perfect monitoring. Moreover,
an extension of the Hörner and Olszewski (2009) construction to repeated games with rare
observation lags is not possible, because that construction assumes that each player assigns
high probability to the event that all players observe the same signal as in the setting of
Mailath and Morris (2002); this condition is possibly violated when a player observes the
low-probability “null” signal.19 The possibility of receiving an uninformative signal also
prevents the application of the folk theorem of Sugaya (2011), because the necessary full
rank condition fails. Thus, instead of invoking or adapting existing results for general
private monitoring games, we allow for the possibility of communication that is perfectly
and publicly observed at the end of every period, i.e. Mi 6= ∆. We assume that, unlike
signals, messages are observed without delay. In the context of our “joint coauthorship”
example of Section 3.2, the authors can quickly reach each other by phone or email after
the reports arrive. We show that as long as |Mi| | Y| + 1 for all i, a folk theorem can be
established.
19We believe that threading combined with Hörner and Olszewski (2009) yields a folk theorem when lags are
sufﬁciently positively correlated because the auxiliary repeated game corresponding to a thread can be treated
as an almost-public monitoring game with the possibility of an uninformative null signal. The techniques we
develop in this section are more novel.
822.5.2 Structure of the Observation Lags
In this section, we allow for the possibility that lags may be correlated (across agents).
Deﬁne:20
L(T) ⌘ Pr
✓
min
i
{Li}T
◆
and set gi ⌘ lim
T!•

1  L(T)
1  Li(T)
 
.
The quantity gi represents the limiting conditional probability that player i assigns to the
event that players j 6= i have not received signals about period-t play within T periods,
when he himself has also not received any signal about period-t play within T periods. Note
that if Pr({L : Li = •}) > 0, then gi =
l((•,...,•))
li(•) .
For our results in the section, we assume that li(•) and gi are both small for all i. It is
easy to see what kind of lags satisfy the ﬁrst condition. The second condition is a bit more
subtle and so we illustrate it through some concrete examples in the Appendix.
2.5.3 The Folk Theorem
We begin our analysis with the simple observation that the repeated play of a⇤ is an
equilibrium of the game with observation lags.21 We use this fact along with techniques
from Abreu et al. (1990) and FLM to construct equilibria that generate any payoff proﬁle
v 2 int(Va⇤).
To use the techniques of FLM, we need to impose some additional assumptions on the
public monitoring structure p. Recall the following deﬁnition from FLM.
Deﬁnition 2.5.2. Let p be a public monitoring structure. Then a mixed action proﬁle a has
pairwise full rank for a pair i, j 2 I if the ((|Ai| + |Aj|) ⇥| Y|) matrix
0
B
@
(p(·|ai,a i))ai2Ai
 
p(·|aj,a j)
 
aj2Aj
1
C
A
20Although we assume that Li(T) < 1 for all T 2 N, our results extend to the case in which there exists
some player i and some T⇤ such that Li(T⇤)=1. In that case, we can simply take the number of threads to be
larger than T⇤, so that player i’s signal structure in the auxiliary game need not contain • as one of its elements.
21Note that for such play, the communication strategies are irrelevant, so we need not specify them.
83has rank |Ai| + |Aj| 1.
We will maintain the following restriction on p throughout the rest of this section.
Assumption 2.5.3. For all pairs i, j, there exists a proﬁle a that has pairwise full rank for
that pair.
We can now state our folk theorem for repeated games with public monitoring and
stochastic lags with communication.
Theorem 2.5.4. Let v 2 int(Va⇤) and suppose that p satisﬁes Assumptions 2.5.1 and 2.5.3.
Furthermore suppose that |Mi| | Y| + 1 for all i. Then there exist some #⇤ 2 (0,1) such that for
every l such that gi < #⇤ and li(•) < #⇤ for all i, there exists d⇤ 2 (0,1) such that v 2 E(d,p,l)
for all d > d⇤.
As a preview of our proof, it is important that both gi and li(•) are small for all
i. The need of the latter condition should be intuitive. For example, in a two-player
game, if it is likely that one player never observes any information, the other player would
have an incentive to play myopically. As we will see, the former condition is important
for establishing truthful communication of signals. The remainder of the section proves
Theorem 2.5.4.
2.5.4 Private Monitoring Game with Communication
Incentives for Truthful Communication
We ﬁrst consider a private monitoring game with communication (in every period) and no
observation lags for which each player’s message space is Mi = ˜ Y ⌘ Y [{•}. The results of
this section are of stand-alone interest: the case where players might sometimes not see the
signal seems plausible and it leads to a form of private monitoring that does not appear to
be covered by past results. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne some notation. For a vector ˜ y 2 ˜ Yn, deﬁne
I(˜ y)={i : ˜ yi 6= •} and |˜ y|⌘| I(˜ y)|. Deﬁne the following set
Y⌘{ (˜ y1,...,˜ yn) 2 ˜ Yn : |(˜ y1,...,˜ yn)| > 0 and ˜ yj = ˜ yk8j,k such that ˜ yj, ˜ yk 6= •}.
84The monitoring structure is then supported on the set Y[{ (•,...,•)}. For any ˜ y 2Y ,w e
deﬁne ~ ˜ y 2 Y to be the y 2 Y such that ˜ yj = y for all j such that ˜ yj 6= •.
Now consider a private monitoring structure ppr that is supported on the set Y[
{(•,...,•)} with the following additional features.
Assumption 2.5.5. ppr((•,...,•) | a) is constant across all a 2 A.
Assumption 2.5.6. Â~ ˜ y=y ppr(˜ y | a)=( 1  ppr((•,...,•) | a))p(y | a) for all y 2 Y.
The reasons for these restrictions become clear when we relate this game to the repeated
game with observation lags. We say that this monitoring structure is #-close to p if ppr is
such that
ppr({˜ y : ˜ y i =( •,...,•)}|a, ˜ yi) < # (2.1)
for all a 2 A and all ˜ yi 2 A [{ •}. Note that this deﬁnition of #-closeness to a public
monitoring structure is quite different from the one used by Hörner and Olszewski (2009).
The key difference is in the conditional probability ppr((•,...,•) | a, ˜ yi = •). Hörner and
Olszewski (2009) assumed this conditional probablity to be close to 1. Here, we assume that
it is very small.
We denote by Gpr(d,ppr) the private monitoring game with discount factor d and private
monitoring structure ppr (and communication) and let Epr(d,ppr) be the set of sequential
equilibrium payoffs of Gpr(d,ppr). We now show the following.
Theorem 2.5.7. Let v 2 int(Va⇤). Then there exist d,d 2 (0,1) with d < d and ¯ # 2 (0,1) such
that v 2 Epr(d,ppr) for all d 2 [d,d] and all private monitoring structures ppr that are ¯ #-close to p.
To prove this theorem we construct strategies that generate a payoff proﬁle of v, and
are public perfect in the sense of Kandori and Matsushima (1998): strategies in the non-
communication stages of the game depend only on the sequence of message proﬁles
reported in the history. These strategies use a form of grim-trigger reversion to static
Nash equilibrium when the messages disagree, in order to provide incentives for truthful
reporting. We prove the theorem in two parts. We ﬁrst prove a lemma demonstrating that
85truth-telling is incentive compatible (i.e. that each player i should report message mi = y
upon seeing signal y 2 Y) when # is sufﬁciently small given strategies with this grim-trigger
property.
Lemma 2.5.8. Let W be a convex, compact set that is a subset of int(Va⇤). Consider a collection
of public perfect strategy proﬁles {sd,ppr
}, indexed by d and ppr, for all d 2 [d,d] and all private
monitoring structures ppr that are #-close to p and have the following properties.
1. In period t, each player i (truthfully) communicates the signals ˜ yt
i 2 ˜ Y = Mi he observes in
period t.
2. If there exists some t such that mt / 2Y , then all players i play a⇤
i .
3. Strategies are such that sd,ppr
(m0,...,mt)=sd,ppr
( ¯ m0,..., ¯ mt) whenever ~ mt = ~ ¯ mt for all
t = 0,...,t.
4. Expected continuation values are always contained in W for play of sd,ppr
in the game
Gpr(d,ppr) whenever the message history contains only elements in the set Y.
Then there exists #⇤  ¯ # such that for all private monitoring structures ppr that are #⇤-public
except at inﬁnity and all d 2 [d,d], truthful communication is incentive compatible at any private
history in Gpr(d,ppr) given continuation play determined by sd,ppr
and truthful communication by
all other players.
Proof. We check that there are no proﬁtable one-stage deviations in which a player misreports
once and then follows the continuation strategy prescribed by s
d,ppr
i . First note that if the
player is at a history in which there exists some t at which mt / 2Y , then all players play a⇤
i
forever from that point on. Since then continuation play does not depend on the message
being sent, all players are indifferent to the message that they send after such a history.
Thus it is incentive compatible.
So it remains to analyze incentives for truth-telling after histories in which mt 2Yfor
all t. Suppose ﬁrst that player i sees the null signal. Then by reporting •, player i obtains
86an expected payoff of
Â
˜ y2Y
ppr(˜ y | a, ˜ yi = •)wi
 
~ ˜ y
 
for some a 2 ’
n
i=1 D(Ai) and some expected continuation value function w : Y ! W.22
If instead player i reports y0 2 Y, he obtains a payoff of
ppr((•,...,•) | a, ˜ yi = •)wi(y0)+Â
~ ˜ y=y0
ppr(˜ y | a, ˜ yi = •)wi(y0)
Thus, to show that truth-telling is incentive compatible after all histories in which a player
observes the null signal, it sufﬁces to show that there exists #⇤ sufﬁciently small so that
Â
y2Y\{y0}
ppr({˜ y : ~ ˜ y = y}|a, ˜ yi = •)wi (y) > ppr((•,...,•) | a, ˜ yi = •)wi(y0) (2.2)
for all y0 2 Y, all a 2 ’
n
i=1 D(Ai), all w : Y ! W, i = 1,...,n, and all ppr #⇤-close to p.
Assumptions 2.5.1 and 2.5.6 imply:
M(ppr,y0,a) ⌘ Â
y2Y\{y0}
ppr({˜ y : ~ ˜ y = y}|a, ˜ yi = •)
=( 1  ppr((•,...,•) | a)) Â
y02Y\{y0}
p(y | a)
=( 1  ppr((•,...,•) | a))(1  p(y0 | a))
> 0.
Note that for a ﬁxed map, w : Y ! W and a 2 ’
n
i=1 D(Ai), (2.2) holds for all i = 1,...,n
and all y0 2 Y if and only if
Â
y2Y\{y0}
ppr({˜ y : ~ ˜ y = y}|a, ˜ yi = •)
M(ppr,y0,a)
wi (y) >
ppr((•,...,•) | a, ˜ yi = •)
M(ppr,y0,a)
wi(y0). (2.3)
Now let ppr be #-close to p. As # ! 0, M(ppr,y0) ! 1  p(y | a) and thus because ppr is #-
22Note that in any sequential equilibrium if a player observes signal •, he still believes that all other players
played according to their prescribed actions, i.e. that there have been no “unexpected” events.
87close to p,
ppr((•,...,•) | a, ˜ yi = •)
M(ppr,y0,a)
<
#
M(ppr,y0,a)
!
0
1  p(y0 | a)
= 0.
Note that for any value of # > 0, because W is convex, the left hand side of inequality (2.3)
is an element of W.
Therefore because W is compact and contained in the interior of Va⇤, there is some #⇤
such that inequality (2.3) holds for all ppr #⇤-close to p. Moreover ’
n
i=1 D(Ai) and the set
of all maps w : Y ! W are both compact. Therefore such an #⇤ can be taken uniformly
across all a and all maps w : Y ! W. This shows that all players will report the null signal
truthfully when ppr is #⇤-close to p.
Now suppose that player i observes y 2 Y. By reporting truthfully, player i obtains a
payoff of wi(y) for some map w : Y ! W. However by reporting y0 2 Y with y0 6= y, player
i obtains a payoff of
ppr({˜ y : ˜ y i =( •,...,•)}|a, ˜ yi = y)wi(y0) (2.4)
while reporting • yields a payoff of
(1  ppr({˜ y : ˜ y i =( •,...,•)}|a, ˜ yi = y))wi(y). (2.5)
Clearly wi(y) is at least the expression in (2.5) for any ppr since wi(y)   0. Furthermore
we can take #⇤ sufﬁciently small so that wi(y) > maxy06=y{#wi(y0)} for all y 2 Y, all maps
w : Y ! W, all i = 1,...,n, and all # < #⇤. Then all players have an incentive to report
truthfully upon observing an informative signal when ppr is #⇤-close to p since
wi(y) > max
y06=y
{#wi(y0)} max
y06=y
 
ppr({˜ y : ˜ y i =( •,...,•)}|a, ˜ yi = y)wi(y0)
 
and
wi(y)   (1  ppr({˜ y : ˜ y i =( •,...,•)}|a, ˜ yi = y))wi(y)
trivially. This concludes the proof.
Remark. The fact that (2.1) is small for all ˜ yi 2 Ai [{ •} is crucial. Otherwise, because a
88message proﬁle of (•,...,•) results in reversion to the static Nash equilibrium, player i
upon observation of the null signal may have an incentive to deviate and report some signal
y 2 Y.
Remark. Because the set W in the lemma does not depend on delta, neither does #⇤. This is
important for our folk theorem as we must establish a claim about all games with a private
monitoring structure that is #⇤-close to p and all discount factors in an interval.
Remark. Players have no incentive to either communicate or respond to a signal that arrives
late, since in equilibrium players do not respond to such communication. This is similar to
the way in which we treat late signals in Section 2.4, where the belief-free property of the
equilibrium construction allows us to show that players do not have an incentive to respond
to late signals.
Non-Communication Stages
Lemma 2.5.8 provides a sufﬁcient condition for truth-telling to be incentive compatible. We
now show that given truthful communication by all players at all histories, we can construct
a collection of strategies {sd,ppr
} that satisfy the necessary properties of Lemma 2.5.8 for
truthful communication and in which all players are also playing best-responses in the
non-communication stages of the game.
To construct such strategies sd,ppr
, we ﬁrst specify that players play a⇤ whenever in the
history there exists some t such that mt / 2Y . Then it is trivial that playing a⇤
i is a best
response at such a history since opponents play a⇤
 i forever. It remains to specify play after
histories in which all messages in the history are elements of Y. We do this by considering
public strategies that only depend on the history of messages.
Given strategies that satisfy conditions 1, 2, and 3 of Lemma 2.5.8 we can simplify the
analysis to that of an auxiliary public monitoring game deﬁned in the following discussion.
The auxiliary game is one of standard simultaneous moves in which public signals arise
according to the conditional probability distribution p every period. We then modify this
repeated game so that at the beginning of periods 1,2,..., the game ends with probability #
89and each player receives ﬂow payoffs of 0 = gi(a⇤) thereafter. This corresponds exactly to
the event in which all players report the null signal, triggering all players to play according
to a⇤ forever.23
In the modiﬁed game, payoffs are given by
(1  d)
•
Â
t=0
dt(1  #)tgi(at). (2.6)
We denote this public monitoring game by Gpu(d,#) and let Epu(d,#) be the set of
sequential equilibrium payoffs of Gpu(d,#). Note that in this game the feasible payoff set is
not constant in d and #, and in particular for any ﬁxed # > 0, as d ! 1, the feasible payoff
set converges to {0}, just as the payoffs to grim trigger strategies converge to those of static
Nash equilibrium as d ! 1 in a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring. However
for any ﬁxed d, as # ! 0, the feasible payoff set converges to V, the feasible payoff set of the
original public monitoring game. Our analysis takes care in addressing this issue.
In order to extend the arguments of FLM to this modiﬁed repeated game, we ﬁrst
renormalize payoffs so that the feasible payoff set is indeed equal to V. We do this by
multiplying the payoffs by a factor of (1  d(1  #))/(1  d) to get payoff structure
(1  d(1  #))
•
Â
t=0
dt(1  #)tgi(at). (2.7)
Now, our modiﬁed game corresponds to a repeated game with discount factor given
by d(1   #), hence all of the conclusions of FLM can be applied to this game, with the
appropriate assumptions on the (original) public monitoring structure.
Before we proceed with the analysis of the game, recall the deﬁnition of self-generation
(Abreu et al. (1990)).
Deﬁnition 2.5.9. For W ⇢ Rn, deﬁne the sets B(W,d,#) and ˆ B(W,d,#) as follows. Let
B(W,d,#) be the set of v 2 Rn such that there exists some mixed action proﬁle a and a map
23Because all players report truthfully at all histories, message proﬁles m 2 ˜ Yn \{ Y[(•,...,•)} never
occur on the equilibrium path. Thus the “grim phase” of playing a⇤ forever is only triggered in the event of
message proﬁle m =( •,...,•); this happens with probability #.
90w : Y ! W such that
v =( 1  d)g(a)+d(1  #) Â
y2Y
w(y)p(y|a), and
vi   (1  d)gi(ai,a i)+d(1  #) Â
y2Y
wi(y)p(y | ai,a i),
for all ai 2 Ai and all i. Analogously deﬁne ˆ B(W,d,#) to be the set of v 2 Rn such that there
exists some mixed action proﬁle a and a map w : Y ! W such that
v =( 1  d(1  #))g(a)+d(1  #) Â
y2Y
w(y)p(y|a), and
vi   (1  d(1  #))gi(ai,a i)+d(1  #) Â
y2Y
wi(y)p(y | ai,a i)
for all i. We say that W is self-generating in the repeated game with payoff structure (2.6) with
discount factor d and absorption probability # if W ✓ B(W,d,#). Similarly, W is self-generating in
the repeated game with payoff structure (2.7) with discount factor d and absorption probability # if
W ✓ ˆ B(W,d,#).
Because the public monitoring game Gpr(d,#) has a slightly different structure from
that of a standard public monitoring game, the consequences of self-generation are not
immediate from past theorems, but the same ideas apply as shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 2.5.10. Suppose W is compact and that W ✓ B(W,d,#). Then W ✓ Epu(d,#).
The proof of Lemma 2.5.10 is completely standard, so we omit it. FLM applied to the
repeated game with discount factor d(1  #) yields the following lemma.
Lemma 2.5.11. Suppose that Assumption 2.5.3 holds. Let ˆ W be a smooth, compact, convex set
in the int(Va⇤). Then there exists ¯ d 2 (0,1) and ¯ # 2 (0,1) such that for all d > ¯ d and all # < ¯ #,
ˆ W ✓ ˆ B( ˆ W,d,#), that is, ˆ W is self-generating in the repeated game with payoff structure (2.7) with
discount factor d and absorption probability #.
Next, we translate the payoff set used in Lemma 2.5.11 back into payoffs without the
renormalization. To do this, we deﬁne (for a set ˆ W) a set W under the payoff normalization
91given by (2.6):
W =
1  d
1  d(1  #)
ˆ W. (2.8)
Of course for any ﬁxed # and a ﬁxed set ˆ W, as d ! 1, W shrinks (setwise) towards the
point-set {0}. Thus for any choice of v 2 int(Va⇤), v will necessarily lie outside of W for d
close to 1, so it is not immediate from that for any discount factor d, one can construct a
self-generating set containing v according to the B operator rather than the ˆ B operator. The
next lemma shows that this can be done for a non-empty interval of discount factors.
Lemma 2.5.12. Let v 2 int(Va⇤) and suppose that Assumption 2.5.3 holds. Consider the repeated
game with payoffs given by (2.6). Then there exist d,d 2 (0,1) with d < d and ¯ # 2 (0,1) such
that v 2 Epu(d,#) for all # < ¯ # and all d 2 [d,d]. Furthermore there exists some compact set
W ✓ int(Va⇤) such that the equilibrium corresponding to payoff v can be taken to have continuation
values that always lie in W for all d 2 [d,d] and all # < ¯ #.
Proof. Fix some v 2 int(Va⇤). Then choose a compact, smooth, convex set ˆ W ✓ int(Va⇤) such
that v 2 int( ˆ W). Since ˆ W is bounded away from 0 and contains v, there exists some h < 1
and compact set W such that v 2 h0 ˆ W ✓ W ✓ int(Va⇤) for all h0 2 [h,1]. By Lemma 2.5.11,
there exists some d and #⇤ such that ˆ W ✓ ˆ B( ˆ W,d,#) for all d   d and all # < ¯ #.
Now choose d 2 (d,1) arbitrarily. Then choose
# = min
(
(1  h)(1  d)
dh
,#⇤
)
.
This then implies that for all # < ¯ # and all d 2 [d,d],
v 2 Wd,# ⌘
1  d
1  d(1  #)
ˆ W ✓ W ✓ int(Va⇤).
Furthermore ˆ W ✓ ˆ B( ˆ W,d,#) for all # < ¯ # and all d 2 [d,d].
This observation allows us to establish the claims of the lemma. To see this, we note that
for every d 2 [d,d] and all # < ¯ #, every ˇ w 2 ˆ W can be written in the form
ˇ wi =( 1  d(1  #))gi(a)+d(1  #) Â
y2Y
ˆ wi(y)p(y|a)
92for all i for some a and some ˆ w : Y ! ˆ W so that ai is a best response given the expected
continuation payoff ˆ wi and opponents’ current mixed action proﬁle a i. Translating payoffs
into the original normalization under (2.6), yields
1  d
1  d(1  #)
ˇ wi =( 1  d)gi(a)+d(1  #) Â
y2Y
1  d
1  d(1  #)
ˆ wi(y)p(y|a).
We then see that
1  d
1  d(1  #)
ˆ wi(y) 2 Wd,#
for all y 2 Y and all i. Thus v 2 Wd,# ✓ B(Wd,#,d,#) and Wd,# ✓ W for all d 2 [d,d] and
all # < ¯ #. Then from Lemma 2.5.10, if v 2 W ✓ B(Wd,#,d,#) then v 2 Epu(d,#). Therefore
v 2 Epu(d,#) for all # < ¯ # and all d 2 [d,d].
Then we relate the auxiliary game Gpu(d,#) back to the original private monitoring game
Gpr(d,ppr) as follows. We let # = ppr((•,...,•) | a).24 Furthermore when constructing
strategies that satisfy condition 3 of Lemma 2.5.8, players play as if they are observing a
public signal structure over Y [{ •} with ppu(• | a)=# and ppu(y | a)=Â~ ˜ y=y ppr(˜ y |
a)=( 1  #)p(y | a) by Assumption 2.5.5. With these observations, lemmas 2.5.8 and 2.5.12
together prove Theorem 2.5.7.
2.5.5 The Repeated Game with Observation Lags
We now prove Theorem 2.5.4. To this end, let us ﬁrst link the private monitoring game
with communication, Gpr(d,ppr), to the original repeated game with public monitoring and
observation lags: For a given lag distribution l and some T 2 N, we deﬁne the induced
private monitoring structure ppr in the following way:
ppr(˜ y | a)=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
Pr({L : Li   T 8i 2I(˜ y), Li < T 8i / 2I(˜ y)})p(y | a) if ˜ y 2Y ,~ ˜ y = y
Pr({L : Li   T 8i}) if ˜ y =( •,...,•)
0 otherwise.
24Here we use Assumption 2.5.5 so that # does not depend on a 2 A.
93Note that ppr satisﬁes Assumptions 2.5.5 and 2.5.6. Then given this monitoring structure,
we deﬁne the game ˜ G(d,l,T)=Gpr(d,ppr), and let ˜ E(d,l,T) be the set of sequential
equilibrium payoffs of ˜ G(d,l,T) for which equilibrium play depends only on the message
histories.
In constructing an equilibrium for the repeated game with observation lags, we suppose
that the message spaces in each period are Mi = ˜ Y. Henceforth G(d,l) and E(d,l)
speciﬁcally refer to the repeated game with observation lag distribution l, discount factor d,
and message spaces Mi = ˜ Y.
Lemma 2.5.13. Suppose that v 2 ˜ E(d,l,T) for all d 2 [d,d] for some ﬁxed l and all T   T⇤,
where 0 < d < d < 1. Then there exists some d⇤ 2 (0,1) such that v 2 E(d,l) for all d > d⇤.
As in the proof of Lemma 2.4.6, the proof here also divides the repeated game into
threads, mapping each thread to an auxiliary game of the form described in the preceding
sections. However because the lemma here additionally allows for communication, care in
deﬁning the communication strategies is necessary in order to appropriately construct the
map from threads to auxiliary games.
Proof. We set d⇤ =
 
d/d
  1
T⇤+1, so that for every d > d⇤, there exists a positive integer multiple
of T⇤ + 1, N(d), such that dN(d) 2 [d,d].
Now we divide the repeated game G(d,l) into N(d) distinct repeated game threads,
the `-th (1  `  N(d)) of which is played in periods `, N(d)+`,2N(d)+`,.... In our
construction, players communicate the public signal generated at the end of period (k  
1)N(d)+m at the end of period kN(d)+(m 1). If they have not yet seen the signal of that
period’s play they report the null signal. Then each repeated game thread is equivalent to a
private monitoring game of the form described in the previous section.
As in the proof of Lemma 2.4.6, each repeated game can be treated independently, as
players never condition their play in the `-th repeated game on information received about
play in the `0-th repeated games (`0 6= `). Moreover, any equilibrium of ˜ G(dN(d),l, N(d))
where play depends only on the message history can be embedded into an equilibrium of
94one of the repeated game threads. But since N(d) > T⇤ + 1, we have v 2 ˜ E(dN(d),l, N(d)),
so it is then clear that v 2 E(d,l) for all d > d⇤.
We can now ﬁnish the proof of Theorem 2.5.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.5.4. By Theorem 2.5.7, there exist d,d 2 (0,1) with d < d and #⇤ 2 (0,1)
such that v 2 Epr(d,ppr) for all d 2 [d,d] and all ppr that is #⇤-close to p.
Then choose ¯ # > 0 such that #
1 # < #⇤ for all #  ¯ #. Now suppose that li(•) < ¯ # and
gi < ¯ # for all i. Then there exists a (ﬁnite) K⇤ such that
Pr(Li  K, Lj > K 8j 6= i)
Li(K)

Pr(Lj > K 8j 6= i)
Li(K)
< #⇤ and
1  L(K)
1  Li(K)
< #⇤
for all i and K   K⇤. Thus v 2 ˜ E(d,l,T) for all d 2 [d,d] and all T   K⇤ since it is easy to
show that the ppr induced by l and T is in fact #⇤-close to p for all T   K⇤. This however
means—by Lemma 2.5.13—that there exists some d⇤ 2 (0,1) such that v 2 E(d,l) for all
d > d⇤; this concludes the proof.
Remark. Note that the proof of this theorem uses delayed-response strategies in three ways:
to ensure that in each thread there is very low probability of all players’ lags being longer
than the thread length; so that even after not observing any signal from the previous period
in a thread, players believe with high probability that others have observed an informative
signal; and to map discount factors near 1 in the game G(d,l) to intermediate discount
factors in the auxiliary games. The ﬁrst feature is also present in the proof of Lemma 2.4.6.
The second and third features are speciﬁc to the proof here. The second, ensured by the
assumption that gi is small, is key to establishing incentives for truthful communication, so
that ppr in the auxiliary game can be shown to satisfy condition (2.1). The third feature is
closely analogous to the use of threads in the work of Ellison (1994).
Remark. Note that an important part of the proof of Theorem 2.5.4 is that messages are instan-
taneously observed. As in the literature on private monitoring games with communication,
this is important since the messages serve to make private information public.
95However, it is straightforward to extend our argument to settings in which messages
are observed with a bounded lag. To see this, suppose that lags arrive within ˇ K periods
with probability 1. We separate the game into ˆ K ⌘ max{K, ˇ K} + 1 threads, where K is as
in the proof of Theorem 2.5.4 (page 95). Each thread is further subdivided into a pair of
subthreads, respectively played in “even” and “odd” thread periods; players communicate
information observed in the even (resp. odd) subthread in periods of the odd (resp. even)
subthread. Since the gap between thread periods is at least ˇ K, all messages sent in the even
(resp. odd) subthread arrive with probability 1 before the next period of the odd (resp. even)
subthread. Thus messages about play in the odd (resp. even) subthread arrive in time for
the next round of play in that subthread. More formally, the `-th thread is separated into
two subthreads so that:
1. In periods (2k) ˆ K + `, the players send messages about the signals generated in period
(2k 1) ˆ K +`, and in periods (2k+1) ˆ K +`, the players play the appropriate responses
to the messages sent in periods 2 ˆ K + `,4ˆ K + `,...,(2k) ˆ K + `.
2. In periods (2k + 1) ˆ K + `, the players send messages about the signals generated
in period (2k) ˆ K + `, and in periods (2k + 2) ˆ K + `, the players play the appropriate
responses to the messages sent in periods ˆ K + `,3ˆ K + `,...,(2k + 1) ˆ K + `.
Under this construction, with the number of threads larger than ˆ K = max{K, ˇ K} + 1,
messages sent in period (2k) ˆ K +` (resp. period (2k +1) ˆ K +` )are observed with probability
1 by the time at which players must act on them—period (2k + 1) ˆ K + ` (resp. period
(2k + 2) ˆ K + `). However, we do not know whether a folk theorem would obtain if lags of
message transmission are possibly unbounded.25
25In any event, as motivated in footnote 6, it seems reasonable to assume that message delays are much
shorter than signal lags.
962.6 Discussion and Conclusion
As we argued in the introduction, the key role of the repeated games model makes it
important to understand which of its many simpliﬁcations are essential for the folk theorem.
We have extended this result to two settings in which players’ information about others’ play
arrives with stochastic lags. In both of the settings we consider, there is a special but natural
form of private information, as players do not know whether and when their opponents
observe signals.
Our proof in the case of almost-perfect monitoring (and no communication) depends on
the methods of HO2006. Unfortunately, our proof technique does not extend to repeated
games with n players. We could attempt to classify any history containing the null signal
as an erroneous history and follow the approach of HO2006 for n-player games, but this
approach is invalid because of the HO2006 n-player proof’s requirement of communication
phases. For repeated games with observation lags having ﬁnite support (possibly including
•), it may seem that the discussion in Remark 4 of HO2006 regarding almost-perfect
monitoring private monitoring games with general signal spaces could be useful. This is
due to the fact that as long as the lag distribution has ﬁnite support, we can take the K
chosen in Lemma 2.4.6 to be sufﬁciently large so that each thread corresponds to a private
monitoring game.26 However the conjecture in Remark 4 of HO2006 regarding the partition
of signals contains an error and thus cannot be applied.27 Instead, we conjecture that the
set of all belief-free equilibrium payoffs in n-player games without communication can be
attained in the analogous games with lags. Using results from Yamamoto (2009), one could
then obtain a lower bound on the limit equilibrium payoff sets for n-player repeated games
with almost-perfect monitoring structures and observation lags.
26Note that this is not the case if the lag distribution’s support is not ﬁnite.
27Speciﬁcally, Remark 4 suggests that one can ﬁnd a partition of the private signals to restore the invertibility
of the appropriate information matrix so that their results go through, with the elements of the partition treated
as the set of private signals. However inference about others’ private histories is different across different signals
within the same element of the partition so that it is not clear whether the appropriate incentive compatibility
conditions would hold.
97A more substantial extension of our results would be to the case in which the lag
distribution varies with the discount factor. It seems likely that our results would extend to
settings in which longer lags become somewhat more likely as players become more patient,
but we do not know how rapid an increase can be accommodated.
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Contagious Commitment via
Unknown Patience
3.1 Introduction
The literature on reputation in repeated interactions demonstrates how the introduction
of a small amount of uncertainty regarding the “rationality” of the long run player can
generate large beneﬁts.1 Speciﬁcally whenever there is some small probability that the long
run player is some behavioral Stackelbeg type who always plays the Stackelberg action,
then a sufﬁciently patient player can guarantee payoffs close to the Stackelberg payoff in all
equilibria of the game.2 This literature typically ﬁxes the type space of player 1 and shows
that a sufﬁciently patient long run rational player can guarantee payoffs arbitrarily close to
the Stackelberg payoff in all equilibria. However when we instead ﬁx the payoff function of
the long run player (in particular ﬁxing the patience of the long run player), if monitoring
of the long run player’s action is noisy, then whenever the type space assigns sufﬁciently
small probability to the behavioral types, there typically exist equilibria in which the long
1See for example Kreps et al. (1982), Fudenberg and Levine (1989), and Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
2Recall that the Stackelberg action is the action that he would prefer to choose in the stage game if player 2
could observe player 1’s choice of action before choosing his action. The payoff in the corresponding strategy
proﬁle is then called the Stackelberg payoff.
99run rational player obtains payoffs much lower than the Stackelberg payoff.3 In other words,
reputation effects vanish in these models when the probability of the behavioral types is
sufﬁciently small for a long run player with a ﬁxed level of patience.
This paper demonstrates that if uncertainty over patience of the long run player is
introduced along with the typical uncertainty regarding the rationality of the long run
player strong reputation effects emerge even when the probability assigned to the behavioral
types is arbitrarily small. We show that in a game where the long run player must choose an
action that he must commit to for the entirety of the game, the introduction of uncertainty
regarding patience together with uncertainty about the rationality of the long run player
generates very strong reputation effects that do not depend on the probability of the
behavioral types. We show more strongly that the required amount of uncertainty regarding
the patience of the rational long run player necessary to generate these strong reputation
effects is quite small.4
With uncertainty over patience, these strong reputation effects are the result of a conta-
gion effect initiated by very patient types. Whenever there is some positive probability that
the long run player is a behavioral Stackelberg type, regardless of the size of this probability,
some positive mass of the most patient types have a strict incentive to play the Stackelberg
action in all equilibria. This then reinforces the reputation effect by effectively increasing
the probability of types that play the Stackelberg action in all equilibria. This increase in
turn incentivizes those less patient types to also play the Stackelberg action, leading to a
contagion of types who play the Stackelberg action in all equilibria. Our main result shows
that even when very patient types are extremely small in probability, this contagion effect
is very strong so that types with intermediate levels of patience (bounded away from no
discounting) obtain high payoffs in all equilibria even when the probability of the behavioral
types becomes arbitrarily small.
To prove our main theorem, we show that there must exist some x⇤ > 0 such that
3See Section 3.5 for a precise statement.
4See Assumption 3.4.1 for a precise statement of the requirements imposed on the distribution over patience.
100whenever the type space assigns positive probability to a Stackelberg commitment type, the
probability with which the long run player plays the Stackelberg action must be at least x⇤
in all equilibria.5 Consider the hypothetical scenario in which the probability that the long
run player player plays the Stackelberg action is given by x > 0. Now given such an x, using
the arguments from Fudenberg and Levine (1989), we can show that the most patient types
will strictly prefer to play the Stackelberg action. Thus there exists some lower bound X
such that at least a mass X(x) > 0 must strictly prefer to play the Stackelberg action given x.
Thus an equilibrium must be such that x   X(x). If X is such that there exists some x⇤ so
that for all x 2 (0,x⇤), x < X(x) then we have shown that any equilibrium with x > 0 must
also satisfy x > x⇤, which is the desired conclusion. Our proof technique will establish that
X must have this property under suitable conditions on the type space.
The reason why a very weak condition such as that imposed in Assumption 3.4.1 sufﬁces
for the reputation theorem is due to the fact that the beneﬁts of reputation erode very
slowly as x decreases. More precisely, the lower bound (derived by Gossner (2011)) to
playing the Stackelberg action for a rational type with discount factor d takes the form
w( (1   d)log(x)) for some continuous function w.6 Importantly  log(x) increases to
inﬁnity as x ! 0 at a very slow rate and so for a rational type with discount factor d, the
value to playing the Stackelberg action does not fall very rapidly as x approaches 0.7 This
means that even for small values of x, a large mass of rational types are still willing to play
the Stackelberg action in all equilibria, providing a strong kick-start to the contagion effect
highlighted above. In contrast, if the lower bound on the payoff to playing the Stackelberg
action took the form w( (1   d)x 1), then Assumption 3.4.1 would no longer sufﬁce for
a result in the spirit of our main theorem. Thus the fact that the lower bound takes the
particular form derived in Gossner (2011) is crucial for the main theorem.
In Section 3.6, we explicitly calculate the exact size of the contagion effect and compute
5Note importantly that x⇤ does not depend on the probability the type space assigns to the Stackelberg type.
6The fact that the lower bound can be expressed as a function of  (1  d)log(x) can also be derived from
Fudenberg and Levine (1992).
7In fact for any r > 0, there exists some x⇤ such that whenever x < x⇤, x r >  log(x).
101the payoffs that each type gets in equilibria as the size of the Stackelberg type becomes
very small. We perform these calculations in a continuous time model in which there is
one behavioral type who always plays the Stackelberg action and a uniform distribution of
patience levels of the rational types. Consistent with the predictions of Section 3.4, we show
that as the probability of the behavioral type converges to zero, the mass of types who play
the Stackelberg action converges to large masses. We show that this limit is unique and that
even moderately patient types obtain very high payoffs even in the limit.
3.1.1 Literature Review
As discussed in the introduction, this paper contributes to the literature that studies repu-
tation effects in repeated games, which began with Kreps et al. (1982) and Fudenberg and
Levine (1989). Fudenberg and Levine (1992) extended their results to settings in which the
long run player’s actions are observed imperfectly. These papers show that when some
uncertainty about the rationality of the long run player is introduced, a sufﬁciently patient
player can guarantee payoffs close to the Stackelberg payoff in all equilibria of the game.
In contrast, Faingold and Sannikov (2011) study reputation effects in a continuous time
model when the discount factor of the long run player is not necessarily close to one. As a
result, the players do not necessarily obtain payoffs close to the Stackelberg payoff. Their
continuous time approach allows them to analyze reputation effects of impatient long run
players through the study of ordinary differential equations. As a result their model can
study the evolution of beliefs over time in equilibrium that the standard discrete time model
cannot.
Methodologically, the techniques in this paper rely on bounds to reputation that are
developed in Gossner (2011), which improve on the payoff bounds obtained in Fudenberg
and Levine (1992). These bounds prove useful for our purposes as it allows us to obtain
sufﬁcient estimates on the mass of types who have strict incentives to play certain actions.
Similarly Faingold (2013) illustrates the usefulness of Gossner’s bounds in studying reputa-
tion effects when the interactions between the long run and short run player become very
102frequent.
There is also a string of recent papers that model reputation effects without behavioral
commitment types. For example, Board and Meyer-ter Vehn (2013) study an alternative
reputation model where the actions of the long run player have long-lasting but transitory
effect on “quality”. As a result, the long run player has an incentive to provide effort to
improve the quality of his product, yielding reputation-like effects. Relatedly Dilmé (2012)
study a model that also generates rich reputation dynamics in a model where the long
run player faces costs to switching their actions. Additionally Bohren (2011) studies more
general stochastic games where actions have a persistent effect on an evolving state variable.
This inﬂuence of the long run player’s action on the state variable then gives rise to effects
that resemble the traditional reputation effects. Finally Weinstein and Yildiz (2012) shows
that in ﬁnitely repeated games, any arbitrary commitment type that is programmed to
play a certain strategy in the can be constructed in a standard ﬁnitely repeated game using
only incomplete information about the stage game payoffs. By introducing higher order
uncertainty about the stage game payoffs of the long run player, Weinstein and Yildiz (2012)
construct types whose unique rationalizable action in the incomplete information game is
to play the strategy that the commitment type is programmed to play.
Finally some recent papers study reputation effects in models that relax some of the
restrictive assumptions that the standard reputation models imposes. Liu and Skrzypacz
(2014) study a model in which the short run players can only observed a limit number
of observations regarding the reputation builder’s action. Liu (2011) studies a similar
reputation model where the short run player must pay a cost to acquire information about
the long run player’s past chosen actions. As a result, both of these papers exhibit reputation
dynamics where play switches between phases of reputation building and reputation
exploitation and spending. Finally Jehiel and Samuelson (2012) study reputation building
in a model with short run players who form beliefs about the long run player’s intended
course of play according to a simpler rule than that required in sequential equilibrium. As
a consequence, the long run player can guarantee payoffs that are strictly higher than the
103Stackelberg payoff.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model.
Section 3.3 proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the described game so that our
results are not vacuous. Section 3.5 illustrates the necessity of both behavioral commitment
types and arbitrarily patient rational types for reputation results. Section 3.4 presents our
main reputation theorem and its proof illustrating how uncertainty about discount factors
help generate strong reputation effects even for small probabilities of the commitment types.
Section 3.6 performs some numerical computations in a continuous time modiﬁcation of the
main game to illustrate the exact size of the contagion effect. Finally Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Model
There are two players i = 1,2, each with a ﬁnite action space Ai. Player 1 moves only once
at time 0 and picks an action a1 2 A1.8 There is an inﬁnite sequence of short run player
2’s who each picks an action a2 2 A2 at times t = 0,1,2,...At the end of each period, the
players observe a stochastic outcome y 2 Y which is drawn independently and identically
from a ﬁnite set Y according to the probability density function p(·|a1) 2 D(Y) where a1 is
the action chosen by player 1 in period 0.
Note importantly that the public signal distribution p( ·|a1) potentially depends on the
action a1. This dependence is used by player 2 to make inferences about the actually chosen
action a1. We impose the following standard assumption on the public signal structure.
Assumption 3.2.1. For all y 2 Y and all a1 2 A1, p (y | a1) > 0. Furthermore (p (·|a1))a12A1
forms a matrix that has full row rank.
The ﬁrst part of the assumption states that all signals are possible regardless of the action
a1. The second part assumes that the long run player’s action is statistically identiﬁable
so that eventually if enough observations of Y are observed, player 2 will learn the true
8This is a signiﬁcant departure from the classical reputation literature where both players choose actions at
each time t = 0,1,2,...As discussed in the introduction, we want to study how uncertainty regarding patience
can alleviate the cost of inﬂuencing the short run players’ beliefs about his own action.
104action. Note that Assumption 3.2.1 holds generically if we regard the public signal structure
(p (·|a1))a12A1 as a vector in R|A1|·|Y|.
We now introduce two sources of private information regarding player 1: uncertainty
over rationality and patience. The ﬁrst is standard in the literature on reputation building but
the second is new. To model these two sources of uncertainty, we construct a type space
(W,µ) where each w 2 W represents a type of player 1. In our model we assume that there
is no uncertainty regarding the type of player 2 and thus there are no types for player 2.
We deﬁne a type space to be a pair (W,µ) of a measurable space W together with a
probability measure µ on W. In this paper we consider a speciﬁc form for W: we partition
W into two sets Wr and Wb (so that W = Wr [ Wb) where Wr denotes the set of all rational
types and Wb denotes the set of all behavioral types. Each w 2 Wb is associated with a pure
strategy a1 2 A1 and is programmed to always play his associated strategy at time 0. Let
us denote the type w 2 Wb that corresponds to the action a1 as wa1. The set of rational
types Wr is deﬁned on the interval [0,1). We interpret a type in Wr as d 2 [0,1) where d
represents the discount factor of the type. We let µr denote the conditional distribution
over Wr and assume that this probability measure admits a density f in L1([0,1]) with
cumulative density function F.
As a concrete example of an economic setting that we have in mind, consider a ﬁrm
servicing a group of customers that needs to decide on the hire of one of two candidates
to run its operations. The ﬁrm is able to perfectly verify the abilities of the two candidates
however this information is not available to its consumers. The better candidate is able to
produce better products attracting more demand from the consumers. However the better
candidate comes at a cost as the ﬁrm must pay him higher wages. Because information
about the ability level of the hired candidate arrives to the customers imperfectly, the ﬁrm
may not be able to convince the market immediately that he has hired the better candidate.
Having described the type space, let us deﬁne the strategies of the players. A pure
strategy for player 1 is a measurable map s1 from Wr ! A1. Note that such a map can be
identiﬁed with a function ˆ s1 in L•  
[0,1]m 1 
where each coordinate takes a value in the
105binary set {0,1} and ˆ s`
1(d)=1 if and only if d 2 Wr and s1(d)=a`
1. Let S1 be the set of
pure strategies in this space. In the Appendix we show that S1 can be endowed with the
appropriate topology to make it a nonempty, compact, metric space. We then deﬁne the
set of player 1 mixed strategies S1 as the set of Borel probability measures over S1. With
a slight abuse of notation, given any s1 2 S1, a1 2 A1, and a type space (W,µ), we deﬁne
s1[a1] as the total probability that player 1 plays a1:
s1
h
a`
1
i
= µ
h
wa`
1
i
+ µ[Wr]
Z
s12S1
Z
d2Wr
s`
1(d)dF(d)ds1[s1].
Similarly deﬁne sr
1
⇥
a`
1
⇤
⌘ s1
⇥
a`
1
⇤
  µ
h
wa`
1
i
to be the total probability that a rational type
plays a`
1.
To deﬁne player 2’s strategy, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne histories. Let Ht be the set of t-period
public histories and deﬁne H =
S•
t=0 Ht. Then we deﬁne player 2’s strategy to be a map
s2 : H ! D(A2). Note that we restrict to strategies of player 2 that are public and do not
depend on player 2’s private history.9
Let us now specify the payoff functions of the players. Player 1 derives ex-ante utility of
V(s1,s2)=
Z
S1
1 Z
0
Es1(d) [U1(s1(d),s2,d)]dF(d) ds1[s1]
from playing a mixed strategy s1 2 S1 against s2 2 S2 where
Ea1U1(a1,s2,d)=Ea1(1  d)
•
Â
t=0
dtu1(a1,st
2(ht)).
Player 1’s objective is to maximize V(s1,s2) against s2. This means that V(s1,s2)   V(s0
1,s2)
for all s0
1 2 S1 and all s1 2 S1 s1-almost everywhere. Note that this in turn means that for
s1-almost every s1 2 S1,
Es1(d)U1(s1(d),s2,d)=max
a0
12A1
Ea0
1U1(a0
1,s2,d)
at F-almost every d 2 [0,1].
9This is without loss of generality for equilibrium since player 1’s action is only chosen in period 0 and thus
does not change based on the history.
106Player 2 simply maximizes expected payoffs at every history h 2 H conditional on
available information:
s2(h) 2 argmax
s0
2
Es1
⇥
u2(a1,s0
2) | h
⇤
.
In other words player 2 is completely myopic and only cares about how s2(h) performs
against his beliefs about player 1’s played action in the current period.10 The solution
concept we use is Nash equilibrium (s1,s2) where s1 is an ex-ante best response against
s2 according to the payoff function V and s2 is a best response at every history h 2 H
according to beliefs consistent with Bayesian updating.11
Finally we impose the following mild assumptions on the stage game utility functions
u1 and u2:
Assumption 3.2.2. Given any pure strategy a1 2 A1 of player 1, player 2 has a unique strict
best response which we denote B(a1).
Assumption 3.2.3. Given any two distinct actions a1,a0
1 2 A1, u1(a1,a2(a1)) 6= u1(a0
1,a2(a0
1)).
Note that these assumptions hold for generic payoff functions. Let us also extend B to the
space of mixed actions a1 2 D(A1) by deﬁning B(a1) as the set of best responses in the stage
game for player 2 against a1. Let m = |A1| and without loss of generality, order the actions
of player 1 so that
u1(a1
1,B(a1
1)) > u1(a2
1,B(a2
1)) > ···> u1(am
1 ,B(am
1 )).
We shorten notation further by deﬁning ak
2 = B(ak
1) and u1(ak
1,ak
2)=vk
1. Recall in the
literature that a1
1 is commonly called the Stackelberg action of the stage game. As a ﬁnal
piece of notational simpliﬁcation, deﬁne wS = wa1
1.
10This is without loss of generality since even if player 1 faced a single non-myopic player 2, player 2 would
have no incentive to play a non-myopic best response at any history because his actions do not inﬂuence the
signal process.
11Note that because the public signal structure has full support, Bayes’ rule pins down unique beliefs at all
public histories.
1073.3 Existence of Equilibrium
Due to the fact that the type space is a continuum, there is no pre-existing general existence
theorem that we can immediately apply here and we must explicitly prove the existence
of an equilibrium. We ﬁrst ﬁnd that when a1
1 is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game,
an equilibrium trivially exists if the behavioral type probability is sufﬁciently small. This
implies the following:
Theorem 3.3.1. Suppose that a1
1 is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Then there exists some
n⇤ > 0 such that if µ[Wb] < n⇤, then there exists a Nash equilibrium in which all rational types play
a1
1.
Obviously there are two limitations to the statement above. First a1
1 may not be a Nash
equilibrium of the stage game and secondly we may be interested in analyzing games
in which the probability of a behavioral type is not necessarily small. Demonstrating
existence in such games requires a different proof technique as the construction of trivial
equilibria is no longer possible. For example consider the strategy proﬁle in which all
players play a1
1 with probability one. This cannot be an equilibrium of the repeated game
if µ[Wb] is very small and a1
1 is not a Nash equilibrium. The reason is that because almost
all types are playing a1
1 (with the exception of the behavioral types), player 2 places large
probability on player 1 playing a1
1 for a long time regardless of the history of realized public
signals. However the less patient types of player 1 would then have an incentive to cheat
because player 2’s posterior does not decrease until very late in the game even if he were
to play a non-Stackelberg action. Therefore in any equilibrium, at least a positive fraction
of the types must necessarily play an action besides aS
1 with positive probability when
µ[Wb] is sufﬁciently small. Nevertheless, we can still prove an existence theorem using
non-constructive methods.
Theorem 3.3.2. Suppose µr is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Then a
Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. See Appendix.
1083.4 Reputation and Contagion
We now show that when even a moderate amount of uncertainty regarding patience (in a
sense to be made precise) exists, a non-vanishing fraction of rational types must play a1
1
with probability 1 even when µ[wS] vanishes to zero. Thus uncertainty regarding patience
interacts with uncertainty about the rationality of the long run player to substantially lower
the cost of convincing the short run player of his intended action, which in turn guarantees
payoffs close to what one would obtain under perfect monitoring for even a moderately
patient long run player. We will show in Section 3.5 Theorem 3.5.2 that some restrictions on
µr are necessary in order to prove such a theorem. In particular, Theorem 3.4.2 requires at
the very least that types of arbitrarily high levels of patience exist with positive probability.
The condition that we impose however is arguably slightly stronger and is summarized in
the following assumption.
Assumption 3.4.1. µr is an absolutely continuous measure with respect to the Lebesgue
measure on [0,1) and let F be its cumulative distribution function (cdf). There exists some
d < 1 and some k   1 such that F is continuously k-times differentiable at all points d   d
and
lim
d!1
DkF(d) 6= 0.
In words, the assumption states that the density does not vanish too rapidly near d = 1.
This precludes for example the distributions studied in Section 3.5 where F(d⇤)=1 for
some d⇤ < 1. However note that the assumption does not require the density of arbitrarily
patient types to be non-vanishing. A trivial example of a probability measure that satisﬁes
this assumption is the uniform distribution over [0,1). Similarly any distribution whose
density converges to some strictly positive number as d ! 1 also satisﬁes the assumption.
Moreover any cdf that has any derivative that converges to a number other than zero as
d ! 1 also satisﬁes the assumption. Thus the assumption is quite weak.12
12In fact if F can be extended to a function ˜ F that is analytic on an open set H ◆ (0,1], then if F violates
Assumption 3.4.1, F must be identically zero on H which is a contradiction of the fact that F is a cdf. Therefore
if F has an analytic extension to an open set H ◆ (0,1], then F must satisfy Assumption 3.4.1.
109With this let us now state the main theorem. Due to our negative results from the
previous section, we must impose further restrictions on the type space: µ[wS] > 0 and
µ[Wr] is bounded away from zero. For a given r > 0, let us deﬁne the set Fr in the following
manner:
Fr ⌘{ (W,µ) : µ[wS] > 0,µ[Wr] > r}.
Note importantly that F places no restrictions on the size of µ[wS] other than it being
positive. Finally given a cumulative distribution function F over Wr =[ 0,1), let Fr(F) be
the set of elements of Fr such that the conditional distribution over rational types coincides
precisely with F:
Fr(F) ⌘{ (W,µ) 2F r : µr = F}.
Theorem 3.4.2. Suppose that F satisﬁes Assumption 3.4.1 and let r > 0. Then under Assump-
tions 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3, for every # > 0, there exists some d⇤ such that all types with d   d⇤ obtain
a payoff of at least v1
1   # in every Nash equilibrium of G(W,µ) for all type spaces (W,µ) 2F r(F).
Importantly note the order of quantiﬁers. The classical reputation results allow the
threshold d⇤ to vary across type spaces (W,µ). What distinguishes this theorem is that d⇤
holds uniformly across all type spaces in Fr(F). Thus d⇤ depends only on F and r and
not on the speciﬁc manner in which µ weights the elements of Wb versus Wr. To prove the
theorem, we show that regardless of type spaces in Fr(F), there exists some n⇤ such that
s1[a1
1] > n⇤ in all Nash equilibria. Having established this argument, then the theorem above
is an immediate application of FL modiﬁed to the game we analyze.
3.4.1 Proof Sketch
Let us ﬁrst highlight the essence of the arguments used in proving Theorem 3.4.2 in the
context of a game in which there are two rational types: one type w1 who does not discount
payoffs and is a time-average payoff maximizer and another type wd with discount factor
d 2 (0,1). Then it is easy to show that the time-average payoff maximizer must always
choose the Stackelberg action in any Nash equilibrium as long as µ[wS] > 0 since playing
110a1
1 results in exactly the Stackelberg payoff for this type whereas any other action yields a
strictly lower payoff.
Then the fact that w1 plays a1
1 in all Nash equilibria reinforces reputation effects for type
wd of lower patience even when µ[wS] is small since there is now a measure µ[wS]+µ[w1]
of types who play a1
1 in all equilibria. Regardless of the size of µ[wS], there must always
be a measure µ[w1] of types who play a1
1 in all equilibria as long as µ[wS] is positive. As a
consequence if µ[wS] > 0, # > 0, and h > 0, there exists some d⇤ such that if d > d⇤, then
type wd is able to guarantee himself a payoff of at least v1
1   # in all equilibria and all type
spaces with µ[w1] > h.
The argument above relies on a very restrictive assumption: the type space places strictly
positive probability on a type (the w1 type) whose uniquely rationalizable action is the
Stackelberg action in any type space in which µ[wS] > 0. The remainder of this section will
illustrate how this simple argument can indeed be extended to quite general type spaces in
which such a type w1 may not exist.
We illustrate heuristically how the proof can indeed be extended. The intuition can be
seen most clearly in the two action case and so suppose that A1 consists of the Stackelberg
action a1
1 and an action a2
1 6= a1
1. Consider a type space (W,µ) with µ[wS] > 0 and
W = Wr [{ wS}. Let s be a Nash equilibrium. Note that if s1[a1
1] > 1/2, then reputation
effects are already strong and so let us assume that s1[a1
1]  1/2. This then means that
s1[a2
1]   1/2.
Now choose # > 0 such that v1
1   # > v2
1 + #. Then with the use of upper bounds to
payoffs obtained in Fudenberg and Levine (1992) or Gossner (2011), we can ﬁnd d⇤ < 1
such that the most that any type d > d⇤ can obtain from playing a2
1 is v2
1 + #. Importantly
note that this d⇤ holds uniformly across all s1 with the property that s1[a1
1]  1/2 and is in
particular independent of the size of µ[wS].
At the same time because s1[a1
1]   µ[wS] > 0, we can also ﬁnd d0   d⇤ such that all
types d > d0 obtains at least v1   # = u1(a1
1,a1
2)   # from playing a1
1.13 This then implies that
13Unlike d⇤, note that d0 cannot be taken to be independent of neither µ[wS] nor s1.
111for any type d > d0, s1(d) must assign probability one to a1
1 and therefore the probability
which s1 assigns to a1
1 must at the very least be:
s1[a1
1]   X0 ⌘ µr[(d0,1)]µ[Wr]+µ[wS].
Now note that because d0 depends on µ[wS] (and may a priori converge to one as µ[wS] ! 0)
the argument above is insufﬁcient for establishing a uniform lower bound on s1[a1
1] across
all equilibria and all type spaces with µ[wS] > 0.
However we can iterate this argument using the new lower bound X0 on the probability
with which a1
1 must be played. More generally, given a probability s1[a1
1] > 0, using the
same arguments above, we can ﬁnd a decreasing function ˆ d(s1[a1
1]) (as a function of s1[a1
1])
such that all types d > ˆ d(s1[a1
1]) must play a1
1 with probability one. This then implies that
for all s1 such that s1[a1
1]  1/2,
s1[a1
1]   µr[(ˆ d(s1[a1
1]),1)]µ[Wr]+µ[wS]   X(s1[a1
1]) ⌘ µr[(ˆ d(s1[a1
1]),1)]µ[Wr]. (3.1)
This function X, under fairly mild conditions on the measure µr, turns out to possess the
nice property that the derivative near zero is strictly bigger than 1.
As evidenced by Figure 3.1, this property implies that X must lie strictly above the
45-degree line in a neighborhood around zero. Furthermore because µ[wS] > 0 and
consequently s1[a1
1] > 0, inequality (3.1) illustrates that any equilibrium must have the
property that s1[a1
1] lies strictly to the right of the point at which F crosses the 45-degree
line. This therefore shows that no matter how small µ[wS] is, as long as it is positive, s1[a1
1]
is at least x⇤. At this point, one may wonder how we can conclude the particular shape of
the function X that lies at the heart of the conclusion just established. Broadly speaking,
this observation is a consequence of the fact that the value of a reputation effect emerging
from the existence of wS erodes very slowly as µ[wS].14 We now shed light on this fact in
the next subsection.
14In particular see Lemmata 3.4.3 and 3.4.14 as well as Theorem 3.4.7 for the details.
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Figure 3.1: Lower Bound on s1[a1
1]
3.4.2 Details of the Proof
Mathematical Preliminaries
Having illustrated the main ideas of the proof technique, we proceed to the proof in more
detail. Given any # > 0, deﬁne the function Gn : (0,1] ! R:
Gn(x)=
✓
1  F
✓
1+
n
logx
◆◆
.
Before relating our discussion to the derivation of our key lemma, we ﬁrst note a purely
mathematical lemma that will prove useful for the estimates we wish to obtain.
Lemma 3.4.3. The following two statements hold.
1. Let p : R ! R be a polynomial over the reals. Then xp(logx) ! 0 as x ! 0.
2. Suppose h is some function h : ( •,0] ! R such that there exists k   1 such that
113limx!0 Dkh(x) 6= 0. Let q(x)=h
⇣
(logx)
 1
⌘
. Then limµ!0 Dq(µ)=+ •.
Proof. We now prove the ﬁrst statement. To prove the statement, it is sufﬁcient to show that
limx!0 x(logx)k = 0 for all k   0. This is trivial for k = 0. Suppose that the statement holds
for k   1. Then using L’Hospital’s rule,
lim
x!0
x(logx)k = lim
x!0
(logx)k
1/x
= lim
x!0
 
k(logx)k 1x 1
x 2 = lim
x!0
 k(logx)k 1x = 0.
This proves the ﬁrst claim.
Then the second claim is a consequence of the ﬁrst.
Dq(x)= 
Dh
 
(logx) 1 
x(logx)2
Let k⇤ be the minimum positive integer k > 0 for which limx!0 Dkh(x) 6= 0. If k⇤ = 1, then
clearly limx!0 Dq(x)=+ • since limx!0 x(logx)2 = 0.
To prove the result for k⇤ > 1, we show that if k⇤   k   1, then
lim
x!0
Dq(x)=lim
x!0
( 1)k Dkh((logx) 1)
xp(logx)
for some p : R ! R a polynomial. Clearly this holds for k = 1. Now suppose it holds for
k < k⇤. Then by L’Hospital’s rule, we have:
lim
x!0
Dq(x)=lim
x!0
( 1)k Dkh((logx) 1)
xp(logx)
= lim
x!0
( 1)k+1 Dk+1h((logx) 1)
p(logx)+Dp(logx)
1
x(logx)2
= lim
x!0
( 1)k+1 Dk+1h((logx) 1)
x(logx)2 (p(logx)+Dp(logx))
Then note that (logx)2 (p(logx)+Dp(logx)) is a polynomial in logx. Thus this completes
the induction.
As a consequence, we have:
lim
x!0
Dq(x)=lim
x!0
( 1)k⇤ Dk⇤
h((logx) 1)
xp(logx)
=+ •,
where the last equality uses statement 1 of the lemma. This concludes the proof.
114Remark. The role that logx plays will become apparent once we begin to study how beliefs
are updated by the short run player. However the above lemma illustrates a remarkable
property of the function (logx) 1 near x = 0, which is essential in guaranteeing that the
contagion effect is strong enough to ensure that reputation effects persist even when the
probability of behavioral types becomes arbitrarily small.
Now with the help of Lemma 3.4.3, Assumption 3.4.1 directly translates to a useful
mathematical property regarding the function Gn, which we summarize in the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.4.4. Suppose that Assumption 3.4.1 holds and let n > 0. Then
lim
x!0
DGn(x)=+ •.
Relating this property back to the arguments in Section 3.4.1 outlining the proof of
Theorem 3.4.2, Corollary 3.4.4 will be used to show that the lower bound function F takes
the shape illustrated in Figure 3.1. The fact that the curve F in Figure 3.1 is very steep near
0 in the ﬁgure is not a mere coincidence and rather corresponds exactly to the property
demonstrated above that the function Gx,# has inﬁnite derivative at exactly zero.15
Proof of Corollary 3.4.4: The proof is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.4.3. Deﬁne the func-
tion: b(x)=1+ nx. Then we can rewrite Gn:
Gn(x)=1  F(b((logx) 1)).
Now deﬁne h(x)=1   F(b(x)). By Lemma 3.4.3 it is sufﬁcient to show that there exists
some k   1 such that limx!0 Dkh(x) 6= 0.
Then note that
Dkh(x)= nkDkF(b(x)).
15Note that an inﬁnite slope near 0 is not necessary for the arguments. Rather it is sufﬁcient that the slope
near 0 is strictly greatly than 1. Nevertheless the strong conclusion of Corollary 3.4.4 is the result of a very mild
assumption.
115Thus
lim
x!0
Dkh(x) 6= 0 , lim
x!0
DkF(b(x)) 6= 0.
But Assumption 3.4.1 implies that there exists k   1 such that limx!0 DkF(b(x)) 6= 0.
A Review of Gossner (2011)
To establish that the function G deﬁned above is indeed a lower bound on s1[aS] we ﬁrst
review some tools developed in the classical reputation literature on upper and lower
bounds on equilibrium payoffs. To derive these upper and lower bounds we speciﬁcally use
the tools developed and studied by Gossner (2011). Recall the following deﬁnitions. Given
any two measures p,q 2 D(Y), the relative entropy is deﬁned as
d(p k q)=Â
y2Y
p(y)log
✓
p(y)
q(y)
◆
.
Note that in this paper due to Assumption 3.2.1, the measures of interest always have full
support on Y and so d(p k q) is always well-deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 3.4.5. a2 2 S2 is an #-entropy-conﬁrming best response to a1 2 S1 if there exists
a0
1 such that the following conditions hold:
• a2 is a best response to a0
1.
• d(p( ·|a1,a2) k p( ·|a0
1,a2))  #.
Bd
a1(#) denotes the set of #-entropy-conﬁrming best responses to a1.
We now deﬁne the following functions.
va1(#)= min
a22Bd
a1(#)
u1(a1,a2).
Similarly deﬁne
va1(#)= max
a22Bd
a1(#)
u1(a1,a2).
116We denote the supremum of all convex functions that lie below va1 as wa1 and the inﬁmum
of all concave functions above va1 as wa1.16
Finally recall the following facts from Gossner (2011).
• va1 and wa1 are nonincreasing and both continuous at 0.
• wa1 and wa1 are nondecreasing and both continuous at 0.
• va1(0)=wa1(0) and wa1(0)=wa1(0).
With these facts and statistical identiﬁability of player 1’s action due to Assumption 3.2.1,
we immediately obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4.6. Let h > 0. Then there exists some n⇤ > 0 such that
|wa1(n)   u1(a1,a2(a1))| < h,
|wa1(n)   u1(a1,a2(a1))| < h
for all n  n⇤ and all a1 2 A1.
With all of these deﬁnitions, we have the following payoff bound due to Gossner (2011)
adapted to the speciﬁc game we analyze.
Theorem 3.4.7. Let s be any Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game. Then given any a1 2 A1 such
that s1[a1] > 0,
wa1( (1  d)log[s1[a1]])  U1(a1,s2)  wa1( (1  d)log[s1[a1]]).
The following section will now use these payoff bounds and the property of the function Gn
illustrated in Lemma 3.4.4 to prove Theorem 3.4.2.
3.4.3 Concluding the Proof of Theorem 3.4.2
Because of Gossner (2011) and Theorem 3.4.7, the following lemma immediately implies the
main theorem and the remainder of the section will be devoted to proving it.
16Technically, Gossner (2011) did not deﬁne the function va1 nor wa1 but the properties of these functions are
essentially the same as the function w deﬁned there.
117Lemma 3.4.8. Let r > 0 and suppose F satisﬁes Assumption 3.4.1. Then there exists some n⇤ > 0
such that s1[a1
1] > n⇤ for all s 2 E(W,µ) and all (W,µ) 2F r(F).
Sequence of Games
Consider a sequence of games with type spaces given by (W,µn) where we ﬁx the conditional
probability measure on Wr with corresponding cumulative distribution function F.W e
assume that µn[wS] ! 0 but that µn[wS] > 0 for all n. We now study the properties of the
limit of equilibria of this sequence of games. More formally, denote by E(W,µn) to be the
set of equilibrium strategy proﬁles of the game G(W,µn). To further simplify the exposition,
we introduce the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.4.9. Given l 2 D(A1), we say that a sequence {(sn,µn)}n approximates l if
1. (W,µn) 2F r(F) for all n,
2. sn 2 E(W,µn) for all n,
3. µn[wS] ! 0,
4. and sn
1[a] ! l[a] for all a 2 A1.
Then let us deﬁne the following set of distributions over A1:
Pr(F) ⌘{ l 2 D(A1) : 9 a sequence {(sn,µn)}n that approximates l}.
In words, the set Pr(F) denotes the set of distributions over actions that can be ap-
proximated by equilibrium distributions over player 1 actions of games that place small
probability on the Stackelberg commitment type wS. Recall that when F is a point mass
distribution at some d⇤ < 1, then l that places probability one on a player 1 strict Nash
action is indeed approximated by some sequence (sn,µn).
To arrive at our main theorem, we study properties of the set Pr(F). Toward the end of
proving Lemma 3.4.8, we show ﬁrst that it is sufﬁcient to demonstrate the existence of some
n > 0 such that l[aS] > n for all l 2 Pr(F). This greatly simpliﬁes the analysis by allowing
118us to study the limit of equilibria as the probability of the behavioral types vanish rather
than studying the sets of equilibria of all type spaces in Fr(F), which is undoubtedly a very
large space.
Lemma 3.4.10. Suppose that there exists n > 0 such that l[aS] > n for all l 2 Pr(F). Then there
exists n0 > 0 such that s1[aS] > n0 for all s 2 E(W,µ) for all (W,µ) 2F r(F).
Proof. Suppose such a n0 > 0 did not exist. Then for every n, we can ﬁnd some (W,µn) 2
Fr(F) with sn 2 E(W,µn) with sn
1[aS] < 1
n. But then this implies that sn
1[aS] ! 0 as n ! •
and in particular µn(wS) ! 0.
Because [0,1]m 1 is a compact subset of Rm we can ﬁnd a convergent subsequence
s
n`
1 . But then note that we have found a sequence such that sn` 2 E(W,µn`) for all ` and
(W,µn`) 2F r(F) such that
s
n`
1 [a] ! l[a] 8a 2 A
for some l 2 D(A1) and µn`(wS) ! 0. This then implies that l 2 Pr(F). But by construction
we also had l[aS]=0. This then of course contradicts the main assumption of the
lemma.
Properties of Pr(F)
We now turn our attention to the study of the set Pr(F). With the help of Lemma 3.4.10, it
is sufﬁcient to prove that there exists some n > 0 such that l[aS] > n for all l 2 Pr.
Lemma 3.4.11. Pr(F) is a closed set.
Proof. The proof follows from a standard diagonalization argument.
An immediate corollary is the following observation which we will use to prove Theo-
rem 3.4.2 by way of contradiction.
Corollary 3.4.12. Suppose there exists no n > 0 such that l[aS] > n for all l 2 Pr(F). Then there
exists l0 2 Pr(F) such that l0[aS]=0.
119Now deﬁne L(l) as the support of actions given a distribution l 2 Pr(F):
L(l)={` = 1,...,m : l[a`
1] > 0}.
Using this language due to the corollary just stated, it remains to show that 1 2L (l) for all
l 2 Pr(F). We ﬁrst ....
Lemma 3.4.13. Suppose that l 2 Pr(F) and let `⇤ = minL(l). Suppose further that (sn,µn)
approximates l. Then there exist n⇤ and d⇤ such that sn
1(d)[a`
1]=0 for all n > n⇤, d > d⇤ and all
` 2L (l) such that `>` ⇤.
Proof. We use Theorem 3.4.7. Fix an # > 0 sufﬁciently small so that
v`⇤+1
1 < v`⇤
1   # < v`⇤
1 + # < v`⇤ 1
1 .
By Lemma 3.4.6 we can choose n⇤ > 0 such that
v`⇤
1 + # < wa`
1(n) for all `<` ⇤
v`⇤
1   # < wa`⇤
1 (n) < wa`⇤
1 (n) < v`⇤
1 + #, and
wa`
1(n) < v`⇤
1   # for all `>` ⇤
for all n  n⇤. Then because z`
n ! z` > 0 for all ` 2L , there exists some n⇤ and d⇤ such that
 (1  d)log(z`
n)  n⇤ for all ` 2L , all n   n⇤, and all d   d⇤.
Then by Theorem 3.4.7, we obtain the following inequalities regarding the payoff to
playing a`
1 for ` 2Lin the equilibrium sn for n   n⇤ and for any type d   d⇤:
v`⇤
1   # < U1(a`⇤
1 ,sn
2,d) < v`⇤
1 + #,
U1(a`
1,sn
2,d) < v`⇤
1   #.
This immediately implies that all types d   d⇤ must play a mixed strategy with support
contained in Lc [{`⇤} in the equilibrium sn for all n   n⇤.
The lemma above is very intuitive. Given a sequence (sn,µn) that approximates l,
because all actions ` 2Lare played with positive probability in the limit, tight payoff
120bounds for each action ` 2Lhold uniformly for all n sufﬁciently large and all sufﬁciently
patient types.17 Then from these payoff bounds, sufﬁciently patient players must obtain
payoffs close to v`
1 for playing an action ` 2Lat all n sufﬁciently large. Clearly for these
sufﬁciently patient players and these values of n, this means that the payoff from playing `⇤
must dominate the payoff for playing any other action ` 2Lfor these sufﬁciently patient
players, which yields our desired conclusion.
Now we can conclude the proof. We have yet to invoke Corollary 3.4.4 and we will
do so in this ﬁnal step of the proof. In this ﬁnal step, we study the upper tail of the
distribution of types in Wr and the actions that these types can play in equilibria that
approximate a distribution l 2 Pr(F). Invoking Lemma 3.4.13, we know that the upper
tail must concentrate their play on the set {`⇤}[L c where Lc ⌘{ 1,...,m}\L . Unlike in
Lemma 3.4.13 however, payoff bounds to playing an action ` 2L c no longer hold uniformly
for all n sufﬁciently large and all sufﬁciently patient types. So ruling out the play of certain
actions in {`⇤}[L c by these types is far more difﬁcult. We use Corollary 3.4.4 precisely to
deal with this challenge. As discussed before, Corollary 3.4.4 will establish the existence of
a strong contagion effect that rules out the possibility that sn
1[a1
1] vanishes to zero.
Lemma 3.4.14. Suppose F satisﬁes Assumption 3.4.1 and let r > 0. Then there exists n > 0 such
that l[aS] > n for all l 2 Pr(F).
Proof. Suppose that the lemma is false so that by Corollary 3.4.12, we can ﬁnd l 2 Pr(F)
such that l[aS]=0. With a slight abuse of notation, let L = L(l). Note by deﬁnition that
1/ 2Lsince l[a1
1]=l[aS]=0.
Choose some sequence (sn,µn) that approximates l. Using Lemma 3.4.13, there exists
some d⇤ < 1 and some n⇤ such that sn
1(d)[a`
1]=0 for all d > d⇤, n > n⇤, and ` 2L\{ `⇤}.
So without loss of generality, by replacing the original sequence with the subsequence
starting at n⇤ + 1, we can assume (sn,µn) to be a sequence that approximates l and at
the same time sn
1(d)[a`
1]=0 for all ` 2L \ { `⇤} and all d > d⇤. Furthermore because
17This would not be true if instead ` / 2L , because sn
1 [a`
1] ! 0 for ` / 2L .
121sn
1[a`⇤
1 ] ! l[a`⇤
1 ] > 0, we can replace the sequence (sn,µn) with a further subsequence such
that sn
1[a`⇤
1 ] > l[a`⇤
1 ]/2 > 0 for all n.
Fix an # > 0 sufﬁciently small so that
v`⇤+1
1 < v`⇤
1   # < v`⇤
1 + # < v`⇤ 1
1 .
Again as in the proof of Lemma 3.4.13, due to Lemma 3.4.6, we can choose n⇤ > 0 such that
for all n < n⇤,
v`⇤
1 + # < wa`
1(n) for all `<` ⇤
v`⇤
1   # < wa`⇤
1 (n) < wa`⇤
1 (n) < v`⇤
1 + #, and
wa`
1(n) < v`⇤
1   # for all `>` ⇤.
Now because sn
1[a`⇤
1 ] > l[a`⇤
1 ]/2 > 0 for all n, there exists some ¯ d   d⇤ such that
 (1  d)log
⇣
sn
1[a`⇤
1 ]
⌘
< n⇤
for all d > ¯ d and all n. Of course this implies that for all d > ¯ d and all n,
v`⇤
1 + # > wa`⇤
1
⇣
 (1  d)log
⇣
sn
1[a`⇤
1 ]
⌘⌘
. (3.2)
Now by Corollary 3.4.4, we can choose ¯ # 2 (0,#) such that
lim
x!0
r
x +(m   1)¯ #
min
⇢
1  F
✓
1+
n⇤
logx
◆
,1  F(¯ d)
 
> 1.
Then we can choose #⇤ 2 (0, ¯ #) such that
r
x +(m   1)#⇤ min
⇢
1  F
✓
1+
n⇤
logx
◆
,1  F(¯ d)
 
> 1 (3.3)
for all x < #⇤.
We now establish an upper bound on the discount factor of a rational type who plays an
action in L with positive probability in a Nash equilibrium. Choose any `0 <` ⇤. Due to
122inequality (3.2), a rational type with discount factor d > ¯ d such that
wa`0
1
⇣
 (1  d)log
⇣
sn
1[a`0
1 ]
⌘⌘
> v`⇤
1 + #
cannot play a`⇤
1 with positive probability. Thus any type who plays a`⇤
1 with positive
probability must have a discount factor d such that either d  ¯ d or
 (1  d)log
⇣
sn
1[a`0
1 ]
⌘
> n⇤ , d < 1+
n⇤
log
 
sn
1[a`0
1 ]
 .
This means that for any n, all types with discount factor d > max
⇢
1+ n⇤
⇣
log
⇣
sn
1[a`0
1 ]
⌘⌘ 1
, ¯ d
 
must play an action supported in Lc ⌘{ 1,...,m}\L , which implies that for all n,
Â
`2Lc
sn
1[a`
1]   µn(Wr)min
(
1  F
 
1+
n⇤
log
 
sn
1[a`0
1 ]
 
!
,1  F(¯ d)
)
> rmin
(
1  F
 
1+
n⇤
log
 
sn
1[a`0
1 ]
 
!
,1  F(¯ d)
)
.
Recall by the deﬁnition of L that for all ` 2L c, sn
1[a`
1] ! 0 and therefore we can choose
n⇤ such that sn
1[a`
1] < #⇤ for all n > n⇤ and all ` 2L c. Fix some n > n⇤. We now divide the
inequality above on both sides by Â`2Lc sn
1[a`
1] yielding:18
1  
 
Â
`2Lc
sn
1[a`
1]
! 1
rmin
(
1  F
 
1+
n⇤
log
 
sn
1[a`0
1 ]
 
!
,1  F(¯ d)
)
 
r
sn
1[a`0
1 ]+(m   1)#⇤ min
(
1  F
 
1+
n⇤
log
 
sn
1[a`0
1 ]
 
!
,1  F(¯ d)
)
.
But this directly contradicts inequality (3.3) and concludes the proof.
Then Lemma 3.4.14 together with Lemma 3.4.10 immediately imply Lemma 3.4.8,
proving Theorem 3.4.2.
18Recall that Â`2Lc sn
1 [a`
1] > 0 because sn
1 [a1
1] > 0 for all n and 1 / 2L .
1233.5 Negative Results
In this section, we present two types of negative results that arise as the consequence of
particular speciﬁcations of the type space. Unlike the theorems analyzed in the classical
reputation literature, we ﬁx the payoff functions of all players and vary the type space of
the long run player in order to study its’ effects on the set of equilibria.
3.5.1 Necessity of Behavioral Commitment Types
First we illustrate why behavioral commitment types are generally necessary for reputation
building.
Theorem 3.5.1. Suppose that the stage game has a pure Nash equilibrium a⇤ and suppose that
µ[Wb]=0. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium in which all rational types play a⇤
1 with probability
one.
Proof. The proof is simple. Consider the strategy proﬁle s in which all types in Wr play
a⇤
1. Then a best response for player 2 is to play a⇤
2 at all histories since player 2 assigns
probability one to player 1 playing a⇤
1 at every history regardless of the signals observed.
But then it is clear that a⇤
1 is a best response for all player 1 types.
This shows that uncertainty regarding discount factors is not sufﬁcient by itself to
generate reputation effects. The reason is due to the fact that in the standard complete
information model when the long run player is known to be rational and his discount factor
is common knowledge, the repetition of a pure static Nash equilibrium is always a Nash
equilibrium of the repeated game regardless of the discount factor.
Note however the above theorem simply notes that µ[Wb] must be strictly positive and
does not necessarily require µ[Wb] to be larger than some pre-speciﬁed value x > 0. We now
study the structure of equilibria when µ[Wb] is strictly positive but small. We show that
even when this is the case, the set of equilibrium payoffs of the long run player generally
includes payoffs far below the long run player’s Stackelberg payoff.
1243.5.2 Necessity of Arbitrarily Patient Rational Types
Suppose that the discount factor of the rational type is known to be at most d⇤ < 1 i.e.
F(d⇤)=1. Then it is easy to show the following:
Theorem 3.5.2. Suppose F(d⇤)=1 for some d⇤ < 1 and the stage game has a strict Nash
equilibrium a⇤. Then there exists some x⇤ such that if µ[Wb] < x⇤, there exists a Nash equilibrium
in which all rational types play a⇤
1 with probability one.
First note that this includes the case of the standard model in which the discount factor
of player 1 is perfectly known. The argument is intuitive. When all rational types play
a⇤
1 and the probability of non-rationality is sufﬁciently small, by deviating to a1
1, player 1
cannot convince player 2 that he indeed played a1
1 until very late in the game. Because of
discounting, these beneﬁts arrive too late in the game for such a deviation to be desirable.
Proof. Consider the strategy in which all rational types play a⇤
1. Then given any type space
(W,µ), because of Assumption 3.2.1, the beliefs of player 2 about player 1’s action at any
public history ht, which we denote µ(ht), is uniquely deﬁned due to Bayes’ rule. Given any
type space (W,µ), deﬁne player 2’s strategy to be such that s2(ht) 2 B(µ(ht)). This now
deﬁnes a strategy proﬁle s. We will now show that given any (W,µ), s constructed in the
above manner is indeed a Nash equilibrium whenever µ[Wb] is sufﬁciently small.
Let ¯ u = maxa2A u1(a). Because a⇤ is a strict Nash equilibrium, we can ﬁnd t⇤ such that
max
a16=a⇤
1
⇣
1  (d⇤)t⇤⌘
u1(a1,a⇤
2)+(d⇤)t⇤
u < u1(a⇤).
Then let ¯ p be the maximum possible likelihood ratio among all actions and all public signals
when comparing against a⇤
1:
¯ p ⌘ max
y,a
p(y | a)
p(y | a⇤
1)
.
Note then that given any t period history of signals (y0,y1,...,yt 1), the probability that
125player 2 assigns to player 1 playing a⇤
1 is at least:
(1  µ[Wb])
µ[Wb]
maxa12A1 p(y0|a1)
p(y0|a⇤
1) ···
maxa12A1 p(yt 1|a1)
p(yt 1|a⇤
1) +( 1  µ(Wb))
 
1  µ[Wb]
µ[Wb] ¯ pt 1 +( 1  µ[Wb])
.
Now let n 2 (0,1) be such that whenever player 2 assigns probability at least n to player 1
playing a⇤
1, player 2’s unique best response is to play a⇤
2.
Then choose there choose k⇤ such that
1  k⇤
k⇤ ¯ pt⇤ 1 +( 1  k⇤)
> n.
Then it is easy to see that as long as µ[Wb]  k⇤,
1  µ[Wb]
µ[Wb] ¯ pt 1 +( 1  µ[Wb])
> n
for all t  t⇤. This then means that at any history ht with t  t⇤, player 2 must play a⇤
2 with
certainty. With this an upper bound on player 1’s payoff to deviating to another action a1 is
max
a16=a⇤
1
⇣
1  (d⇤)t⇤⌘
u1(a1,a⇤
2)+(d⇤)t⇤
¯ u.
By deﬁnition of t⇤, the above is strictly less than u1(a⇤) and so we have indeed checked that
player 1’s actions are incentive compatible. This concludes the proof.
Bagwell (1995) proves essentially the same theorem in the context of a two-stage game.
Additionally the point here corresponds to the theorems found in Cripps et al. (2004) who
illustrate the same point in a different setting where the player can change his action every
period. Note that the above result depends importantly on the assumption that the action of
player 1 is observed imperfectly. For example, if the action was perfectly observed, then
even without any behavioral types, a sufﬁciently patient player 1 would always choose a1
1
in all Nash equilibria. In contrast, the imperfection in observation of the long run player’s
action (and more precisely the full support assumption of the public monitoring structure)
eliminates the possibility of large jumps in player 2’s posterior regarding the played action
126of player 1 especially when s1[a1] is close to one. This then implies that when (a1,a2(a1)) is
a strict Nash equilibrium of the stage game, a deviation to an action a0
1 6= a1 is very costly
since player 2’s belief about the played action being a1 remains close to one for a long time.
Unlike in Section 3.4, we can make s1[a1] very close to one because the highest patient types
are no longer available to rectify and reinforce reputation effects.
3.6 Numerical Simulations
3.6.1 Strictly Dominated Action: Product Choice Game
Let the stage game be given by the following two player game.
Table 3.1: Stage Game
B D
H a,x  b,0
L c, y 0,0
Player 1 chooses a technology of either H or L in period 0. Playing H incurs a cost to
player 1 (a < x, b > 0). However if player 1 played H and player 2 was convinced that he
did so, player 2 would prefer to play B whereas if player 2 were to become convinced that
player 1 played L, then he would play D. Let w⇤ be the cutoff likelihood ratio above which
the short run player plays B. To simplify notation, let k =( lH   lL)2.
We simplify the model such that the type space of discount factors (the amount of
discounting over a unit interval of time) is given by the uniform distribution over (0,1).
Furthermore assume that only rational types exist in the model. Because the model is
in continuous time, it is convenient to transform the discount factor into a discount rate:
r ⌘  logd. Furthermore conditional on the ﬁrm choosing technology q 2{ H, L}, the
stochastic process of public signals observed by the consumers is given by:
dXt = lqdt+ dZt
where lH > lL. With this simple setup, we can now perform a rich analysis of the product
127choice game described above.
Bayesian Inference
We ﬁrst solve the ﬁltering problem. Conditional on the long run player playing q 2{ H, L},
we can calculate the process dpq
t:
dpt,H = kpt,H(1  pt,H)2dt+
p
kpt,H(1  pt,H)dZt,
dpt,L =  kp2
t,L(1  pt,L)dt+
p
kpt,L(1  pt,L)dZt.
It is computationally much more convenient to express all terms in terms of the likelihood
ratio:
wH
t =
pH
t
1  pH
t
,wL
t =
pL
t
1  pL
t
.
We obtain the following SDE:
dwH
t = kwH
t dt+
p
kwH
t dZt
dwL
t =
p
kwL
t dZt.
Value Functions
With the above, we can now solve for the value function of a type r that plays H whenever
w  w⇤:
VH(r,wH
t )= rbdt+( 1  rdt)
⇣
VH(r,wH
t )+E[dVH(r,wH
t )]
⌘
.
Rearranging we obtain:
r
⇣
VH(r,wH
t )+b
⌘
dt = E[dVH(r,wH
t )];
We can derive a similar equation at any w > w⇤ which implies the following ODE for VH:
rVH(r,w)=
8
> > <
> > :
 rb +(lH   lL)2w
⇣
∂VH
∂w + w
2
∂2VH
∂w2
⌘
if w < w⇤,
ra +(lH   lL)2w
⇣
∂VH
∂w + w
2
∂2VH
∂w2
⌘
if w > w⇤.
128Solving the above ODE piecewise, we obtain the following:
VH(r,w)=
8
> > <
> > :
 b + C1w
  1
2
⇣
1+
p
8r+k p
k
⌘
+ C2w
1
2
⇣
 1+
p
8r+k p
k
⌘
if w < w⇤
a + C3w
  1
2
⇣
1+
p
8r+k p
k
⌘
+ C4w
1
2
⇣
 1+
p
8r+k p
k
⌘
if w > w⇤.
Because of the boundary conditions, VH(r,0)= b and limw!+• VH(r,w)=a, we have
C1 = 0 and C4 = 0. Thus the above simpliﬁes to:
VH(r,w)=
8
> > <
> > :
 b + C2w
  1
2
⇣
1 
p
8r+k p
k
⌘
if w < w⇤
a + C3w
  1
2
⇣
1+
p
8r+k p
k
⌘
if w > w⇤.
We then solve for C3 and C4 explicitly by employing the smooth pasting and value matching
conditions:
lim
w"w⇤ VH(w)= lim
w#w⇤ VH(w)
lim
w"w⇤ V0
H(w)= lim
w#w⇤ V0
H(w).
After evaluation and algebraic manipulation, we get the following closed-form solution to
the differential equation:
VH(r,w)=
8
> > <
> > :
 b +
a+b
2
⇣ p
k p
8r+k + 1
⌘
(w/w⇤)
  1
2
⇣
1 
p
8r+k p
k
⌘
if w < w⇤
a +
a+b
2
⇣ p
k p
8r+k   1
⌘
(w/w⇤)
  1
2
⇣
1+
p
8r+k p
k
⌘
if w > w⇤.
Similarly we calculate the value functions of a type r that plays L:
rVL(r,w)=
8
> > <
> > :
rc + k w2
2
∂2VL
∂w2 if w > w⇤,
k w2
2
d2VL
dw2 if w < w⇤.
This then yields the following solution to the differential equation:
VL(r,w)=
8
> > <
> > :
c
2
⇣
1 
p
k p
8r+k
⌘
(w/w⇤)
1
2
⇣
1+
p
8r+k p
k
⌘
if w < w⇤,
c  
c
2
⇣
1+
p
k p
8r+k
⌘
(w/w⇤)
1
2
⇣
1 
p
8r+k p
k
⌘
if w > w⇤.
129Equilibrium
First note that for every w, VH(r,w)   VL(r,w) is strictly decreasing in r whenever w < w⇤.
Thus there exists a function r⇤ : [0,•) ! [0,•) such that for all w, VH(r,w) > VL(r,w) for
all r < r⇤(w) and VH(r,w) < VL(r,w) for all r > r⇤(w).
This then implies that every equilibrium is uniquely determined by a cutoff discount
rate r⇤ such that the equilibrium likelihood ratio is
¯ w =
1  e r⇤( ¯ w)
e r⇤( ¯ w) = er⇤( ¯ w)   1
and VL(r⇤, ¯ w)=VH(r⇤, ¯ w). All of this yields the equation:
VL(r⇤,er⇤
  1)=VH(r⇤,er⇤
  1). (3.4)
Thus in any equilibrium, r⇤ is a ﬁxed point of Equation (3.4).
Note that thus far we have not introduced any behavioral commitment types into the
game and thus r⇤ = 0 is a trivial equilibrium. However we now introduce the idea of
robustness to the introduction of the Stackelberg type wS.
Deﬁnition 3.6.1. Let s be an equilibrium of the continuous time game with only rational
types. Then s is robust to the introduction of wS if for any sequence of games (Wr [{wS},µn)
with µn[wS] ! 0, there exist sn 2 E(Wr [{wS},µn) such that sn[a1
1] ! s[a1
1].
It is an easy modiﬁcation of the arguments in Section 3.4 to prove that the only equilib-
rium that is robust to the introduction of wS (the Stackelberg commitment type) is when
r⇤ > 0. Furthermore r⇤ is the unique point not equal to zero at which Equation (3.4) holds.
Theorem 3.6.2. There exists a unique equilibrium that is robust to the introduction of wS. In this
equilibrium, the cutoff discount rate r⇤ satisﬁes Equation (3.4) and is strictly positive.
Size of the Contagion Effect
Using this framework we can now explicitly compute the size of the contagion effect.
Consider the following speciﬁcation of payoffs: a = 1, b = 1,x = 2,x = 1,y = 1. In this
130scenario w⇤ = 1 so that player 2 plays B at time t if and only if pt   1
2. Furthermore let
k =( lH   lL)2 = 1.5.
Table 3.2: Stage Game
B D
H 1,1  1,0
L 2, 1 0,0
Given these parameters we can compute the mass of types playing the In the equilibrium
robust to the introduction of the Stackelberg type, d⇤ ⌘ e r⇤
⇡ 0.617. Thus s1[H] ⇡ 0.383
and so approximately 38 percent of all rational types play H in equilibrium. Given this,
in Figure 3.2, we plot the payoffs of all rational types in the equilibrium robust to the
introduction of the Stackelberg type. As a consequence this means that even when the
probability of the Stackelberg type is extremely small, there will be approximately 38 percent
of rational types who play the Stackelberg action in any equilibrium. This leads to high
payoffs even for types with moderate levels of patience. For example, a type with a discount
factor of 0.95 obtains a payoff of approximately 0.81 in the robust equilibrium.
If instead k = 2 so that the signal structure is more informative, then d⇤ ⇡ 0.476 and thus
over half of the population plays the Stackelberg action in the unique robust equilibrium. As
a result the payoffs of all types are at least 0.57 as illustrated in Figure 3.3. Furthermore the
same type d = 0.95 from the previous example now obtains a payoff of approximately 0.92
in the robust equilibrium while a much less patient type d = 0.8 also obtains a relatively
high payoff of 0.76.
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion
To conclude, the paper leaves open natural questions for further research. It is unclear
whether private information regarding discount factors can generate reputation effects
with small probability of behavioral commitment types in the standard reputation model
where the long run player can continuously change his action. This problem is substantially
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Figure 3.2: The payoff of type d in the robust equilibrium.
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Figure 3.3: The payoff of type d in the robust equilibrium.
132complicated by two factors. First the lack of commitment to an action means that it may
be a best response for a very patient player to pick a non-Stackelberg action at some point
in the future. Perfect commitment to an action avoids this complication and thus allows
for strong contagion effects starting with these very patient types. Secondly, the long run
player’s decision at every point in time will depend on the short run player’s posterior
about not just whether he is a rational or behavioral type but also on the short run player’s
beliefs about the long run player’s discount factor. Because this is changing over time, it is
important to understand how the short run player’s perceived distribution over the long
run player’s patience evolves in order to study whether reputation can be maintained.
Another potentially interesting open question is whether one can obtain similar results
if incomplete information concerns the monitoring structure of player 2 rather than the
patience level of player 1. Consider player 1 who has private information about the
technology pq(·|a1) governing the mapping from intended action to public consequences
Y. Intuitvely those types that know that p(·|a1) is essentially one of perfect monitoring will
have a strict incentive to play the Stackelberg action. This may lead to a similar contagion
effect for those who have less perfect technologies. However to study this question, new
techniques must be developed to obtain bounds on how the payoff estimates depend on the
monitoring structure, which is not directly addressed in Gossner (2011).
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138Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Preliminary Mathematical Tools for Equilibrium Analysis
A.1.1 General Properties of the Value to Waiting
Throughout this section N denotes an equilibrium adoption ﬂow, with associated value to
waiting WN
t and no-news posterior pN. We we establish some basic mathematical properties
of the value to waiting WN corresponding to any equilibrium adoption ﬂow N.
Lemma A.1.1. Let N be an equilibrium ﬂow of adopters. Then WN
t is continuous in t.
Proof. This is immediate from Lemma 1.2.4. Note that WN
t can be written as:
WN
t =
• Z
t
h(t)dt
for some h 2 L1[0,•) \ L•[0,•). Then it is immediate that WN
t is continuous in t.
Lemma A.1.2. Suppose that N is an equilibrium and that WN
t < 2pN
t   1 for some t > 0. Then
there exists some n > 0 such that WN
t is continuously differentiable in t on the interval (t  n,t+ n)
and
˙ WN
t =(r + r +(#G + lGNt)pN
t +(#B + lBNt)(1  pN
t ))WN
t
  r(2pN
t   1)   pN
t (#G + lGNt)
r
r + r
.
139Proof. By Lemma A.1.1, WN
t must be continuous in t. Because 2pN
t   1 is continuous in t,
there exists some n > 0 such that WN
t < 2pN
t   1 for all t 2 (t   n,t + n). This means that
Nt = r ¯ Nt for all t 2 (t   n,t + n) and so Nt must be continuous at all t 2 (t   n,t + n).
From Lemma 1.2.4, WN
t can be rewritten for all t 2 (t   n,t + n) as
WN
t =
t+n Z
t
re (r+r)(s t)
⇣
pN
t e 
R s
t(#G+lGNx)dx   (1  pN
t )e 
R s
t(#B+lBNx)dx
⌘
ds
+ e (r+r)(t+n t)
⇣
pN
t e 
R t+n
t (#G+lGNx)dx +( 1  pN
t )e 
R t+n
t (#B+lBNx)dx
⌘
WN
t+n
+
t+n Z
t
re (r+r)(s t)pN
t
⇣
1  e 
R s
t(#G+lGNx)dx
⌘
ds
+ e (r+r)(t+n t)pN
t
⇣
1  e 
R t+n
t (#G+lGNx)dx
⌘ r
r + r
.
From this it is easy to see that WN
t is continuously differentiable with respect to t for all
t 2 (t   n,t + n).
The derivative can be computed using Ito’s Lemma for processes with jumps. Given
the perfect Poisson learning structure, the derivation is simple and we provide it here for
completeness.
As above, for any D < t + n   t we can rewrite WN
t as
WN
t =
t+D Z
t
re (r+r)(s t)
⇣
pN
t e 
R s
t(#G+lGNx)dx   (1  pN
t )e 
R s
t(#B+lBNx)dx
⌘
ds
+ e (r+r)D
⇣
pN
t e 
R t+D
t (#G+lGNx)dx +( 1  pN
t )e 
R t+D
t (#B+lBNx)dx
⌘
WN
t+D
+
t+D Z
t
re (r+r)(s t)pN
t
⇣
1  e 
R s
t(#G+lGNx)dx
⌘
ds
+ e (r+r)DpN
t
⇣
1  e 
R t+D
t (#G+lGNx)dx
⌘ r
r + r
.
Since this is true for all D 2 (0,t + n   t), the right hand side of this identity, which we
denote RD, is continuously differentiable with respect to D and satisﬁes d
dDRD ⌘ 0. Taking
the limit as D ! 0 and since ˙ WN
t = limD!0
d
dDWN
t+D by continuous differentiability, we then
140obtain that
˙ WN
t =( r+r+(#G +lGNt)pt +(#B+lBNt)(1  pt))WN
t  r(2pt  1)  pt(#G +lGNt)
r
r + r
,
as claimed.
We can prove a similar lemma for the case in which the equilibrium value to waiting is
strictly above the payoff to adopting today.
Lemma A.1.3. Suppose that N is an equilibrium and that WN
t > 2pN
t   1 for some t > 0. Then
there exists some n > 0 such that WN
t is continuously differentiable in t on the interval (t  n,t+ n)
and
˙ WN
t =( r + pN
t #G +( 1  pN
t )#B)WN
t   pN
t #G
r
r + r
.
Proof. The proof of continuous differentiability of WN
t follows along the same lines as in the
proof of Lemma A.1.2. Lemma A.1.1 again implies that if WN
t > 2pN
t   1, then there exists
n > 0 such that WN
t > 2pN
t   1 for all t 2 (t   n,t + n). By the deﬁnition of equilibrium,
Nt = 0 for all t 2 (t   n,t + n).
Hence, WN
t satisﬁes
WN
t = e r(t+n t)
⇣
pN
t e #G(t+n t) +( 1  pN
t )e #B(t+n t)
⌘
WN
t+n
+ pN
t
t+n Z
t
#Ge (#G+r)s r
r + r
ds.
From this it is again immediate that WN
t is continuously differentiable in t.
To compute the derivative, we can proceed as above, rewriting WN
t as
WN
t = e rD
⇣
pN
t e #GD +( 1  pN
t )e #BD
⌘
WN
t+D + pt
t+D Z
t
#Ge (#G+r)s r
r + r
ds
for any D < t + n   t.
Differentiating both sides of the above equality with respect to D and taking the limit as
D ! 0, we obtain:
˙ WN
t =( r + pN
t #G +( 1  pN
t )#B)WN
t   pN
t #G
r
r + r
,
141as claimed.
A.1.2 Special Properties of the Value to Waiting under PBN
Here we focus on learning via perfect bad news. By Equation 1.1, an upper bound on the
no-news posterior is given by:
µ(#,L0, p0) :=
8
> > <
> > :
1 if # > 0,
p0
p0+(1 p0)e L0 if # = 0.
We now show that absent breakdowns, this posterior is attained in the limit.
Lemma A.1.4. Let N be an equilibrium under PBN. Suppose that # > 0 or p0 > 1/2. Then
pN
t ! µ(#,L0, p0) and WN
t !
r
r+r(2µ(#,L0, p0)   1) as t ! •.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case in which # > 0. Then trivially pN
t ! 1 as t ! •. So for any
n > 0, there exists some t⇤ such that whenever t > t⇤, then 1  pN
t < n.
Then we can produce upper and lower bounds on WN
t :
r
r + r
(1  n)  
r
r + r
n <
r
r + r
⇣
2pN
t   1
⌘
 WN
t 
r
r + r
.
Since this is true for any n > 0, it follows that limt!• WN
t =
r
r+r as claimed.
Now suppose that # = 0 and p0 > 1/2. Then note that WN
t  2pN
t   1 for all t: Indeed,
suppose that WN
t > 2pN
t   1 for some t. We can’t have that WN
s > 2pN
s   1 for all s   t,
since otherwise WN
t = 0, contradicting WN
t > 2pN
t   1 > 0. But then we can ﬁnd s > t
such that WN
s = 2pN
s   1 and WN
s0 > 2pN
s0   1 for all s0 2 (t,s). This implies N0
s = 0 for all s0,
and hence WN
t = e r(s t)WN
s = e r(s t)(2pN
s   1)=e r(s t)(2pN
t   1), again contradicting
WN
t > 2pN
t   1 > 0.
Let N⇤ := limt!•
R t
0 Nsds = supt
R t
0 Nsds  ¯ N0. Let p⇤ := limt!• pN
t = supt pN
t . For
any n > 0 we can ﬁnd t⇤ such that whenever t > t⇤, then e l
R t
t⇤ Ns ds > 1   n. Because
1422pN
t   1   WN
t for all t, we can then rewrite the value to waiting at time t as:
WN
t =
• Z
t
re (r+r)t
⇣
pN
t   (1  pN
t )e l
R t
t Nsds
⌘
dt

r
r + r
⇣
pN
t   (1  pN
t )(1  n)
⌘
for all t > t⇤. Moreover, by optimality WN
t  
r
r+r(2pN
t   1) for all t, so combining we have
r
r + r
(2p⇤   1)  lim
t!•
infWN
t  lim
t!•
supWN
t 
r
r + r
(p⇤   (1  p⇤)(1  n)).
Since this is true for all n > 0, it follows that
lim
t!•
WN
t =
r
r + r
(2p⇤   1).
But the above is strictly less than 2p⇤   1, so for all t sufﬁciently large we must have
2pN
t   1 > WN
t . Then for all t sufﬁciently large, we have Nt = r ¯ Nt. Thus, N⇤ = ¯ N0 and
therefore p⇤ = µ(#,L0, p0).
A.2 Quasi-Single Crossing Property for Equilibrium Incentives
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1.4.1 under Perfect Good News
From now on we drop the superscript N from W and p.
Proof. The proof consists of two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we show that whenever Wt = 2pt  1,
then Wt   2pt   1 for all t   t. In the second step, we show that whenever Wt > 2pt   1,
then Wt > 2pt   1 for all t > t.
Step 1: Suppose Wt = 2pt   1 at some time t and suppose for a contradiction that at
some time s0 > t, we have Ws0 < 2ps0   1. Let
s⇤ = sup{s < s0 : Ws = 2ps   1}.
By continuity, s⇤ < s0, Ws⇤ = 2ps⇤   1, and Ws < 2ps   1 for all s 2 (s⇤,s0). Then by
143Lemma A.1.2, the right hand derivative of Ws   (2ps   1) at s⇤ exists and satisﬁes:
lim
s#s⇤
˙ Ws   2 ˙ ps = r(2ps⇤   1)+ps⇤ (#G + lGNs⇤)
r
r + r
> 0.
This implies that for some s 2 (s⇤,s0) sufﬁciently close to s⇤ we have Ws > 2ps   1, which is
a contradiction.
Step 2: Assume Wt > 2pt   1 at some t and suppose for a contradiction that there exists
s0 > t such that Ws0 = 2ps0   1. Let
s⇤ = inf{s > t : Ws = 2ps   1}.
By continuity, s⇤ > t, Ws⇤ = 2ps⇤   1, and Ws > 2ps   1 for all s 2 (t,s⇤). Then by
Lemma A.1.3 the left-hand derivative of Ws   (2ps   1) at s⇤ exists and is given by:
lim
s"s⇤
˙ Ws   2 ˙ ps = r(2ps⇤   1)+ps⇤
r
r + r
#G > 0.
This implies that for some s 2 (t,s⇤) sufﬁciently close to s⇤, we must have Ws < 2ps   1,
which is a contradiction.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1.4.1 under Perfect Bad News
Proof. The proof consists of two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we show that whenever Wt = 2pt  1,
then Wt  2pt   1 for all t   t. In the second step, we show that whenever Wt < 2pt   1,
then Wt < 2pt   1 for all t > t.
Step 1: Suppose Wt = 2pt   1 at some time t and suppose for a contradiction that at
some time s0 > t we have Ws0 > 2ps0   1. Then because Wt !
r
r+r (2µ(#,L, p0)   1) <
2µ(#,L, p0)   1 by Lemma A.1.4, there exists s < s such that Ws = 2ps   1, Ws = 2ps   1,
and Ws > 2ps   1 for all s 2 (s,s). By Lemma A.1.3, we have the following two limits:
lim
s#s
˙ Ws =( r +( 1  ps)#)(2ps   1).
lim
s"s
˙ Ws =( r +( 1  ps)#)(2ps   1).
144Also, as usual
lim
s#s
d
ds
(2ps   1) = 2ps(1  ps)#
lim
s"s
d
ds
(2ps   1) = 2ps(1  ps)#.
In order that Ws > 2ps   1 for all s 2 (s,s), we need:
(r +( 1  ps)#)(2ps   1)   2ps(1  ps)#
(r +( 1  ps)#)(2ps   1)  2ps(1  ps)#.
Rearranging we get:
r(2ps   1)   (1  ps)#
r(2ps   1)  (1  ps)#.
But this is impossible given that ps > ps. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: Suppose that Wt < 2pt   1 and suppose for a contradiction that there exists
some s0 > t such that Ws0   2ps0   1. Deﬁne
s = inf{s0 > t : Ws0   2ps0   1}.
By continuity, Wt < 2pt   1 for all t 2 [t,s) and Ws = 2ps   1.
Furthermore, by Lemma A.1.4, there exists some s   s such that 2ps   1 = Ws and
2ps   1 > Ws for all s > s. By Lemma A.1.2, we have the following two limits:
Hs ⌘ lim
s"s
✓
˙ Ws  
d
ds
(2ps   1)
◆
= r(2ps   1)   (# + lr ¯ Ns)(1  ps)
Hs ⌘ lim
s#s
✓
˙ Ws  
d
ds
(2ps   1)
◆
= r(2ps   1)   (# + lr ¯ Ns)(1  ps).
As usual, because Ws < 2ps   1 for all s 2 (t,s) and for all s > s, we must have Hs   0 and
Hs  0. But since ps   ps, this is only possible if s = s =: s⇤ and Hs⇤ = Hs = Hs = 0.
Thus,
r(2ps⇤   1)=(# + lr ¯ Ns⇤)(1  ps⇤).
145Now consider any s 2 [t,s⇤). Because ps  ps⇤ we must have
r(2ps   1)  (# + lr ¯ Ns)(1  ps).
Combining this with the fact that Ws < 2ps   1 and Ns = r ¯ Ns yields
rWs < (# + lr ¯ Ns)(1  ps) < (2p  Ws)(# + lr ¯ Ns)(1  ps)+r(2ps   1 Ws).
Rearranging we obtain:
0 <  rWs + r(2ps   1 Ws)+( 2p  Ws)(# + lr ¯ Ns)(1  ps).
But by Lemma A.1.2, the right-hand side is precisely the derivative d
ds(2ps   1)   ˙ Ws. This
implies that for all s 2 [t,s⇤), 2ps   1   Ws is strictly increasing, contradicting continuity
and the fact that 2ps⇤   1 = Ws⇤. This concludes the proof of Step 2.
A.3 Equilibrium Uniqueness and Characterization
A.3.1 Equilibrium Characterization under Perfect Bad News
In this section, we do not impose Conditions 1.5.2 or 1.5.3. Recall that p⇤ := min{p, p]},
where
p :=
# + r
# + 2r
,
p] :=
r + r
r + 2r
.
Recall the deﬁnition of G : [0,1] ⇥ R+ ! R:
G(p,L) :=
• Z
0
re (r+r)t
⇣
p   (1  p)e (#t+L(1 e rt))
⌘
dt.
We extend the function to the domain [0,1] ⇥ (R+ [{+•}) by deﬁning:
G(p,+•) :=
r
r + r
p.
146Finally, recall the deﬁnition of L⇤ : (0,1) ! R+ [{+•}:
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
L⇤(p)=0 if p  p,
2p   1 = G(p,L⇤(p)) if p 2 (p, p])
L⇤(p)=+ • p   p].
The proof of Theorem 1.5.1 proceeds in three steps. Assuming that N is an equilibrium,
we show in Lemma A.3.1 that if t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then the evolution of adoption behavior on
(t⇤
1,t⇤
2) is uniquely pinned down by an ODE. We next prove Lemma 1.5.4, which provides a
characterization of t⇤
1 and t⇤
2 in terms of (pt,Lt). Given these two steps uniqueness is clear.
Finally, we check feasibility in Lemma A.3.4, proving equilibrium existence.
Characterization of Adoption between t⇤
1 and t⇤
2
Lemma A.3.1. Suppose N is an equilibrium with no-news posterior pt. Suppose that t⇤
1 < t⇤
2. Then
at (almost) all times t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2),
Nt =
r(2pt   1)
l(1  pt)
 
#
l
.
Proof. Note that because 2pt   1 = WN
t at all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2) and pt is weakly increasing, WN
t
and pt are differentiable almost everywhere (with respect to Lebesgue measure).
Using again the fact that 2pt   1 = WN
t at all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2) we obtain for all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2):
WN
t = e r(t⇤
2 t)
✓
pt +( 1  pt)e 
R t⇤
2
t (#+lNs)ds
◆
(2pt⇤
2   1)
= e r(t⇤
2 t)
✓
pt   (1  pt)e 
R t⇤
2
t (#+lNs)ds
◆
.
Then for all t at which WN
t and pt are differentiable, we obtain:
˙ WN
t = (r +(# + lNt)(1  pt))WN
t
2 ˙ pt = 2pt(1  pt)(# + lNt).
Furthermore, because WN
t = 2pt   1 for all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2), we must have for almost all
147t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2):
˙ WN
t = 2 ˙ pt.
This means that for almost all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2):
Nt =
r(2pt   1)
l(1  pt)
 
#
l
.
A direct corollary of the above lemma is the following:
Corollary A.3.2. The posterior at all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2) evolves according to the following ordinary
differential equation:
˙ pt = rpt(2pt   1).
Given some initial condition p = pt⇤
1, this ordinary differential equation admits a unique solution,
given by:
pt =
pt⇤
1
2pt⇤
1   er(t t⇤
1)(2pt⇤
1   1)
.
Proof of Lemma 1.5.4
We now prove a more general version of Lemma 1.5.4 in which we replace p in Lemma 1.5.4
with p⇤.
Lemma A.3.3. Let N be an equilibrium with corresponding no-news posterior pt 0 and threshold
times t⇤
1 and t⇤
2, and let Lt 0 := l ¯ Nt 0 describe the evolution of the economy’s potential for social
learning. Then
1. t⇤
2 = inf{t : Lt < L⇤(pt)}; and
2. t⇤
1 = min{t⇤
2, sup{t : pt < p⇤}}.1
Proof. We ﬁrst prove both bullet points under the assumption that either # > 0 or p0 > 1
2.
Note that in this case Lemma A.1.4 implies that t⇤
2 < +• and we must also have that pt is
strictly increasing for all t > 0.
1We impose the convention that if {t   0:pt < p⇤ = 1
2} = ∆, then sup{t   0:pt < p⇤ = 1
2} := 0.
148For the ﬁrst bullet point, note that by deﬁnition of t⇤
2 and by Theorem 1.4.1, we have
2pt   1 > Wt = G(pt,Lt) for all t > t⇤
2. This implies that Lt < L⇤(pt) for all t > t⇤
2.
Moreover, if 0 < t⇤
2, then by continuity we must have 2pt⇤
2   1 = Wt⇤
2 = G(pt⇤
2,Lt⇤
2) and so
Lt⇤
2 = L⇤(pt⇤
2). In this case, because Ls is decreasing in s and ps is strictly increasing in s
and L⇤(p) is increasing in p, we must have Ls   L⇤(ps) for all s < t⇤
2. This establishes the
ﬁrst bullet point.
For the second bullet point, it sufﬁces to prove the following three claims:
(a) If t⇤
2 > 0, then pt⇤
2 < p].
(b) If t⇤
1 > 0, then pt⇤
1  p.
(c) If t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then pt⇤
1   p.
Indeed, given (a) and (b), we have that if 0 < t⇤
1 = t⇤
2, then pt⇤
1  p⇤. Given (a)-(c), we have
that if 0 < t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then pt⇤
1 = p = p⇤. If 0 = t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then (c) implies that p0   p = p⇤. In
all three cases (ii) readily follows. Finally, if 0 = t⇤
1 = t⇤
2, then there is nothing to prove.
For claim (a), recall from the above that if t⇤
2 > 0, then Lt⇤
2 = L⇤(pt⇤
2), whence pt⇤
2 < p]
because L⇤(p])=+ •.
For claim (b), note that if t⇤
1 > 0, then for all t < t⇤
1, we have Wt > 2pt   1. Then by
Lemma A.1.3 and because Wt⇤
1 = 2pt⇤
1   1, we must have
0   lim
t"t⇤
1
˙ Wt   2 ˙ pt =( r +( 1  pt⇤
1)#)(2pt⇤
1   1)   2pt⇤
1(1  pt⇤
1)#
= r(2pt⇤
1   1)   #(1  pt⇤
1),
which implies that
pt⇤
1 
# + r
# + 2r
=: p.
Finally, for claim (c), note that if t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then Lemma A.3.1 implies that for all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2),
0  Nt =
r(2pt   1)
l(1  pt)
 
#
l
.
149This implies that for all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2),
pt  
# + r
# + 2r
=: p,
and hence by continuity pt⇤
1   p as claimed. This proves the lemma when either # > 0 or
p0 > 1
2. Finally, if # = 0 and p0  1
2, then it is easy to see that pt ⌘ p0 for all t. Thus, t⇤
2 =
+• = inf{t : Lt < L⇤(p0)=0}. Also, if p0 < 1
2, then t⇤
1 =+ • = sup{t : pt < p⇤ = 1
2}; and
if p0 = 1
2, then t⇤
1 = 0 =: sup{t   0:pt < p⇤ = 1
2}.
With these lemmas, it is immediate that if an equilibrium exists, then it must take the
form of the adoption ﬂow given by Equation 1.6 in Theorem 1.5.1. Moreover, it is easy to
see that given initial parameters, Equation 1.6 uniquely pins down the times t⇤
1 and t⇤
2 as
well as the joint evolution of pt and Nt at all times (we elaborated on this in the main text),
and that whenever t⇤
1 < t⇤
2 < +•, then 2pt   1 = Wt for all t 2 [t⇤
1,t⇤
2]. Provided feasibility
is satisﬁed, it is then easy to check that this adoption ﬂow constitutes an equilibrium.
Feasibility
It remains to check feasibility of the adoption ﬂow implied by Equation 1.6 in Theorem 1.5.1.
Note that feasibility is non-trivial only at times t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2).
Lemma A.3.4. Suppose Nt 0 is an adoption ﬂow satisfying Equation 1.6 in Theorem 1.5.1 such
that t⇤
1 < t⇤
2. Then for all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2),
Nt  rLt.
Proof. It sufﬁces to show that
lim
t"t⇤
2
Nt  r ¯ Nt⇤
2.
The lemma then follows immediately since r ¯ Nt   Nt is strictly decreasing in t at all times in
(t⇤
1,t⇤
2).2
2This is only true if either # > 0 or p0 > 1
2. If # = 0 and p0 = 1
2, then Nt = 0 for all t and t⇤
1 = 0 < t⇤
2 =+ •.
But in this case feasibility is immediate.
150To see this, suppose by way of contradiction that r ¯ Nt⇤
2 < limt"t⇤
2 Nt. By continuity this
means that there exists some n > 0 such that r ¯ Nt < Nt for all t 2 (t⇤
2   n,t⇤
2). Then note
that from the indifference condition at t⇤
2, we have that 2pt⇤
2   1 = G(pt⇤
2,l ¯ Nt⇤
2). Furthermore
because L⇤(pt) is increasing in t,2 pt   1 < G(pt,l ¯ Nt) for all t < t⇤
2.
Since at all times t 2 (t⇤
2   n,t⇤
2) we have Nt > r ¯ Nt, this implies that
WN
t > G(pt,l ¯ Nt) > 2pt   1.
But this is a contradiction since we already checked that the described adoption ﬂow satisﬁes
the condition that WN
t = 2pt   1 for all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2).
A.3.2 Equilibrium Characterization under Perfect Good News
Theorem 1.6.1 follows readily from Lemma 1.6.2 and Lemma 1.6.3. Lemma 1.6.3 was proved
in the text. It remains to prove Lemma 1.6.2.
Proof of Lemma 1.6.2: Suppose for a contradiction that t⇤
1 < t⇤
2. From the deﬁnition of
these cutoffs, we must have 2pt   1 = Wt for all t 2 [t⇤
1,t⇤
2]. Then for all t 2 (t⇤
1,t⇤
2) and
D 2 (0,t⇤2  t) we have:
Wt =pt
t+D Z
t
(# + lNt)e 
R t
t (#+lNs)dse r(t t) r
r + r
dt+
⇣
(1  pt)+pte 
R t+D
t (#+lNs)ds
⌘
e rD (2pt+D   1),
where the ﬁrst term represents a breakthrough arriving at some t 2 (t,t + D) in which
case consumers adopt from then on, yielding a payoff of e r(t t) r
r+r; and the second term
represents no breakthrough arriving prior to t + D in which case, due to indifference,
consumers’ payoff can be written as e rD (2pt+D   1).
Note that we must have pt   1
2 on (t⇤
1,t⇤
2), since Wt is bounded below by 0. Given that
we assume that either # = 0 or p0 6= 1
2, this means that either # > 0 or pt > 1
2 for t sufﬁciently
151close to t⇤
1. Then it follows that for sufﬁciently small D
Wt < pt
⇣
1  e 
R t+D
t (#+lNs)ds
⌘ r
r + r
+
⇣
(1  pt)+pte 
R t+D
t (#+lNs)ds
⌘
(2pt+D   1)
 pt
⇣
1  e 
R t+D
t (#+lNs)ds
⌘
· 1+
⇣
(1  pt)+pte 
R t+D
t (#+lNs)ds
⌘
(2pt+D   1)
= 2pt   1,
where the ﬁnal equality comes from Bayesian updating of beliefs. This contradicts Wt =
2pt   1. Thus, t⇤
1 = t⇤
2.
A.4 Violation of Condition 1.5.2 under Perfect Bad News
pt
Lt
1
L⇤(p)
(2) (1)
p p]
Figure A.1: Partition of (pt,Lt) when #   r
In this section, we discuss the case in which r   #. We saw in Theorem 1.5.1 that the
characterization theorem holds even when Condition 1.5.2 is violated.
152In this case because L⇤(p)=+ • for all p > p⇤, we have:
Nt =
8
> > <
> > :
0 if Lt > L⇤(pt),
r ¯ Nt if Lt  L⇤(pt).
Note that now partial adoption never occurs and the unique equilibrium reduces to all-or-
nothing adoption.
As a result the saturation effect discussed in Section 1.5 is no longer present and welfare
always strictly increases in response to an increase in opportunities for social learning:
Proposition A.4.1. Fix r > 0 and p0 2 (0,1) and suppose that #   r > 0. Then W0 is strictly
increasing in L0.
A.5 Inefﬁciency of Equilibria
A.5.1 Inefﬁciency under PBN
Proof of Proposition 1.5.8: From Proposition 1.3.3, recall that
ps =
K(L0)
K(L0)+
r
r+r
r
r+#
,
where
K(L0)=
• Z
0
re (r+r)te #t L0(1 e rt)dt.
Note also that
K(L0) <
r
r + # + r
which then implies that
ps <
(r + r)(r + #)
2(# + r)(r + r)   #r
= p.
Finally observe from the proof of Lemma 1.5.4 that pt⇤
1   p.
If L0 > L⇤(p), either t⇤
1 > 0 or t⇤
2 > 0. In the ﬁrst case, adoption begins too late since
pt⇤
1   p > ps and therefore equilibrium is inefﬁcient. If on the other hand, t⇤
1 = 0 < t⇤
2, then
again because ps < pt⇤
1, adoption is too slow initially since consumers only partially adopt
153between t⇤
1 and t⇤
2. Thus again equilibrium is inefﬁcient.
On the other hand, if L0  L⇤(p0), then equilibrium is efﬁcient since both the cooperative
benchmark and equilibrium prescribe that absent breakdowns all consumers adopt whenever
given an opportunity.
A.6 Comparative Statics under PBN
A.6.1 Saturation Effect: Proof of Proposition 1.5.9
Throughout Section A.6 we impose Conditions 1.5.2 (so that p⇤ = p) and 1.5.3 as in the text.
We ﬁrst prove Lemma 1.5.6.
Proof of Lemma 1.5.6: Let L0 := max{L⇤(p0),L⇤(p)}. We show that t⇤
1(L0) < t⇤
2(L0) if and
only if L0 > L0.
Suppose ﬁrst that L0 > L0. Then by the proof of the ﬁrst part of Lemma 1.5.4, we must
have t⇤
2 > 0 and Lt⇤
2 = L⇤(pt⇤
2). If t⇤
1 = t⇤
2 =: t⇤, then by claims (a) and (b) in the proof of
Lemma 1.5.4, we must have pt⇤  p. But combining these statements, we get
Lt⇤ = L0 > L⇤(p)   L⇤(pt⇤)=Lt⇤,
which is a contradiction.
Suppose conversely that t⇤
1 < t⇤
2. Then by the proof of Lemma 1.5.4, we have that
L⇤(pt⇤
1) < Lt⇤
1 = L0. That proof also implies that if 0 < t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then pt⇤
1 = p   p0; and if
0 = t⇤
1 < t⇤
2, then pt⇤
1 = p0   p. Thus, either way L0 > L0, as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 1.5.9: For the ﬁrst bullet point, consider any L1
0 < L2
0  L0 with cor-
responding threshold times ti
1 and ti
2, value to waiting Wi
t, and no-news posteriors pi
t for
i = 1,2. By Lemma 1.5.6, we must have ti
1 = ti
2 =: ti. Let ˆ t := min{t1,t2}. Then note that
for all t  ˆ t, p1
ˆ t = p2
ˆ t and Li
ˆ t = Li
0. By Lemma 1.5.4 this implies that either 0 = t1 = t2 or
t1 < t2. If 0 = t1 = t2, then for all t > 0, we have 2pi
t   1 > Wi
t and
pi
t =
p0
p0 +( 1  p0)e (#t+(1 e rt)Li
0).
154Thus, p1
t < p2
t for all t > 0. Then by Lemma 1.2.4, W1
0 < W2
0.
If t1 < t2, then by deﬁnition of the cutoff times
W2
t1 > 2p2
t1   1 = 2p1
t1   1   W1
t1.
Since there is no adoption until t1, we have
Wi
0 = e rt1 pt1
p0
Wi
t1,
which again implies that W1
0 < W2
0. This proves the ﬁrst bullet point.
To prove the second bullet point, suppose that L2
0 > L1
0 > L0. By Lemma 1.5.6,
we then have ti
1 < ti
2 for i = 1,2. Moreover, by the proof of Lemma 1.5.4, we have
max{p0, p} = p1
t1
1
= p2
t2
1
. Because Ni
t = Ni
t = 0 for all t < ti
1 for both i = 1,2, this implies
that t1
1 = t2
1 = t1. Then
W2
t1 = 2p2
t1   1 = 2p1
t1   1 = W1
t1.
But once again,
Wi
0 = e rt1 pt1
p0
Wi
t1,
for i = 1,2, whence W1
0 = W2
0.
A.6.2 Learning Dynamics
Proof of Lemma 1.5.10
Proof of Lemma 1.5.10. Suppose that ˆ L0 > L0 > L⇤(p0). Recall that we are assuming
p] > p0 > p so that t⇤
1(L0)=t⇤
1( ˆ L)=0 and L0 = L⇤(p0). Then by Lemma 1.5.6, we have
t⇤
2( ˆ L0),t⇤
2(L0) > 0. Let t⇤
2 = min{t⇤
2( ˆ L0),t⇤
2(L0)}. Then because p0 = p
L0
0 = p
ˆ L0
0 , the ODE
in Corollary A.3.2 implies that at all times t < t⇤
2, we have p
L0
t = p
ˆ L0
t = pt. By Lemma A.3.1,
this implies that for all t < t⇤
2,
lNt = ˆ l ˆ Nt. (A.1)
155To prove the ﬁrst bullet point, note that Equation A.1 implies that
Lt⇤
2 = L0  
Z t⇤
2
0
lNt dt < ˆ L0  
Z t⇤
2
0
ˆ l ˆ Nt dt = ˆ Lt⇤
2.
By Lemma 1.5.4 and because p
L0
t⇤
2 = p
ˆ L0
t⇤
2 , this implies that t⇤
2 = t⇤
2(L0) < t⇤
2( ˆ L0).
From this and Equation A.1, it is then immediate that lNt = ˆ l ˆ Nt for all t < t⇤
2 = t⇤
2(L0),
proving the second bullet point.
Proof of Proposition 1.5.11
Proof. Clearly p
L0
t is strictly increasing for all L0 2 (0,L⇤(p0)) since in this case t⇤
2(L0)=0
so that
p
L0
t =
p0
p0 +( 1  p0)e (#t+(1 e rt)L0).
Suppose next that ˆ L0 > L0   L⇤(p0). By Lemma 1.5.10, t⇤ := t⇤
2(L0) < t⇤
2( ˆ L0),
lNt = ˆ l ˆ Nt, and p
L0
t = p
ˆ L0
t for all t  t⇤, which proves the ﬁrst bullet point.
To prove the second bullet point, we claim that there exists some n > 0 such that at all
times t 2 (t⇤,t⇤ + n), we have p
L0
t > p
ˆ L0
t . To see this, we prove the following inequality for
the equilibrium corresponding to L0:
lim
t"t⇤ lNt < lim
t#t⇤ lNt. (A.2)
In other words, there is necessarily a discontinuity in the equilibrium ﬂow of adoption at
exactly t⇤. Indeed, because Nt = r ¯ Nt for all t   t⇤ and by continuity of ¯ Nt, feasibility implies
that limt"t⇤ lNt  limt#t⇤ lNt. Suppose for a contradiction that limt"t⇤ lNt = limt#t⇤ lNt :=
lNt⇤. Then lNt⇤ = ˆ l ˆ Nt⇤. Moreover, for all t > t⇤, we have lNt = rLt⇤e r(t t⇤), which is
strictly decreasing in t. On the other hand, ˆ l ˆ Nt satisﬁes
ˆ l ˆ Nt =
8
> > <
> > :
r(2pt 1)
(1 pt)   # if t < t⇤
2( ˆ L0)
rLt⇤
2( ˆ L0)e r(t t⇤
2( ˆ L0)) if t   t⇤
2( ˆ L0).
Thus, for t 2 [t⇤,t⇤
2( ˆ L0)), ˆ l ˆ Nt is strictly increasing in t. This implies that ˆ l ˆ Nt > lNt for all
156t 2 [t⇤,t⇤
2( ˆ L0)). But then by Equation 1.1,
p
ˆ L0
t⇤
2( ˆ L0) > p
L0
t⇤
2( ˆ L0),
which by Lemma 1.5.4 implies
ˆ Lt⇤
2( ˆ L0) = L⇤(p
ˆ L0
t⇤
2( ˆ L0)) > L⇤(p
L0
t⇤
2( ˆ L0)) > Lt⇤
2( ˆ L0).
This yields that for all t   t⇤
2( ˆ L0))
ˆ l ˆ Nt = re r(t t⇤
2( ˆ L0) ˆ Lt⇤
2( ˆ L0) > re r(t t⇤
2( ˆ L0)Lt⇤
2( ˆ L0) = lNt.
Thus, ˆ l ˆ Nt > lNt for all t > t⇤ and hence p
ˆ L0
t > p
L0
t for all t > t⇤. By Lemma 1.2.4, this
implies
W
ˆ L0
t⇤ > W
L0
t⇤ .
But this is a contradiction, because we have that
W
ˆ L0
t⇤ = 2p
ˆ L0
t⇤   1 = 2pL0   1 = W
L0
t⇤ .
This proves that limt"t⇤ lNt < limt#t⇤ lNt. But then,
lim
t#t⇤
ˆ l ˆ Nt = lim
t"t⇤
ˆ l ˆ Nt = lim
t"t⇤ lNt < lim
t#t⇤ lNt.
Therefore there must exist some n > 0 such that ˆ l ˆ Nt < lNt for all t 2 [t⇤,t⇤ + n). Together
with the fact that p
L0
t⇤ = p
ˆ L0
t⇤ , this implies that p
L0
t > p
ˆ L0
t for all t 2 (t⇤,t⇤ + n), proving the
second bullet point of the proposition.
Finally, for the third bullet point, observe ﬁrst that there must exist some t > t⇤ such
that p
L0
t = p
ˆ L0
t . If not, then by continuity of beliefs p
L0
t > p
ˆ L0
t for all t > t⇤, and we once
again get that W
ˆ L0
t⇤ > W
L0
t⇤ , which is false. Then t := sup{s 2 (t⇤,t) : p
L0
s > p
ˆ L0
s } exists,
with t > t⇤ by the second bullet point. Further, by continuity, p
L0
t = p
ˆ L0
t , which implies
R t
0 lNsds =
R t
0
ˆ l ˆ Nsds. This yields Lt < ˆ Lt. But note that this implies that ˆ l ˆ Nt > lNt for all
t > t: Indeed, if t   t⇤
2( ˆ L0), this is obvious. On the other hand, if t 2 (t⇤,t⇤
2( ˆ L0)), then we
must have lNs < ˆ l ˆ Ns for some s < t, which implies that lNs0 < ˆ l ˆ Ns0 for all s0 2 (s,t⇤
2( ˆ L0)),
157because N is strictly decreasing and ˆ N is strictly increasing on this domain. This implies
that
p
ˆ L0
t⇤
2( ˆ L0) > p
L0
t⇤
2( ˆ L0),
which as above implies that
ˆ Lt⇤
2( ˆ L0) = L⇤(p
ˆ L0
t⇤
2( ˆ L0)) > L⇤(p
L0
t⇤
2( ˆ L0)) > Lt⇤
2( ˆ L0).
Then it is again obvious thatˆ l ˆ Nt > lNt for all t > t. Thus, in either case we get that
p
ˆ L0
t > p
L0
t for all t > t, as claimed by the third bullet point.
A.6.3 Adoption Behavior
Proof of Proposition 1.5.12: First note that because p0   p, t⇤
1(L0)=t⇤
1( ˆ L0)=0.
Then at all L0 < L⇤(p0), the adoption ﬂow absent breakdowns satisﬁes Nt = r ¯ Nt for all
t. Thus, conditional on a good product we get At(L0,G)=At( ˆ L0,G)=1   e rt for all t
and all pairs L0, ˆ L0  L⇤(p0).
Now suppose that ˆ L0 > L0 > L⇤(p0). Note that Nt, ˆ Nt > 0 for all t > 0 (recall
Condition 1.5.3). Let t⇤ = t⇤
2(L0). By Lemma 1.5.10, lNt = ˆ l ˆ Nt for all t < t⇤. Then for all
t < t⇤
Nt
¯ N0
=
lNt
L0
=
ˆ l ˆ Nt
L0
>
ˆ l ˆ Nt
ˆ L0
=
ˆ Nt
ˆ ¯ N0
. Therefore for all t < t⇤, we have At(L0,G) > At( ˆ L0,G).
Finally note that for all t   t⇤, Nt = r ¯ Nt and so:
At(L0,G)= At⇤(L0,G)+
⇣
1  e r(t t⇤)
⌘
(1  At⇤(L0,G))
At( ˆ L0,G)  At⇤( ˆ L0,G)+
⇣
1  e r(t t⇤)
⌘ 
1  At⇤( ˆ L0,G)
 
where the second inequality follows from feasibility. But because At⇤(L0,G) > At⇤( ˆ L0,G),
At(L0,G) > At( ˆ L0,G) for all t > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.5.13. We ﬁrst prove the proposition when we increase the information
structure from l to ˆ l > l holding ﬁxed ¯ N0. Given this, proving the theorem for arbitrary
158changes from L0 to ˆ L0 is straightforward.
Let N and ˆ N be the equilibrium under l and ˆ l, respectively. Note that when p  p0,
Nt > 0 for all t > 0. Given an arbitrary strictly positive adoption ﬂow M and t > 0, consider
the following map:
l 7!
t Z
0
Mte 
R t
0 (#+lMs)dsdt.
Note that for any t > 0, the above is strictly decreasing in l. This implies that for all t > 0,
t Z
0
Nte 
R t
0 (#+lNs)dsdt >
t Z
0
Nte 
R t
0 (#+ˆ lNs)dsdt. (A.3)
We now show that
t Z
0
Nte 
R t
0 (#+ˆ lNs)dsdt  
t Z
0
ˆ Nte 
R t
0 (#+ˆ l ˆ Ns)dsdt
which together with Inequality (A.3) implies the desired conclusion that At(ˆ l, ¯ N0,B) <
At(l, ¯ N0,B) for all t > 0.
To prove this, suppose that there exists some t > 0 such that
t Z
0
Nte 
R t
0 (#+ˆ lNs)dsdt <
t Z
0
ˆ Nte 
R t
0 (#+ˆ l ˆ Ns)dsdt. (A.4)
Note that by Proposition 1.5.12,
R t
0 Nsds  
R t
0 ˆ Nsds for all t   0 and so
t Z
0
#e 
R t
0 (#+ˆ lNs)dsdt 
t Z
0
#e 
R t
0 (#+ˆ l ˆ Ns)dsdt (A.5)
for all t   0. Inequalities (A.4) and (A.5) together imply:
t Z
0
 
# + ˆ lNt
 
e 
R t
0 (#+ˆ lNs)dsdt <
t Z
0
 
# + ˆ l ˆ Nt
 
e 
R t
0 (#+ˆ l ˆ Ns)dsdt.
But this is equivalent to
⇣
1  e 
R t
0(#+ˆ lNs)ds
⌘
<
⇣
1  e 
R t
0(#+ˆ l ˆ Ns)ds
⌘
.
This contradicts
R t
0 Nsds  
R t
0 ˆ Nsds as found in Proposition 1.5.12.
159Having shown the above, consider any change from L0 = l ¯ N0 to ˆ L0 = ˆ l ˆ ¯ N0 > L0. Then
there exists l⇤ > l such that ˆ L = l⇤ ¯ N0. Let N⇤ be the equilibrium associated with the pair
(l⇤, ¯ N0). By Lemma 1.5.5, unique equilibrium for the pair (ˆ l, ˆ ¯ N0) satisﬁes ˆ Nt =( l⇤/ˆ l)N⇤
t .
But then the above argument implies:
At(L,B)=E
2
4
t Z
0
Ns
¯ N0
ds
3
5 > E
2
4
t Z
0
N⇤
s
¯ N0
ds
3
5 = E
2
4
t Z
0
l⇤
ˆ l ˆ ¯ N0
ˆ l ˆ ¯ N0
l⇤ ¯ N0
N⇤
s ds
3
5
= E
2
4
t Z
0
ˆ Ns
ˆ ¯ N0
ds
3
5 = At( ˆ L,B).
A.7 Comparative Statics under PGN
A.7.1 Adoption Behavior
The only statement that was not proved in the text is: At( ˆ L0,G) < At(L0,G) for all
t > t⇤( ˆ L0), as claimed in the ﬁrst bullet of Proposition 1.6.7.
Proof. When # = 0, the statement is trivial, so assume that # > 0. The claim is also obvious
for all t  t⇤(L0) since adoption occurs at the maximal rate under L0 whereas under ˆ L0,
adoption ceases at times t 2 (t⇤( ˆ L0),t⇤(L0)) absent breakthroughs.
So assume that t > t⇤(L0). Recall that the cutoff posterior p⇤ at which adoption ceases
is unchanged upon a change from L0 to ˆ L0. Then expected adoption up to time t for any
G 2 [L0, ˆ L0] can be expressed in the following manner:
At(G,G)=p⇤  
1  e rt 
+( 1  p⇤)
0
B
@(1  e rt⇤(G))+e rt⇤(G)
t Z
t⇤(G)
#e #(t t⇤(G))
⇣
1  e r(t t)
⌘
1
C
A
where
(1  p⇤)=
1  p0
1  p⇤.
160Now for a ﬁxed t, consider the function:
t⇤ 7! p⇤  
1  e rt 
+( 1  p⇤)
0
@(1  e rt⇤
)+e rt⇤
t Z
t⇤
#e #(t t⇤)
⇣
1  e r(t t)
⌘
1
A.
Then a straightforward computation yields that the derivative of the above map with respect
to any t⇤ < t is re (# r)t⇤
e #t > 0. Thus, the map is strictly increasing in t⇤ for all t⇤ < t.
Because t⇤(G) is strictly decreasing in G, it follows that for all t > t⇤(G), At(G,G) is strictly
decreasing for all G 2 [L0, ˆ L0]. This proves the claim.
A.8 Heterogeneous Discount Rate Example
First we show the following basic mathematical fact.
Lemma A.8.1. Let t > t⇤ and suppose that f and g are real-valued functions such that f(t)=g(t)
for all t  t⇤,f (t) < g(t) for t 2 (t⇤,t), and f(t) > g(t) for all t > t. Suppose that
• Z
0
e rt f(t)dt =
• Z
0
e rtg(t)dt.
Then for all ˆ r > r,
• Z
0
e ˆ rt f(t)dt <
• Z
0
e ˆ rtg(t)dt.
Proof. We have
0 =
• Z
0
e rt(g(t)   f(t))dt =
t Z
0
e ˆ rte(ˆ r r)t (g(t)   f(t))dt +
• Z
t
e ˆ rte(ˆ r r)t (g(t)   f(t))dt
< e(ˆ r r)t
0
@
t Z
0
e ˆ rt(g(t)   f(t))dt +
• Z
t
e ˆ rt (g(t)   f(t))dt
1
A
< e(ˆ r r)t
• Z
0
e ˆ rt (g(t)   f(t))dt.
This implies that
R •
0 e ˆ rt f(t)dt <
R •
0 e ˆ rtg(t)dt, as claimed.
As in the main text, assume that ˆ lM
p
0 > lM
p
0 > L⇤
rp(p0) and that p0 > 1/2 and # = 0.
161Then modifying the arguments from the proof of Theorem 1.5.1, it is easy to show that
when Mi
0 is sufﬁciently small, the unique equilibrium under both information processes l,
ˆ l will be such that the impatient type adopts immediately upon opportunity at all times
absent breakdowns and the patient type only partially adopts until some time t⇤ > 0 after
which he switches to immediate adoption:3
gNi
t = rMi
t,
gN
p
t =
8
> > <
> > :
rp(2pt 1)
1 pt   grMi
t if t < t⇤(g)
grM
p
t if t   t⇤(g)
for g 2{ l, ˆ l}.
Then using arguments analogous to those in Lemma 1.5.10, we can show that t⇤(l) <
t⇤(ˆ l). Furthermore an analogue of Proposition 1.5.11 shows that there must exist some
t > t⇤(l) such that
pl
t
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
= p
ˆ l
t if t  t⇤(l)
> p
ˆ l
t if t 2 (t⇤(l),t)
< p
ˆ l
t if t > t.
Then using Lemma A.8.1, the proof follows along the lines illustrated in the main text. This
proves Theorem 1.7.1.
3The full proof of the modiﬁcation is available upon request. Here we use a standard argument that shows
that whenever the impatient type weakly prefers to wait, then the patient type must strictly prefer to wait.
Similarly, if the patient type weakly prefers to adopt then the impatient type must strictly prefer to adopt.
162A.9 Cooperative Benchmark
A.9.1 Perfect Bad News
To prove the all-or-nothing property of the optimal policy, we write the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation. Note that there are two state variables, p and ¯ N.
rV(p, ¯ N)= max
0Nr ¯ N
(2p   1) N+DpV(p, ¯ N)p(1  p)(#+lN) D ¯ NV(p, ¯ N)N (1  p)(#+lN)V(p, ¯ N).
Since the right hand side is linear in N, it is optimal to always choose either N = 0 or
N = r ¯ N.
To see that the optimal policy must be a cutoff strategy, deﬁne
P(p, ¯ N) :=( 2p   1)+DpV(p, ¯ N)p(1  p)l   D ¯ NV(p, ¯ N)   l(1  p)V(p, ¯ N)
and note that whenever P(p, ¯ N) < 0, then
rV(p, ¯ N)=DpV(p, ¯ N)#p(1  p)   (1  p)#V(p, ¯ N) (A.6)
so that this corresponds to the case where setting N = 0 is optimal. It then sufﬁces to prove
that
P(p, ¯ N) < 0 ) P(p0, ¯ N) < 0 8p0 < p.
To prove this, note ﬁrst that for every p such that P(p, ¯ N) < 0, there must exist some p0 > p
such that P(p0, ¯ N)=0. (Otherwise V(p0, ¯ N)=0 for all p0 > p, which is clearly false.)
So it sufﬁces to prove that there cannot exist p < p such that P(p, ¯ N)=P(p)=0 and
P(p, ¯ N) < 0 for all p 2 (p, p). Suppose for a contradiction that such an interval (p, p) exists.
Then ordinary differential equation (A.6) implies:
V(p, ¯ N)=
✓
p
¯ p
◆ r+#
# ✓
1  p
1  ¯ p
◆  r
#
V( ¯ p, ¯ N)
163for all p 2 (p, p). Then we can rewrite the expression for P(p, ¯ N) for p 2 (p, p):
P(p, ¯ N)=( 2p   1)+
rl
#
V(p, ¯ N)   D ¯ NV(p, ¯ N)
=( 2p   1)+
rl
#
V(p, ¯ N)  
✓
p
¯ p
◆ r+#
# ✓
1  p
1  ¯ p
◆  r
#
D ¯ NV( ¯ p, ¯ N)
=( 2p   1)+
✓
p
¯ p
◆ r+#
# ✓
1  p
1  ¯ p
◆  r
# ✓
lr
#
V( ¯ p, ¯ N)   D ¯ NV( ¯ p, ¯ N)
◆
,
Note that if lr
# V( ¯ p, ¯ N)   D ¯ NV( ¯ p, ¯ N)   0, the last expression is increasing in p and so
P(p, ¯ N) < 0 which is a contradiction.
If instead lr
# V( ¯ p, ¯ N)   D ¯ NV( ¯ p, ¯ N) < 0, then the second term in the last expression is
concave. Furthermore, the derivative of the last expression with respect to p at p must be
weakly positive: If it were strictly negative, then because P(p, ¯ N)=0, there would exist
some p 2 (p, p) close to p such that P(p, ¯ N) > 0. But if the derivative of P(p, ¯ N) is weakly
positive at ¯ p, then by concavity it must be positive throughout (p, p). But this again yields
the contradiction that P(p, ¯ N) < 0. This completes the proof.
A.9.2 Perfect Good News
As in the perfect bad news case, we again write the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
rV(p, ¯ N)= max
0Nr ¯ N
(2p   1)N + p(# + lN)
✓
r
r + r
¯ N   V(p, ¯ N)
◆
  DpV(p, ¯ N)p(1  p)(# + lN)   D ¯ NV(p, ¯ N)N.
Again the right hand side is linear in N and thus the optimal policy always chooses either
N = 0 or N = r ¯ N.
The easiest way to check that an optimal policy exists in cutoff strategies is to simply
guess and check that the HJB equation is satisﬁed by such a strategy. This is straightforward
from the social planner policy constructed in Section 1.3.1.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Deﬁnitions of sG
i and sB
i
We recall the following deﬁnitions of ˜ sG
i , ˜ sB
i 2 ˜ S
r
i of HO2006.
First, deﬁne ˜ s
g
i as some strategy such that ˜ s
g
i [∆] 2 DG and
for all ˜ ht
i =
⇣
a,(a
M2,M1
i ,a
M2,M1
 i ),...,(a
M2,M1
i ,a
M2,M1
 i ))
⌘
,a 2 Mi ⇥ M i,t   1:
˜ s
g
i [ht
i]=a
M2,M1
i ;
and deﬁne deﬁne ˜ sb
i such that ˜ sb
i[∆] 2 DB and
for all ˜ ht
i =
⇣
a,(a
M2,M1
i ,a
M2,M1
 i ),...,(a
M2,M1
i ,a
M2,M1
 i )
⌘
,a 2 Mi ⇥ M i,t   1:
˜ sb
i[˜ ht
i]=a
M2,M1
i .
Moreover deﬁne ˜ sb
i[ht
i]=am
i for every history ˜ ht
i that is a continuation of a history
˜ hr
i =
⇣
a,
⇣
a
M2,M1
i ,a
M2,M1
 i
⌘
,...,
⇣
a
M2,M1
i ,a
M2,M1
 i
⌘
,(a
M2,M1
i ,a0
 i)
⌘
,
a 2 B⇥ M i,a0
 i 6= a
M2,M1
 i ,t   r   1,
where am
i is a possibly mixed minmax action against player  i. Then ˜ sG
i and ˜ sB
i are deﬁned
as small perturbations of ˜ s
g
i and ˜ sb
i to obtain a pair of strategies ˜ sG
i and ˜ sB
i in ˜ S
r
i . HO2006
showed that by chosing r sufﬁciently small, we may ensure that there exists some T such
165that
min
˜ Si
˜ UT
i (˜ si, ˜ sG
 i) > ¯ vi > vi > vi > max
˜ ST
i
˜ UT
i (˜ si, ˜ sB
 i)
for sufﬁciently patient players.
Given the above deﬁnitions, we can obtain strategies in repeated games with observation
lags and private monitoring structure p in a natural way by identifying with each ˜ ht
i 2 ˜ Ht
i the
unique element of ht
i 2 Ht
i such that ht
i and ˜ ht
i report exactly the same observations about
the play of player  i at all times and ht
i contains no observations with a positive lag. We
denote this identiﬁcation by ˜ ht
i ' ht
i.
Similarly we identify si 2 ST
i to a strategy ˜ si 2 ˜ ST
i in a natural way. We say that ˜ si ' si if
si[ht
i]=˜ si[˜ ht
i] for all ˜ ht
i 2 ˜ Ht
i and all ht
i 2 Ht
i such that ˜ ht
i ' ht
i. Then we simply deﬁne sG
i and
sB
i to be strategies such that ˜ sG
i ' sG
i and ˜ sB
i ' sB
i . It is easy to see that we can appropriately
deﬁne sG
i and sG
i at all histories ht
i 2 Ht
i that are not identiﬁed with some ˜ ht
i 2 ˜ Ht
i to obtain a
pair of strategies sG
i ,sB
i 2S
r
i . Moreover when the probability of observation lag is small and
p is very close to perfect monitoring, it is clear that UT
i (si,s i) is close to ˜ UT
i (˜ si, ˜ s i) where
˜ si ' si and ˜ s i ' s i. Thus we have for sufﬁciently patient players and r sufﬁciently small,
min
Si
UT
i (si,sG
 i) > ¯ vi > vi > vi > max
ST
i
UT
i (si,sB
 i).
B.2 Details of the Proof of Theorem 2.4.3
B.2.1 Proof of Lemma 2.4.4
Proof of Lemma 2.4.4: We wish to specify transfers xB
i : HT
 i ! R  in such a way that players
are indifferent between all possible strategies in the T-period repeated game given auxiliary
transfers xB
i . To do this, we deﬁne equivalence classes over T-period histories in the following
way:
(hT 1
 i ,a
t1
i ,a
t2
i ,...,a
tm
i ,aT
i ,aT
 i) ⇠ (ˆ hT 1
 i , ˆ a
t1
i , ˆ a
t2
i ,...,ˆ a
tm
i , ˆ aT
i , ˆ aT
 i)
if and only if hT 1
 i = ˆ hT 1
 i and aT
i = ˆ aT
i . Here, if player  i does not obtain information about
the play of player i in time T, then aT
i is taken to be • (representing a null signal). Also
166notationally, a
t1
i ,...,a
tm
i are the elements of h
T,o
i that are not equal to aT
i . We may represent
this equivalence class of T period histories in the form (hT 1
 i ,aT
i ); note that this indicates
that neither
1. the action played by player  i in period T, nor
2. new information gained about past actions
matter for the determination of the equivalence class.
We deﬁne equivalence classes over t-period histories similarly, and represent such an
equivalence class by (ht 1
 i ,at
i). We now deﬁne a transfer function xB
i as in HO2006 for some
functions qt deﬁned over equivalence classes of t-period histories:
xB
i (hT
 i)=
1
dT
T
Â
t=1
dt 1qt(ht 1
 i ,at
i).
Here, ht 1
 i is the t-period truncation of hT
 i and at
i is the signal that player  i observed of
player i’s period-t action in period t. That is, at
i = • if player  i does not observe i’s play
immediately and is otherwise equal to the actual period-t action of player i.1
Given any hT 1
 i , consider the matrix
✓
µ i(·|ai, ¯ sB
 i(hT 1
 i ))
◆
ai2Ai
.
Note that the matrix above has full row rank when l i(0) is sufﬁciently close to 1 and p
is sufﬁciently close to perfect monitoring. Therefore the sub-matrix obtained by deleting
the column corresponding to the “•” signal is invertible.2 We then set qt(hT 1
 i ,•)=0 and
solve the system of equations deﬁned by
µ i(·|ai, ¯ sB
 i(hT 1
 i ))· qT(hT 1
 i ,·)=gi(a⇤
i , ¯ sB
 i(hT 1
 i ))  gi(ai, ¯ sB
 i(hT 1
 i )), (B.1)
1According to this deﬁnition, if for example the play of player 1’s period-1 action is not observed immediately
(i.e. in period 1) by player 2, then the observation of player 1’s period-1 action in a later period only has an
effect on xB
i through its effect on player  i’s play.
2In fact, this sub-matrix approaches the identity matrix as l(0) ! 1 and p approaches perfect monitoring.
167where a⇤
i is the stage game best response to ¯ sB
 i(hT 1
 i ). Our preceding observations show
that system (B.1) has a unique solution when l i(0) is sufﬁciently large and p is sufﬁciently
close to perfect monitoring.
Then in period T   1, player i is indifferent between all of his actions given that player
 i plays according to the strategy prescribed by ¯ sB
 i at history hT 1
 i and transfers given by
qT(hT 1
 i ,·), as playing any action ai generates a payoff of
(1  d)dT 1gi(ai, ¯ sB
 i(hT 1
 i ))+(1  d)dT 1 Â
wi2Ai[{•}
µ i(wi | ai, ¯ sB
 i)qT(hT 1
 i ,wi)
=(1  d)dT 1gi(a⇤
i , ¯ sB
 i(hT 1
 i )).
Suppose that all transfers qt for t   t have been deﬁned so that player i is indifferent
across all of his strategies from period t+1 on. Then deﬁne Ut+1(ht 1
 i ,ai) to be the expected
continuation payoff given the transfers at period t + 1, given that player  i’s history in
period t   1 is ht 1
 i and player i played ai in period t.
We now deﬁne qt 1 in a similar manner. Again we consider any hT
 i 2 HT
 i and consider
the following expression:
1
dT
T
Â
s=t
ds 1qs(hs 1
 i ,as
i).
Again deﬁne qt 1(ht 1
 i ,•)=0 and consider the matrix
✓
µ i(·|ai, ¯ sB
 i(ht 1
 i ))
◆
ai2Ai
.
Let us denote the sub-matrix obtained by deleting the column corresponding to the null
signal “•”b yD(ht 1
 i ). This is again invertible when l i(0) is sufﬁciently close to 1 and p
is sufﬁciently close to perfect monitoring. Now consider the system of equations
(1  d)dt 1
⇣
µ i(·|ai, ¯ sB
 i(ht 1
 i ))· qt(ht 1
 i ,·)+gi(ai, ¯ sB
 i(ht 1
 i )))
⌘
+( 1  d)Ut+1(ht 1
 i ,ai)
=( 1  d)Ut+1(ht 1
 i ,a⇤
i (ht 1
 i ))+(1  d)dt 1gi(a⇤
i (ht 1
 i ), ¯ sB
 i(ht 1
 i )) (B.2)
where a⇤
i (ht 1
 i ) is the term that maximizes the expression on the right hand side of the
equation above.
168Because the matrix D(ht 1
 i ) is invertible, the system (B.2) has a unique solution when we
set qt(ht 1
 i ,•)=0. Iterating in this manner allows us to obtain the ﬁrst part of the lemma.
To achieve non-negativity of transfers, we observe that as the square matrices D(ht 1
 i )
converge to the identity matrix, the solutions qt(ht 1
 i ,ai) must be non-negative in the limit.
Thus we can make all transfers qt(ht 1
 i ,ai) non-negative by adding to all of them a positive
constant that converges to zero as l i(0) and p jointly converge to 1 and perfect monitoring
respectively.
Finally we deﬁne a strategy rB
i 2 ST
i in the following way. Let rB
i (ht 1
i ) be the action
a⇤
i (ht 1
 i ) as deﬁned above for all histories hT 1
 i that do not contain any null signals, where
ht 1
i is the history that corresponds to ht 1
 i . Deﬁne rB
i (ht 1
i ) arbitrarily for all other histories.
Then note that as monitoring becomes perfect, the expected value of xB
i goes to zero if players
play according to rB
i and ¯ sB
 i. By the deﬁnition of rB
i , the payoff in the T-times-repeated
game without any transfers then approaches maxsi2ST
i UT
i (si, ¯ sB
 i); this implies that
lim
#!0
UA
i (si, ¯ sB
 i,xB
i )=max
˜ si
UT
i (˜ si, ¯ sB
 i)
for all si 2 ST
i .
B.2.2 Proof of Lemma 2.4.5
Proof. Let # > 0 be such that p is #-perfect and Pr(L i > 0) < #. For every n > 0, observe
that there exists #/r small enough such that, for any history ht 1
i 2 H
R,t 1
i and conditional
on observing ht 1
i , player i assigns probability at least 1   n to the event that player  i
observed the corresponding history ht 1
 i . Consider for some ht 1
i 2 H
R,t 1
i and any action
ai 2 Ai, the row vector consisting of the probabilities assigned by player i, conditional on
history ht 1
i and on action ai taken by player i in period t, to the different equivalence classes
of histories (ht 1
 i ,ai) observed by player  i in period t. As in HO2006, we construct a matrix
Dt 1 by stacking the row vectors for all regular histories ht 1
i 2 H
R,t 1
i and actions ai 2 Ai.
Note that for small enough #/r, the matrix Dt 1 has full row rank for every t.
With this we can deﬁne q(·,·) by setting q(ht 1
 i ,•)=0 for any ht 1
 i 2 Ht 1
 i . This is
169possible since the number of rows is exactly the same as in HO2006 and the number of
columns corresponding to (ht 1
 i ,ai) for some ai 6= • is also the same as in HO2006. This
proves the lemma.
B.3 Conditions Guaranteeing Small gi
When the measures L1,...,Ln are independent and identically distributed, we have
l(•,...,•)
li(•)
=
l1(•)···ln(•)
li(•)
. (B.3)
Clearly when l1(•)=···= ln(•) and l1(•) small, (B.3) is close to 0. Even if L1,..., Ln
are not identically distributed but are independent, we again have (B.3) small if
(maxi li(•))n
mini li(•)
is sufﬁciently small, i.e. when no player i’s probability of never observing a signal is much
smaller than some other player’s probability of never observing a signal.
Consider lags for which Li is split into two components, X and Ai: Li = X + Ai. Note
that X is common across all players. We assume that Ai is independent and identically
distributed across players, and that Ai is independent of X. Let x be the density of X and c
denote the density of Ai.
Then gi is small if
(1  x(•))(c(•))n + x(•)
x(•)+( 1  x(•))(c(•))
(B.4)
is small—which is true if x(•) is much smaller than c(•). For example, suppose that
x(•)=0 but c(•) > 0. Then if c(•) is small, (B.4) is small.3
3By contrast, consider the case in which c(•)=x(•)=# > 0. Then (B.4) equals
(1  #)#n + #
# +( 1  #)#
,
which converges to 1/2 as # ! 0—so gi cannot be taken to be small even when # is small.
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C.1 Proof of Existence
Proof. First note that due to absolute continuity of µr, there exists f 2 L1([0,1]) that
represents the density of µr. This proof follows via Kakutani’s ﬁxed point generalized to
locally convex topological vector spaces. The trick is to construct the appropriate topologies
on the spaces S1 and S2 to make compactness and continuity as easy to prove as possible.
This is done in the following manner. Note that we deﬁne St
2 as the set of t-period maps
st
2 : Ht ! D(A1). St
2 is compact with respect to the following norm:
kst
2k = sup
ht2Ht
|st
2(ht)|.
By Tychonoff’s theorem, S2 = ’t 0 St
2 is compact in the product topology denoted T .
Moreoever it is easy to see that (S2,T ) is indeed metrizable with the following metric:1
d(s2,a2)=
•
Â
t=0
2 t kst
2   at
2k
1+ kst
2   at
2k
.
In summary we have shown that (S2,T ) is a compact, convex, metric space.
As we stated in Section 3.2, S1 can be identiﬁed with a subset of all measurable maps
1For a proof, see any functional analysis textbook containing a section on locally convex topological vector
spaces.
171from [0,1] !{ 0,1}m 1. Then deﬁne the following subset of L•([0,1]):
G = {f 2 L•([0,1]) : |f(x)|1 8x 2 [0,1]}.
Note that G is indeed compact in the weak-star topology endowed on L•([0,1]) by the
Banach-Alaoglu theorem. Furthermore G is metrizable in the weak-star topology. Then
Gm 1 ✓ L•([0,1])m 1 is compact and metrizable in the product topology (generated by the
weak-star topologies on each coordinate). Call this topology S. Notice that S1 is a closed
subset of Gm 1 and thus (S1,S) is a compact metric space.
With the above observations, we need to check the continuity of the appropriate utility
functions with respect to the appropriate topologies. We consider the following two utility
functions:
V1(s1,s2)=
1 Z
0
Es1(d)u1(s1(d),s2)f(d)dd
= Â
a12A1
Ea1u1(a1,s2)
1 Z
0
s1(d)[a1]f(d)dd.
V2(s1,s2)=
•
Â
t=0
lt Â
ht2Ht
Es1 [u2(a1,s2(ht)) | ht]
|Ht|
where l 2 (0,1). Note that for any two s1,s0
1 2 S1, if
1 Z
0
s1(d)[a1]f(d)dd =
1 Z
0
s0
1(d)[a1]f(d)dd
for all a1 2 A1, then V2(s1,s2)=V2(s0
1,s2) for all s2 2 S2. Thus the distribution over A1
induced by s1 is a sufﬁcient statistic for the computation of V2(·,s2). Therefore we write
V2(µ,s2) for V2(s1,s2) where µ is the distribution over A1 induced by s1.
It is easy to check the continuity of V1 in (s1,s2). Because S1 ⇥ S2 is a metric space, it is
sufﬁcient to consider sequential continuity. Thus suppose that (sn
1,sn
2) ! (s1,s2). By the
deﬁnition of the deﬁnition of the weak-star topology on L•([0,1]), since f 2 L1([0,1]),
1 Z
0
sn
1(d)[a1]f(d)dd !
1 Z
0
s1(d)[a1]f(d)dd
172for all a1 2 A1. Clearly Ea1u1(a1,sn
2) ! Ea1u1(a1,s2) for all a1 2 A1. Thus V1 is indeed
continuous.
Now let us check that V2 is indeed continuous. Suppose again that (sn
1,sn
2) ! (s1,s2).
Let µn to be the distribution over A1 induced by sn
1 and similarly let µ to be the distribution
over A1 induced by s1. By the deﬁnition of the weak-star topology, µn ! µ. With this it is
easy to see that
V2(µn,sn
2) ! V2(µ,s2).
Then we can use Glicksberg’s existence theorem for continuous games to show that the
game with strategy spaces S1,S2 and payoff functions V1 and V2 has a Nash equilibrium
in mixed strategies.2 In other words, there exists (s1,s2) 2 S1 ⇥ D(S2) that is a Nash
equilibrium of the above game. But because S2 is already convex and V2 is already linear in
s2, every element of D(S2) can be uniquely identiﬁed with an element of S2. Thus there
exists (s1,s2) 2 S1 ⇥ S2 that is a Nash equilibrium.
Upon careful inspection of V2, this then implies that s2 maximizes expected payoff at all
histories (under the stage game payoffs). Therefore we have indeed shown that (s1,s2) is a
Nash equilibrium of the original game.
2See for example Reny (2008).
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